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THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN PERSONALISM



I

THEISM has an obvious significance for any philosophical system which claims to uphold the intrinsic value of finite persons. Historically, the Christian teaching on the inestimable value of the human person has been closely linked with the theistic conception of God, through the doctrine of man's final end. Personal immortality, and the existence of a personal, Infinite God have been the foci around which Christian thought on this matter has revolved. The notion of God as creative and provident, with the consequent concept of man's personal destiny, was decisive in the formulation of a Christian Personalism. A decisive advance was thereby accomplished on the Greek conception of man and the universe. The necessitarianism of Greek metaphysics, and the lack of a doctrine of creation, prevented the Greeks from ever formulating a comprehensive philosophical explanation of

the world and man, and rendered impossible the task of building up a religious world-view which could be validated by philosophic principles. "When Greek philosophy came to an end," says Gilson, "what was sorely needed for progress in natural theology was progress in metaphysics."¹ And, as Gilson remarks, when such progress was made by the fourth century, A. D., it was made wholly and decisively under the influence of the Christian religion.

It is but natural, therefore, that the many systems recently competing for favor under the rather elastic title of "Personalism" have, for the greater part, a strongly theistic flavor. Such systems unanimously find in the person the ultimate unit of reality and agree on giving a primary place to the doctrine of personality. But the lesson of history is that any attempt to found the value of the human person independently of any relation to a transcendent, personal God is doomed to failure. No true Personalist can, then, afford to neglect the claims of Theism and natural theology to a place in his system. Hence the strongly theistic flavor of most forms of Personalism, indicating that they are in this matter, though often unconsciously, the heirs of the Christian tradition. One can scarcely fail to notice the insistence with which the problem of God returns in the successive issues of *The Personalist*.² This theistic bias has been strengthened through the strong influence that has been exercised, historically, on Personalism by the current of thought known as "Personal Idealism."³ The group of British philosophers who were protagonists of this doctrine represent a vigorous reaction, within idealism, against the Absolutism and monism of German Hegelianism. Combating the pantheistic

¹ E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, p. 37.

² Published by the University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

³ R. Metz regards this school as a part of the Neo-Idealist movement (Cf. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, pp. 380-398). Among the typical representatives of the school he lists A. S. Pringle-Pattison, J. Seth, W. R. Sorley, and H. Rashdall. While their general positions present many similarities, there is no rigid, systematic unity; their writings represent a general attempt often not very original, to strike a compromise between Absolutism and extreme pluralism. Cf. *infra* for an evaluation of their attempt.

tendency of Hegel, they defended the personal character of God, and the individual value of the human person. Hegelian panlogism had rendered impossible even a modified pluralism, by its merging of human and divine consciousness in an unique, universal Self. The personal idealists strove to establish the value of finite personality, by restoring it to the epistemological setting in which it had been envisaged by Kant.⁴

Such attempts served as a wholesome reaction against the Hegelian Absolutism and the Neo-Hegelianism of Bradley, Bosanquet and Green. Still, the general positions reached were often unsatisfactory from the theistic standpoint.⁵ And, in so far as they purported to safeguard finite personality, their doctrines were frequently, from the metaphysical viewpoint, not above criticism. The epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the system were often, in their tentative character, but tenuous supports for their superstructures.

Still, the theistic interests of the personal idealists and their vindication of the value of finite personality were not without influence. In Personalism, we find the same emphasis on the concept of a personal God, the same opposition to all forms of Absolutism, the strenuous defense of the individual value of the human person. Here, too, we find the desire to give philosophical validity to such tenets by aligning them with a set of general epistemological and metaphysical principles. In a system which accords primacy to a doctrine of personality, it is but natural that metaphysical preoccupations assume a rank of first importance. For it is not possible to formulate a satisfactory doctrine of personality, save by enclosing it within the framework of a more general metaphysical system and by subordinating it to the general principles of reality. As a consequence, the typical forms of Personalism have a strongly metaphysical flavor. Their authors are not uninterested in a theory

⁴The tendency to envisage the problem of personality in an epistemological rather than in a metaphysical setting is a heritage of Kant's critical philosophy, whose influence is discernible in all recent forms of idealism.

⁵Cf. *infra* for a brief evaluation of their contributions.

of knowledge;⁶ but epistemological considerations, while systematically necessary, are, for them, propaedeutic, supplying an indispensable introduction to metaphysics, by providing a groundwork for a theory of reality.⁷ Any consistent system of Personalism must, from the very nature of its avowed interests, be an essentially metaphysical one.

The character of the metaphysical system within which such a doctrine of personality is formulated will obviously depend to a large extent on a general conception of the principles of a theory of reality. How is the metaphysical system to be conceived? What is its alignment with any particular theory of knowledge? And, granting its necessary connection with some preliminary epistemological doctrines, will this inevitably determine its character as idealistic or realistic? Unfortunately, Personalism is not as yet a unified system, either in its epistemology or in its theory of reality. In particular, Personalists have not as yet subscribed unanimously to a common set of metaphysical principles; and, as a consequence, even their views on the nature of personality show important divergences. Still, there is discernible a growing measure of agreement on certain fundamental principles. The origin of this agreement may often be traced to a common allegiance to definite philosophical traditions; Kant and the English idealists are the mentors who shape the general lines of the philosophy of Personalism.

Closely linked with the metaphysical doctrines, we find in most forms of Personalism a doctrine of Theism. The theistic interest is very evident in the doctrine of Personal Idealism, and in the thought of all those Americans who have announced themselves as Personalists. This primacy of Theism in a personalist world-view is a recurring theme in the writings of such men as Howison, Rashdall, Bowne, Knudson, Flewelling, Brightman; and, generally, in the philosophical literature emanating from the University of Southern California (Los

⁶ Cf. my previous article, "Personalism, Thomism, and Epistemology," *The Thomist*, Vol. VIII, 1 (1945), pp. 1-26.

⁷ On the place of Epistemology in systematic Personalism, cf. Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, pp. 88-89.

Angeles). Typical Personalism is often characterized by them as "theistic";⁸ and, indeed, the ultimate criterion by which they reject certain aberrant forms of Personalism as "non-typical" is found in a failure to safeguard the primary tenets of traditional theism.⁹ The true Personalist accepts the concept of a personal God and seeks in Him the final explanation of the world. Broadly, this is in harmony with the traditional theistic world-view. The question, however, of the philosophical validity of such tenets entails an examination of the metaphysical basis on which it is founded. Natural theology is not an autonomous science, in the sense that it finds its principles, presuppositions and method in its own domain, independently of any other philosophical discipline. It is essentially a part of metaphysics; representing, in fact, the crowning point of the metaphysical investigation. Without the answer to the main problems raised by natural theology, the metaphysical search for the conditions of the intelligibility of being remains essentially incomplete.

Natural theology raises two problems: Does God exist? What is His nature? Fundamentally, these are closely connected—they are in fact but two aspects of the same problem. For it is not possible to prove God's existence without *eo ipso* proving something about His nature. Properly conceived, too, both problems are essentially unified in their use of a common method: as envisaged in the traditional doctrine of Thomism, the sole method of natural theology is the *via analogiae* with its triple way of causality, negation and eminence.¹⁰ Essentially present in both parts of natural theology, this analogical method is the ultimate answer to the difficulties of agnostics, symbolists and anthropomorphists concerning the nature and extent of our knowledge of God.¹¹ Unfortunately, many modern

⁸ Knudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22, 61-67.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-61.

¹⁰ Cf. A. D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, pp. 79-90. Also J. Horgan, "Our Knowledge of God," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, Vol. LVIII (1941), pp. 137-157, 229-252.

¹¹ Cf. J. Horgan, *op. cit.*

attempts to "restate" traditional theism in terms of contemporary thought are founded on a complete neglect of the "*via analogiae*" and of "*analogia entis*."¹² As a consequence, their theistic doctrines often leave the demonstrability of God in an extremely precarious position; while the question of our knowledge of God's nature is handled in a fashion that savors of agnosticism, or, at the other extreme, of pure anthropomorphism.

While admitting, then, the genuineness of the Personalist interest in natural theology, one must submit to a careful scrutiny the exact philosophical positions on which its tenets are founded. The typical theistic doctrine of a Personal God, in whom the ultimate explanation of all things is to be sought is accepted without reserve. It is unquestionable that the typical representatives of Personalism are deeply convinced, even philosophically, of the importance and necessity of such a doctrine.¹³ Neither can one dispute the genuine concern with which they view the disastrous consequences of a rejection of this traditional certitude. Philosophically, however, the crucial question is the evaluation of the precise premises on which the tenets of Theism are to be founded. In the intellectual atmosphere of our times, where God is frequently rejected in the name of reason and philosophy, the problem of the proper philosophical orientation to be assigned to a defence of Theism becomes of paramount importance.

II

For the Thomist, the rational demonstration of God's existence and the deduction of His attributes are problems that pertain strictly to metaphysics. It is in this domain that we must

¹² Many of the difficulties inherent in Personalist Theism will be seen to be largely due to a neglect of the analogical method and of the doctrine of *analogia entis*.

¹³ Cf. the important place assigned to Theism in their published works, by the earliest American adherents of Personalism. For evidence of the continuation of the theistic interest among their disciples, cf. *The Personalist*, Vol. IX, 3 (1928) ("A Symposium on the Concept of God"), and current issues of the same journal.

seek the principles on which our reasoning in both parts of natural theology are based.¹⁴ The method of metaphysical inference which underlies the demonstration both of God's existence and of His attributes exemplifies the ontological character of the whole discussion in theodicy. The traditional Scholastic setting for a rational defence of Theism has, then, been in the strictly metaphysical domain; and it is as the crowning point of metaphysics that one must evaluate the attempt made by St. Thomas in the *quinque viae* to demonstrate, as a fact, God's existence, and something of the mode of that existence.¹⁵ It is, then, in the metaphysical domain that the validity of a rational demonstration of God must be tested. For the Thomist, all other methods of approach must ever remain secondary to the strictly metaphysical argument: they serve merely the role of "psychological preparations" which dispose the mind for the true demonstration.¹⁶ Thus, the appeal to religious experience, which might have a considerable appeal for many Personalists,¹⁷ receives but scant notice in any theodicy of genuinely Thomistic inspiration.¹⁸

Personalists are in agreement that, in a systematic philosophy, primacy must be accorded to metaphysics. Indeed, as already pointed out, the philosophies of Personalism have a strongly metaphysical flavor. The theory of knowledge which stands at the head of such philosophies is viewed as the indispensable prolegomenon to a theory of reality. Its essential role is to dispose of the challenge of the sceptic, and of all who question the essential trustworthiness of reason or sense.¹⁹

¹⁴ On the necessary connection of the problem of God with the general metaphysical investigation, see L. de Raeymaeker, *Philosophie de l'Etre*, pp. 288-305, 320-322. Also F. van Steenberghen, *Ontologie*, pp. 110-121, 128-129.

¹⁵ For the metaphysical orientation of Thomistic theodicy, see Hilary Carpenter, O.P., "The Philosophical Approach to God in Thomism," in *The Thomist*, Vol. I, 1 (1939), pp. 45-61.

¹⁶ Cf. F. van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁷ Cf. Bishop E. L. Parsons, "The God of Religious Experience," *The Personalist*, Vol. IX, 3 (1928), pp. 170-184.

¹⁸ For an objective evaluation of the difficulties inherent in the argument from mystical experience, cf. E. L. Mascall, *He Who Is*, pp. 14-22.

¹⁹ Cf. A. C. Knudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

Besides, a study of the conditions and limitations of human knowledge furnishes valuable data for the metaphysical enquiry.

An important consequence of the position adopted by Personalists in their epistemology is the possibility of a valid rational theory of reality. The rejection of the Kantian limitation of our knowledge to the purely phenomenal world entails the acceptance of such a possibility. If the categories of substance and causality are regarded as empty, subjective, *a priori* forms (Kant), or as the result of the mind's tendency to feign (Hume), the impossibility of a knowledge of things-in-themselves follows as a logical consequence. With this conclusion goes the rejection of the possibility of any valid metaphysics.

The Kantian and Humean forms of agnosticism are rejected by Personalists as being based on a false conception of metaphysical reality;²⁰ but they are replaced by a form of idealism. Realism, which endows the external world with an extramental reality, is rejected in the Personalist epistemology. In virtue of its theory of knowledge, Personalism is committed to the rejection of any doctrine which regards reality as a self-existing entity, independent of consciousness, and constituting a norm to which our knowledge must conform, if it is to be true. The conception of reality as an objective, substantial "form of existence" is characterized as a "crude" form of realism.

Realism, to become acceptable to Personalists, must be re-interpreted. In consequence of their epistemological tenets, they cannot accept a concept of reality as consisting of various substances, active or passive, endowed with the characteristic of permanence in time. Metaphysical reality must be re-conceived in consonance with the tenets of idealism. Since, on such principles, the structure of reality is built up within mind itself, then the very existence of an extramental world remains a mere assumption, conditioned by the self that makes it.²¹ The world that I conceive is, in the words of Bowne, the world that I construct. With Kant, he regards the external world as phe-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²¹ Cf. my article already cited, p. 16 ff.

nomenal. Still, in the reality of our conscious selves, Personalists find an anchor for metaphysical reality. "True, metaphysical reality," Knudson asserts,²² consists "in the unifying and self-identifying activity of consciousness." Hence, the norm for metaphysical reality is to be found in self as revealed in consciousness.

It is difficult to assign a positive philosophical status to this re-interpreted concept of metaphysical reality. Clearly, however, it implies a denial of the ontological reality of substance as conceived in the Scholastic tradition. In itself, the doctrine is a logical implication of Personalistic epistemology; and, in particular, of the idealistic tenet of "creative" thought. For although there is a "given" element in knowledge, reality is constituted, "created" by consciousness.

It is very clear from the tenor of discussions on this point that the polemic is directed not against a correctly understood Scholastic position, but rather against metaphysics as falsified and distorted by Kant's critical philosophy.²³ When, for instance, we are told that it is futile and contradictory to seek "an unknown thing-in-itself," a something "lurking behind the mask of phenomena," or when we have "permanence" assigned as the essential note of substance, it is not difficult to discover the source from which the terms of the discussion have been borrowed. As against the Kantian perversion of metaphysics, the criticisms are quite valid.

A certain form of metaphysics is, however, admitted as valid, its function being to give a rational interpretation of our experience. This Personalist metaphysics is, withal, severely circumscribed in scope by the fundamental underlying epistemological idealism. Its character is further determined by the doctrines of voluntarism and fideism. The anti-intellectualism which characterizes most forms of Personalism is to be traced to an acceptance of the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. The significance of this doctrine lies, for theistic Personalism,

²² Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

²³ Cf. the general tenor of metaphysical discussions in *The Personalist* and the illuminating remarks of Knudson in his *Philosophy of Personalism*, pp. 168-172.

in its implications for religious faith. Such faith is concerned primarily with the ethical attributes of God. It apprehends God in so far as He is pure Goodness and pure Love. The critical question arises for the Personalist: Has this faith any rational justification? A basis for such a justification can, it is asserted, be found in cognitional aspects of our affective and volitional experiences. Knowledge is not to be confined to sense-perceptions and rational deductions from them—this was the “epistemological error” of the “old intellectualism.” The validity of religious faith demands, above all, the objectivity of values not apprehended through the senses or by pure reason. Not in purely intellectual processes, but in “that practical and vital experience” that underlies such processes, is to be sought the deepest truth about reality.²⁴

With Kant, Personalists end by elevating faith above reason: in matters suprasensible and metaphysical, primacy belongs to faith, in which assent is a necessary presupposition, ultimately due to will. With Kant, too, they have found it necessary to “abolish knowledge, to make room for belief.”²⁵ The sole amendment to the Kantian conclusion is the Personalist concession that a chasm must not be placed between knowledge and belief. Knowledge is, consequently, not limited to the phenomenal world, nor is faith to be confined solely to the practical reason. The theoretical reason cannot be divorced from the domain of values—it tends to pass beyond phenomena. In such an analogical factor as that of purpose, it points beyond knowledge, to the plane of practical reason, to the realm of ends and values, in which alone a complete world-view is found.

While there are important modifications here, they leave the fundamental voluntarism of the doctrine untouched. All knowledge is firmly grounded on faith. In fact, this voluntarism is ultimately more radical than the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. Kantianism leaves knowledge supreme in the phenomenal world; but for Personalists, knowledge has

²⁴ Cf. Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface.

no longer a monopoly even in the domain of reason. At the inception of all knowledge there lies the twofold act of faith: that the world is intelligible and that I can understand it. And throughout the course of its development, human knowledge has always intermingled with its elements of belief. Faith obtains everywhere: we find it at the inception of knowledge and at its completion.

In this radical voluntarism, all knowledge is ultimately founded on a faith which can receive no ulterior justification. Intellect is thus entirely subordinated to will, and is regarded as incapable of attaining logical certitude. "All hope of deduction and logical demonstration must be given up. . . . The mind is not driven by any compulsion of objective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity of self-realization and self-preservation. . . . In most practical matters a purely logical contemplation would leave us in uncertainty, and the will to believe, because of the necessity of doing something, comes in to overturn the equilibrium and precipitate a conclusion."²⁶

This radical voluntarism and fideism colors the whole Personalist system; and, indeed, its metaphysics is interesting as providing an example of a modern variety of non-rational philosophy. The anti-intellectualist prejudice proceeds on the assumption that Kant's critique has forever disposed of traditional metaphysics; this assumption has given rise to numerous fideistic and fundamentally anti-metaphysical doctrines. The higher metaphysical truths, the deepest truths of reality, are no longer regarded as the fruit of a rational demonstration; they are attained as the object of a special "faith" which is either appetitive or perceptive in character.

The root-error of Personalism in this matter lies in its radical subordination of intellect to will. Thomism has always admitted a close interaction between these two faculties, and has not been guilty of the error of conceiving them as in radical independence and even in opposition. It has carefully avoided the "hypostatization" of potencies which was the

²⁶ B. P. Bowne, *Theism*, pp. 27, 34.

flair of the eighteenth-century "faculty" psychologies. Against the Thomistic doctrine, then, criticisms such as those levelled by Professor Stout against the very conception of faculties, have no force.²⁷ If the essential unity of mind is safeguarded, there is little danger of misunderstanding the real nature of mental faculties. The latter are not set up as rigid or compartmentalized mental powers, existing independently side by side. We must remember that all such faculties are rooted in the one, unitary soul. Intellect and will, consequently, though distinct by their objects and activities, are yet intimately related; they act and react upon each other in the closest fashion. Strictly speaking, intellect does not know, nor will will, but the whole man knows through his intellect and wills through his will. Their respective acts mutually include each other. "The intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand."²⁸ Without intellect, there would be no will; without will, intellect, in turn, would be static. Intellect is, then, the root and principle of will: *ignoti nulla cupido*. On the other hand, the influence of will upon intellect is not without significance. Will provides the intellect with direction and energy: it chooses its object of investigation, enlivens its attention, gives it perseverance to overcome obstacles, enabling it to marshal all its forces for the task in hand. Such a directive function of will becomes of great importance when we consider the frailty of the human intellect and the difficulties of its object.

In the Personalist view, belief is essentially irrational—an exaggerated statement of the role of will in belief. For although will rules intellect, yet we cannot believe as we please. Will has certainly the power to direct intellect along certain paths, may withhold it from examining certain evidence, and thus warp and influence its assents. But, in the presence of intrinsic evidence which is sufficiently clear, assent is natural and necessary. Only the intellect can see and in knowledge it is governed

²⁷ *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 113-127.

²⁸ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1.

by what it sees. In knowledge properly so-called, will cannot make or unmake truth; it can affect the thinking subject but not the intelligible object.

Obviously, Personalists have perverted the traditional notion of the act of faith. For faith is, properly, not an act of volition (as Personalism holds), but an act of intellect. The assent which is given in faith is intellectual, even though it is an imperfect act. The act of faith is justified in its initial stages by intellect, and it remains an intellectual act, though commanded by will. Voluntarism errs, then, in making intellect the slave of will, and in regarding belief as a blind act of volition, unjustified by intellect. Belief cannot be described as strictly "rational," because it has not the necessary rational basis—perception of the evidence of a necessary relation. Still, the act of belief is reasonable: intellect feels justified in giving an unqualified assent.

Its epistemological foundations commit Personalism to a different doctrine. Voluntarism cannot accept the traditional doctrine of faith. As a matter of fact, "faith" as envisaged by Personalists is something radically different from its Scholastic counterpart. Personalism, in keeping with the general anti-intellectual bias of modern philosophy, relegates faith to the realm of sentiment, affectivity, feeling. The whole field of knowledge is thus given a non-rational foundation. This fundamental orientation is seen to affect both the general metaphysical positions of Personalism and its special doctrine of our knowledge and conception of God.

III

What general positions characterize Personalism as a metaphysical system? A fundamental tenet of typical Personalism is what has been described as "the principle of the individuality of the real."²⁹ It has been thus enunciated: whatever has metaphysical existence is individual and concrete. The abstract and universal exist only as ideas; as such, they may have

²⁹ H. W. Carr, "The God of Philosophy," *The Personalist*, Vol. IX (1928), p. 158.

epistemological necessity, but they are not to be conceived as things-in-themselves.³⁰

As thus stated in general terms, the doctrine would seem to be but a restatement of the realistic tenet of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. But in its Personalist interpretation, it is seen to imply a background of modern philosophy. It is asserted, for instance, that the ancients, due to their objective epistemology, were generally inclined to metaphysical universalism and exaggerated realism. Plato hypostatized the universals, attributing to them an ontological existence in a world of reality of their own. While Aristotle corrected this tendency, by insisting that all existence is concrete and individual, he did not wholly free himself from Platonic universalism. For him, the "forms" or ideas are immanent in particular things, and cannot exist apart from them. The universals are real and objective, and are not simply our notions of things. They exist in the individuals included under them and are not to be identified with these substances themselves. In Aristotelian metaphysics, then, the individual is a composite and lacks complete inner unity. Species or substance constitutes the essence of the individual, and the individual substance, in turn, constitutes the perceptible phenomena. It is alleged that this "ontological modification of Platonic realism" remains fundamentally infected with Platonism. It is not completely freed from universalism and the superiority of the species.³¹ This tendency to ultra-realism persisted, it is asserted, in the Scholastic interpretations of Aristotle. The Schoolmen, for instance, never sufficiently safeguarded the individuality of the human soul.³²

Such strictures on the Aristotelian basis of individuality must be taken with reserve. It may be granted that Aristotle did not completely harmonize the Platonic unity and eternity of essences with their real multiplication in many individual sub-

³⁰ Cf. B. P. Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, pp. 244-245. Also A. C. Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 171.

³¹ Knudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

jects.³³ Nor does he consistently distinguish metaphysical essences from physical substantial forms, using the terms *εἶδος* and *μορφή* to designate now the one, now the other.

Still, in his view, all real existence is concrete, individual: in the real order, only the individual exists. The opposition of matter and form, while it may entail an element of unintelligibility in the individual, does not really oppose its unity. The universal, as a universal, exists only in the apprehending mind. The polemic which Aristotle directs against the Platonic forms—against the substantialization of universals—is, as is well known, one of the leitmotifs of his *Metaphysics*. In it he returns to the theme again and again. The universals, he insists against Plato, are not self-subsistent, substantial entities. In particular, the widest universals, being and unity, are not substances. The world which is given to us is a world of concrete, individual things, acting and reacting upon one another. The genesis of the universal notion is to be accounted for by the abstractive function of intelligence, which seizes upon the characters common to many individuals and expresses them in the concept. While these characteristics are fundamentally real, and are not simply the print of the mind's activities, we must not be misled by their abstract and universal character, as expressed in the concept. Such characteristics do not apply to them, as they are realized in concrete individuals.³⁴

Aristotle certainly did not explain the real world of change through the mere operations of universals. It would be very strange if such an acute critic of Platonism were to fall into the fallacy of universalism. On the contrary, we find, in his *Metaphysics*, a clear doctrine of the distinction between first and second substance—a distinction strangely ignored in the Personalist strictures. The fact that only first substance is concrete and individual ("this house," "this man"), and that of it alone the universal is affirmed; while second substance is

³³ Cf. Régis Jolivet, *La Notion de Substance*, pp. 36, 304.

³⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *passim*, especially A. 9, B. 2, B. 4 (VIII), B. 6, M. 4, 5.

called only by analogy—affords a basis for a doctrine that is fundamentally opposed to Platonic ultra-realism.³⁵

The developments and modifications effected in the Aristotelian doctrine by the Mediaevals³⁶ are not accorded proper recognition by Personalists.³⁷ The doctrine of human individuality, a point neglected by Aristotle, was especially developed by the Schoolmen, under the influence of the Christian discussions of personality. The precisions effected by St. Thomas in the notions of individual and person are so well known as not to need a commentary. One who reads the precise qualifications attached to these notions, in questions 29 and 30 of the First Part of the *Summa*, will scarcely subscribe to the opinion that “it was Leibnitz who first developed the principle of individuality in a thoroughgoing way.”³⁸ And the doctrine there developed may be found repeated in many other *loci* in the Thomistic patrimony, and in that of his commentators. Yet, despite all this evidence to the contrary, we are told all the Mediaevals—Platonists and Aristotelians alike—are to be saddled with the “universalist” error of the Greeks!

Personalists think we must have recourse to the pluralism of Leibnitz for a more satisfactory formulation of the principle of individuality.³⁹ In the Leibnitzian monadology, the monads are the real individuals. They are thoroughly individual: *omne individuum tota sua entitate individuatur*. Each real substance is, therefore, a monad, a unique and unitary being, entirely distinct from every other being. This serves to emphasize the isolation and individuality of each individual—a necessary thesis, in the Personalist view. The monads are “windowless”—nothing can pass into or out of them. They act from forces completely inherent in themselves. In virtue of its

³⁵ Aristotle, *Categories*, 5 (2a 11); *ibid.* (2b 15); (3a 7).

³⁶ Cf. M. de Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (3rd English edition), Vol. I, pp. 269-270; Vol. II, pp. 337-339.

³⁷ Mediaeval Scholasticism is, in this matter, uncritically labelled with Aristotelianism, or Platonism, *sans phrase*.

³⁸ Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, for acknowledgment of this indebtedness to Leibnitz.

unique, internal principle, each monad is thoroughly individualized and differentiated. This individuation is derived by Leibnitz, not from a substantial or formal principle, but from a power of action, which tends to emphasize the individuality and separateness of each monad. This concept of power or activity is at the basis of Leibnitz' activism which becomes the adopted Personalist explanation of the essence of finite substances.

The Leibnitzian monadology, championed especially by Herbert Wildon Carr,⁴⁰ has, as is well known, given rise to grave difficulties in metaphysics. The monads, as conceived by Leibnitz, are simple and unextended. How, on this conception, extension and movement are to be explained, is rather obscure. Yet extension is a datum of experience and must be accounted for in any rational theory of reality. One would account for the appearance of extension in two ways: either by regarding bodies as really extended, as they certainly "appear" to us; or, alternatively, by treating the phenomenon as a constant illusion (the theory of the radical idealist). The first way is closed to Leibnitz, since the monads—the ultimate elements—are themselves unextended. Nor can he adopt the second course, since, if nothing in the universe has real extension, a causal explanation of the illusion of extension becomes impossible.

Another consequence of the monadology, more serious for its personalist advocates, is its failure to afford a secure basis for a doctrine of individuality. Yet it is precisely as providing a secure basis for such a doctrine of individuality that Leibnitz' doctrine finds favor with Personalists. If true individuality consists, not in something substantial, but in a power of action; if one being is distinguished from another by its peculiar mode of activity, what fundamentally is the principle of individuation? Force or power of action is not in itself an ultimate principle of individuation. It is no more than an accidental mode of being, in the category of second act, and essentially

⁴⁰ Cf. H. W. Carr, *Leibnitz* (1929); *The Monadology of Leibnitz* (1930); *A Theory of Monads* (1922); and various articles.

dependent upon some substance in which it inheres. Force presupposes a substantial subject. In the last analysis, reality must be composed of substances, as subjects of all accidental modes of being. And with this conclusion, we return to the rejected viewpoint of Aristotle and the Scholastics, a view eminently in harmony with common sense, that reality is composed of substances and accidents.

IV

Thus far, Personalism seems committed to a pluralistic view of reality. If this pluralism were entirely unqualified, it would not possess much intrinsic interest for the theist. A doctrine of unmitigated pluralism might be an interesting antithesis to absolute monism, but it could scarcely hold out hope of a very secure basis for a theistic doctrine.

It is in its qualification of pluralism by a fundamental, underlying monism, that the personalist doctrine merits attention from the systematic philosopher. For any rational attempt to interpret reality must do justice to both elements—diversity and unity—of our experience. And it is especially through some doctrine of basic unity that philosophy must ultimately answer the mind's quest for unification. Moreover, a metaphysical doctrine of monism has special significance in discussing the foundations for a doctrine of God. Traditionally, the philosophic notion of God has been conceived through the doctrine of *analogia entis*, and the concept of being-by-participation. A doctrine of absolute pluralism and monadology could not yield such a metaphysical unity. Hence the necessity for Personalists of seeking in reality an underlying monism that will lead ultimately to a concept of God.⁴¹

The monadic conception of the world as many has, as its necessary complement, the assertion that the world is also one. The conception of ultimate unity is a necessary requirement of reason. The quest of unification goes back to the very begin-

⁴¹ Bowne, especially, has developed the theme of the ultimate unity of all things, and has linked it with his proof of God's existence. Cf. his *Theism*, pp. 44-63.

nings of philosophical speculation. The posing of the problem of the One and the Many at the very inception of Greek philosophy shows how man has always felt the necessity of attaining to a unitary world-view. Historically, this quest for unity has resulted in some extreme monistic doctrines: the static monism of Parmenides; the atomistic materialism of Leucippus and Democritus; hylozoism; the various shades of pantheism, ancient and modern. Such one-sided monisms, which in effect deny the reality of the many, must ever remain metaphysically inadequate. Personalists readily recognize the inadequacy of all forms of absolute monism.

In a world of individual, distinct things, how is unity to be conceived? The problem is one of some difficulty for Personalists. The crucial question for them is that of the metaphysical status to be assigned to matter. How is matter to be integrated into the ontological unity of things? It is but natural that the problem should arise in this way as a consequence of the peculiar neo-idealistic doctrines upheld in epistemology entails a similar attitude towards the nature and reality of matter. The conceptions of the Greeks in this regard are found eminently unsatisfactory. In Platonic philosophy, matter is non-being, empty space. For Aristotle, it is pure potentiality, the source of unintelligibility in beings. Neither view successfully explains the nature of matter. Indeed, with the imperfect data in their possession, they could never satisfactorily conceive nor transcend the dualism of matter and spirit.

A decisive advance towards a more metaphysical view of matter was marked by the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. Its value for the Personalist lies in its approximation to a "spiritual monism."⁴² Through this conception matter, in contrast to its "necessary" character in Greek philosophy, becomes utterly subordinated to God; it becomes wholly the instrument of His Divine Will. Still, even this conception is not sufficiently radical; matter is still credited with at least a

⁴² Cf. Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

tenuous metaphysical independence.⁴³ Moreover, as we shall see, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is unacceptable to many Personalists.

It is to the moderns that Personalists appeal for a thoroughgoing spiritualism. In Leibnitz and Berkeley, they find an approach to that thoroughgoing monism which fits the exigencies of their system. Both philosophers defended the utter phenomenality of matter and the ultimate reality of spirit. Only spirit is ultimately real. Still, in the extreme pluralism of Leibnitz, the spiritual is multiplied in many isolated, independent monads; and to provide for their unity, recourse is had to the gratuitous theory of pre-established harmony. In the view of Berkeley, every finite spirit possesses an independent reality of its own. In sum, therefore, they present us with a qualitative monism but a numerical pluralism. The ultimate unity of things is still unaccounted for.

The position adopted by Personalists is dictated by their allegiance to an idealistic spiritualism. On the one hand, the principle of individuality must be championed against the attacks of all forms of absolute monism and absolute idealism. On the other hand, as against the pluralists and positivists, a certain basic unity of all things must be defended. The elements of this fundamental monism are found in certain conceptions of Lotze. The latter, a theist, upheld vigorously the ultimate unity of all things, basing his chief argument on the fact of interaction. Reciprocal action, he argued, proved the ultimate unity of all things. Universalizing the notion of reciprocal action, he maintained that through it the changes and states of one being are conditioned by the changes and states of all others. The assumption of this interconnection, he tells us, lies at the root of all scientific investigation and conditions the metaphysical quest for unity. A world constituted of beings in absolute isolation would be impervious to science and philosophy. To be real, a thing must not only change in reference to some other beings, but must also occupy a place, as a recipro-

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

cally acting and reacting element, in a world-system which embraces all being.

The technical details of the argument which purports to establish this conclusion are not significant,⁴⁴ although it would be instructive to attempt to translate them into their corresponding terms in the Scholastic doctrine of *actio* and *passio*. In substance, his reasoning is as follows: Reciprocal action is given as a fact; but action is possible only if things exist in a single world; and, further, *are actually states or parts of a single being which is identical with the world as a whole*.⁴⁵

Such a conception of interaction, founded on the notion of a basic monism, has often been challenged.⁴⁶ It finds favor, nevertheless, with Personalists and has important implications for their Theism. Interaction, Bowne asserts, is not an immediate datum of experience, but is a necessary rational affirmation. The compatibility of this necessary interaction of all things with their self-sufficiency and independence presents a problem for Personalists. Bowne's solution lies in the recognition that we cannot affirm both a necessary interaction of things and a fundamental pluralism. While assigning to things, then, a quasi-independence, we affirm, at the same time, their common dependence on a single, self-sufficient Being, in and through whose activity they are unified.⁴⁷

The original pluralism is thereby considerably modified. Finite beings are still granted some independence and come under the general principle of individuality; on the other hand, they are still to be regarded as parts of the same world, and, as such, essentially dependent on the same ultimate cause. This doctrine of an ultimate unity, which could become a cardinal point in the philosophical foundations of Theism, is not satisfactorily developed by Personalists. Knudson, appar-

⁴⁴ For the technical exposition of the argument, cf. E. E. Thomas, *Lotze's Theory of Reality*, pp. 47 ff.

⁴⁵ Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysics* (English translation edited by Bosanquet), pp. 123-124.

⁴⁶ Cf. F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, pp. 62-84. Cf., too, the answers to these objections by Bowne in his *Metaphysics*.

⁴⁷ Cf. Bowne, *Theism*, esp. pp. 59-60.

ently, recognizes the necessity of elucidating its nature, but fails to supply the necessary development.⁴⁸ In fact, he freely concedes that he is at a loss to explain how finite beings can combine a measure of independence in their being with an essential ultimate dependence on the One.⁴⁹ Likewise, Bowne is content to point to the necessity of unifying the plurality of finite beings in the unitary world-ground—the latter designation smacking dangerously of the impersonal “One” of the Absolute Monists. (Bowne is, of course, in reality a firm opponent of the Absolutist philosophies). Carr, recognizing the necessity of complementing the pluralism resulting from the principle of individuality by some principle of unification, seeks for an ultimate monism. This principle he finds in a conception of God. His conception of God is, however, very far from that of traditional theism. Carr’s God is one conceived in conformity with the principle of individuality, taken in conjunction with the vital principle of biology as a dominant organizing entelechy in the living world, and with the higher entelechy, the principle of evolution of living forms. All these “scientific facts,” taken together, necessitate the conception of “a spiritual power, a supra-rational and supra-conscious individual, the source of existence and the dispenser of agency.”⁵⁰ With Bergson, Carr thinks that we are compelled to admit a life-force, *élan vital*, a power continuously creative and organizing. The actual form in which we are to conceive this force is, according to Carr, as a world-soul—a conception as old as Plato, but rejuvenated and embellished in the light of modern science. Multiple scientific implications compel us, with metaphysical necessity, to the conclusion that “there must be a world-soul, a mind universal, a supreme monad, dependent on the activities of the individual reals which . . . constitute the universe.”⁵¹

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-199.

⁴⁹ This leads him to profess a semi-agnosticism with regard to the ultimate nature of the unifying *One*. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 292-293.

⁵⁰ H. Wildon Carr, “The God of Philosophy,” *The Personalist*, Vol. IX, 3 (1928), p. 167.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

While, then, Personalists are unanimous in advocating the necessity of a fundamental monism in any systematic world-view, there is scarcely any unanimity on its nature. There is an order in the universe. If this order is ultimate, it cannot consist solely of absolutely independent, unitary beings—these monads must ultimately be subordinated to the system.

It may be possible to obtain some clarification of the Personalist conception of unity through a further consideration of their doctrine on finite reality. Two tenets are of capital importance for this development: (1) An activistic-volitional conception of reality; (2) An occasionalistic view of created activity.

Personalism revives Leibnitzian activism. Reality, in its essential nature, is essentially an activity. The category of substance must be reinterpreted in terms of cause: a conception of matter as inert is erroneous. If things are to exist at all, they must be in interaction with each other, connected by causal relations and conceived from the causal point of view.⁵² Such a view, it is claimed, finds support in the more recent theories of the physicists.⁵³ Science today no longer views matter as the inert substance of common observation. The component elements of matter are now viewed as being in ceaseless activity. Matter and force are inseparable in the real order, though distinct in thought. The real object is now seen to be an agent, acting and reacting in various ways. The many conceptions of purely passive being in the history of philosophy are due to a confusion of the abstractions of thought with the processes of reality. Passivity is the characteristic of matter in Aristotle's doctrine of pure potentiality, and in the doctrines of Neo-Platonism, Spinozism and Hegelian thought. Whatever the particular conception—pure potency, pure Thought, pure Substance or pure Being—they envisaged reality as always reduced to the bare category of existence, containing no principles of movement, deprived of any dynamic character which

⁵² Cf. R. T. Flewelling, "One View of Theism," *The Personalist*, Vol. XXI (1940), pp. 7-9. Cf. also Bowne, *Metaphysics*, pp. 16-17.

⁵³ Cf. Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

could account for change and multiplicity. All reality is concrete and has a definitely causal character. Activity constitutes the very essence of being. "Causality," says Bowne, "is the distinguishing mark of being. . . . Being is cause and the only mark of distinction between being and non-being is a power of action of some sort."⁵⁴

How is such causality to be conceived? The Personalist conception owes a good deal to Leibnitz, whose formulation stresses the contingent element in causality and its synthetic character. All existence is stamped with contingency in so far as it is due to a free act of the Divine Will. And the true application of even finite causality is found in the realm of will. Through his concept of substance, he had reduced all reality to causality in the dynamic sense of the term. But dynamism is given definite and concrete meaning only in the activity of will. Man's experience of causality is limited to that of volitional causality—his experience of himself as a willing and struggling being. Impersonal force or causality is to him inconceivable. He must regard power or cause as personal and spiritual.

The voluntarism thus implicit in the Leibnitzian doctrine was developed by Maine de Biran. For him, all reality is spiritual and the activity of spirit may be either volitional or cognitional. The two forms are in reality inseparable: all thought activity involves a volitional element. Activity is the very essence of consciousness; *cogito, ergo ago*. Self-consciousness is nothing else than consciousness of power. The fundamental fact of consciousness is this experience of volitional causality. Thus the notion of causality becomes thoroughly voluntaristic.⁵⁵

Bowne further develops this conception of causality by an epistemological doctrine of Kantian inspiration. For Kant, causality, as a category of the understanding, is empty and formal apart from experience. But experience is arbitrarily limited by Kant to the phenomenal world. It must be taken to

⁵⁴ B. P. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, pp. 41, 45.

⁵⁵ Cf. F. Baumgarten, *Die Erkenntnislehre von Maine de Biran*.

include the data of self-consciousness, and in this we have our sole knowledge of causality in the form of volition. Any other form of causality in the objective world is merely inferred. Our own conscious personal activity is, therefore, the key to the meaning of the category.

Self-determining intelligence is, therefore, the true type of causality: only in this form is causality an intelligible, consistent concept.⁵⁶ Through this concept, the antinomies of a world-view—change and identity, unity and plurality—are solved. Such antinomies are soluble only on the plane of the personal. The old antinomy of change, for instance, with its implication of yet opposition to permanence, is solved only by appealing to the powers of the soul—its self-identifying consciousness and its faculty of self-determination. These two powers are obvious facts of experience. We change and perform multiple activities; yet we retain our personal identity. Our permanence is explained by consciousness and memory, while our freedom of will accounts for our power of self-determination, and our creative self-development. Taken together, these two powers of the soul constitute volitional causality.⁵⁷

With this doctrine, we encounter another attempt to explain metaphysical change without reference to the traditional doctrines of act and potency, or, more specifically, of substance and accident. Yet the whole history of metaphysical speculation on the problem, from Parmenides and Heraclitus to Bergson, bears out this one conclusion—that no adequate solution can afford to dispense with these inevitable Aristotelian concepts. The attitude which so lightly rejects them is not founded on a critical examination of the doctrines themselves; rather is it founded on a prejudice against the whole body of traditional metaphysics. The false conception of substance which began with the Cartesian school has perpetuated a prejudice against the genuine notion, a prejudice which often precludes even a fair examination. The Leibnitzian version of the Cartesian

⁵⁶ Cf. B. P. Bowne, *Personalism*, pp. 190-196; *Metaphysics*, pp. 81-90.

⁵⁷ Cf. Bowne, *Personalism*, pp. 196-198; Knudson, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

doctrine leads to dynamic conception of substance. This conception of substance as activity, with its inherent dynamism, naturally leads to the conception of reality as causal. But causality is limited by Personalists to one fundamental form: volitional causality. It is not difficult to understand the reason for this undue limitation. Undoubtedly, it is in our consciousness of our personal activities, mental and physical, in our thinking and willing processes, in our commanded acts, in our direction of mental operations, in our exercise of the internal and external faculties, and of the bodily organs, that we have our primary experience of causality. In all these we apprehend ourselves as agents, efficient causes of mental processes and bodily movements. These latter are apprehended as due to our power to exercise them. Observing that other beings behave in similar fashion, we infer they, too, possess active powers like our own, that they are efficient causes.⁵⁸

Does this conclusion extend, too, to corporeal beings? We must remember that the affirmation of efficient causality in beings other than ourselves is a metaphysical inference from observed facts. Observing that effects similar to those produced in ourselves—whether in our own lives or in the external world—are also consequent upon certain changes in nature, we infer that those corporeal beings have also powers, energies, forces by which they produce these effects. It must certainly be granted to the Personalists that all this is by way of metaphysical inference. For the senses testify only to time and space connections between events in external nature. But intellect apprehends in these action and interaction—that is, the causal dependence of events and actions upon the active influence of physical things. What must be defended is the legitimacy of the metaphysical inference by which this conclusion is guaranteed.

From all this it is clear that our experience of causality is

⁵⁸ "It is true that the psychological field provides the typical examples of immediate apprehension of causal relations, but instances of willing and striving are only one kind of instance among many" (D. J. B. Hawkins, *Causality and Implication*, p. 102).

primarily a knowledge of our own personal efficient causality. Personalists rightly emphasize the primacy of this personal experience of causality in our lives. Our knowledge of the exercise of the powers and energies that constitute material things is subsequent to, and derived by analogy from, our knowledge of our own personal efficient causality. The significance of this fact is, however, wrongly interpreted by Personalists as a negation of efficient causality in material things—a limitation to the personal form of volitional causality. The ascription of causality to the things of nature is, for them, a lapse into “naive anthropomorphism.” It is objected that experience does not reveal to us the existence of such causality. Experience is here taken by Personalists in the narrow sense of volitional experience. But experience as used in metaphysics must be taken in a much wider sense. It includes rational interpretation of, and inference from, the data of internal and external sense-experience. Taken in this wider sense, it certainly reveals to us the existence of efficient causality in physical things. Metaphysical inference, based on a rational interpretation of our experience, shows us that there is real efficient causality not merely in our personal being but also in the physical universe.

The metaphysics of Personalism is thus regrettably limited by its presuppositions and by its epistemological tenets. An example of this limitation is furnished by its method of approach to the doctrine of causality. The conclusion is accepted from Kantian epistemology that causality is a category of the understanding, and, as such, empty and formal apart from experience. True, Personalist experience is not limited to the phenomenal world, but is extended to include the data of self-consciousness. Still, metaphysically, the conception is unsatisfactory. For the metaphysics of the finite is primarily an interpretation of the explanatory principles of all finite being. The interpretation is to be carried out according to a well-defined method, in which experience, deductive reasoning, and intuition each plays a definite role.⁵⁹ In this method, a primary

⁵⁹ On the method of metaphysics, cf. P. Descoqs, *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis*, I, pp. 42-104.

place must be given to the task of deducing the constitutive principles of finite being, in order that being, as it is verified in our experience, may be properly accounted for. This work of interpretation proceeds largely through the process of metaphysical inference.⁶⁰ The characteristics of finite being which must be accounted for are truly objective. The unity and identity of each finite being as given in experience must be reconciled with the diversity and multiplicity of real finite beings, equally given by experience. The antithetical solutions of absolute monism and radical pluralism are seen to be inadequate explanations of these contrasting aspects of finite beings. The analogy of being here provides the key to the solution. This doctrine, so strangely ignored by Personalists, is of vital importance, both for a metaphysics of finite being and for a doctrine of God.

In developing the further implications of analogy, the metaphysician necessarily encounters the question of the conditions of the existence of finite being. To explain finite being as given in experience, he finds it necessary to infer its intrinsic constitution of certain correlative principles of being.⁶¹ This intrinsic composition found in all finite beings explains at once the diversification and multiplication of such real beings and their analogical unity within the concept of being. Inevitably, then, he has recourse to the classic notions of Thomistic metaphysics.

A first step in his metaphysical inference leads him to view finite being as composed of two intrinsic correlative principles:⁶² by one of these a thing is placed on the general plane of the value of being, and falls within the extension of the transcendental notion of being; by the other principle, a thing is such a particular being—it has particularity and realizes the perfection of being in its own individual way. Finite being is

⁶⁰ Cf. F. van Steenberghen, *Ontologie*, pp. 71, 77, 115-117, and *passim*. L. de Raeymaeker, *Philosophie de l'Être*.

⁶¹ On the doctrine of the intrinsic constitution of finite being, cf. L. de Raeymaeker, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-155.

⁶² On the nature of the intrinsic constitution of finite being, and on the notion of transcendental relations, cf. N. Balthasar, *L'abstraction métaphysique et l'analogie des êtres dans l'être*, *passim*. L. de Raeymaeker, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-123.

thus seen to be a composite of two intrinsic, correlative principles—one giving it the absolute perfection of being, one explaining how this perfection is realized in its own particular way.⁶³ Here, stripped of all the obscurity and minutiae with which it has accidentally become overlaid in centuries of controversy, is the classic Thomistic doctrine of the composition of all finite being of essence and existence. The terminology of this doctrine may often have given rise to unnecessary obscurities, but what really matters is the precious doctrine enshrined in the technicalities. By whatever names one chooses to designate them, it is impossible, in a truly metaphysical analysis of finite being, to avoid the classic underlying notions and the realities which they cover. Viewed critically, the Personalist doctrine appears, by way of contrast, as truly a *simpliste* solution: the extreme pluralism entailed by the monadology, if not modified by some intelligible doctrine of unity, will end by suppressing entirely one of the aspects of real finite being.

From the static viewpoint, analogy and the fundamental composition of finite being explain adequately the problem of being. When we pass to the dynamic viewpoint, a new problem arises. Finite being is also given to us in immediate experience as in movement, as subject to change. What are the metaphysical implications of this new aspect? Here again we are confronted with an age-old problem, one that is entirely legitimate and demands a solution. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is enabled to solve the problem, in virtue of its classic doctrine of act and potency.⁶⁴ Change in finite being involves these two principles. Whatever changes must be determinable, perfectible, potential in some way—it is capable of realizing a perfection under some aspect. Every principle of determination is called, in Scholastic language, act. Change implies the permanent identity of a subject, the determinability of which is successively actuated in different ways; in other words, all

⁶³ Cf. St. Thomas, *In Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 1.

⁶⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, *de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 2; *Contra Gentiles*, II, c. 17; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2.

change implies a structure of potency and act. Each term of the structure is relative to the other; they constitute correlations, principles of being, transcendental relations. The being which they constitute is, in virtue of this structure, entirely subject to change. It remains always determinable in some way, by successive acts which bring it further perfections.

It was by means of this classic doctrine that Aristotle solved the dilemma of Parmenides and Heraclitus. It is unfortunate that the balanced solution which it offers to the problem of change has been largely misunderstood or ignored by modern philosophy. The only alternative to it is a radical but one-sided solution which really fails to do justice to either of the real aspects afforded by changing being. The doctrine of perpetual flux of Heraclitus—absolute evolutionism and dynamism—is an example of such an inadequate solution. Likewise the radical activism of a Leibnitz and of some Personalists, the evolutionism of Bergson and Le Roy fail to do justice to every aspect of changing being; they fail to safeguard the necessary aspect of permanence in change.

The doctrine of substance meets with a similar fate in Personalist metaphysics. The traditional Thomistic doctrine of substance and accident was designed to account for the phenomena of change and activity in finite beings. These latter appear in our experience as active and as subjects of change. In neither case can the phenomenon be adequately explained without positing a certain composition in finite beings. The being which is active, which is the principle of activity, is not essentially so; it is not active by its whole entity. Activity cannot be the essential definition of any finite being. An analysis of the activity or change of any finite being leads to the metaphysical inference that such phenomena can be explained only by a real composition of principles in the being. There must be principle of substantiality and principles of accidental modifications to explain this aspect of finite being. Against the activism of Leibnitz and of certain Personalist metaphysicians we must insist on some balanced theory which really does justice to the implications of activity.

The misapprehension of the notion of substance by Personalists leads to their failure to see the whole doctrine in its proper perspective, as a metaphysical implication of change. This failure to apprehend the doctrine from its proper perspective is again the consequence of following false mentors. Under Kantian influence, they tend to reduce substance to a category of the understanding, and to regard permanence as its characteristic note.⁶⁵ Historically, it is well known how disastrous this Kantian influence has been for the doctrine of substance. Logically, it has led, first, to the perversion of the notion of substance, and, finally, to its complete rejection. And even when the objectivity of the notion has been retained, it has been a perpetuation of the old Lockean conception of an unknown, inert substratum, lying behind or beyond phenomena.

To avoid this consequence, Personalists have made an unhappy combination of the "permanence" notion of substance with the Leibnitzian activism. In consequence, while they have been able to retain the element of activity, they are unable to base it on any satisfactory foundation.

The further necessity of combining the notion of permanence with that of reality as essentially active logically leads to the Personalist doctrine of causality. For on these data, the concept of finite causality is intelligible only on the personal plane. Only in volitional causal actions of persons can Personalists find an authentic example of true causality. In volitional causality the element of permanence is preserved: it is not a temporary influence on the event, but is abiding and immanent in it. Bowne seeks the explanation of this type of causality in the soul's powers of self-determination and self-identification. In the oneness of consciousness, unity and plurality are identified.

A momentous change is introduced into this conception of causality by Bowne's doctrine of occasionalism. If Personalists generally defend only causality of the human will, Bowne rejects outright causality in the objective world. The world of

⁶⁵ This conception, so common among modern non-Scholastic philosophers, is really taken for granted in practically all Personalist discussions of the doctrine.

matter is purely phenomenal. Nature has no inherent forces resident within it; it is nothing more than the continuous, orderly intervention of God. Things are not real causes; they are simply the "occasions" on which God intervenes to produce His effects. He is the sole cause in the universe. Cause and effect are not objectively real; they are the order which our understanding introduces into the data of sensibility.

From this synthesis of Kantian epistemology with the doctrine of Occasionalism, the following is the resulting position: created substances are not truly efficient causes—they are but the occasions for the manifestation of the Divine Will and the Divine operations. This is equivalently a radical denial of created efficient causality. Such occasionalism, in so far as it is related to Theism, is founded on the desire to give to the Deity a supremely eminent status. God is to be absolutely supreme, without a rival in the causal order: His primacy as First Cause is deemed to be challenged if created agents can lay claim to any efficient causality. Matter and material substances must, then, be completely subordinated to His Will. They must be despoiled of the last vestiges of independence and autonomy.

The general criticisms levelled against all forms of Occasionalism are valid, too, against this Personalist doctrine: its logical effect is the very contrary to the one desired. In the last analysis every form of occasionalism is derogatory to the perfections of God, the First Cause. St. Thomas, especially, has brought out this consequence, showing effectively how the doctrine detracts from the divine perfections. In the *Contra Gentiles*, III, c. 69, where he discusses the doctrine of Occasionalism, he sets out the *multa inconvenientia* which follow from such a view of created substances. However we conceive the relations of created causes to the First Cause, in no case must the real causality of second agents be denied. For such a denial is especially derogatory to the Divine Wisdom. To admit that God has created certain organs admirably adapted for the performance of certain functions, and then to deny that

they perform these or any other functions, is tantamount to denying the wisdom of the Creator. On the occasionalist thesis, there is no cogent reason why any created thing should serve even as the occasion of the divine activity. It is hard to understand why one thing rather than another should serve as such occasion for the divine operations.⁶⁶ On such a view it becomes particularly difficult to explain the order of finality in the universe. The elements of this order—its hierarchical structure, its subordination of means to end, and part to whole, its gradation of participated perfections—all these are explicable only if we assume that, in maintaining this order, creatures cooperate efficiently with the divine First Cause. If, however, creatures are inert, inoperative, bereft of all causal efficiency, mere occasions of God's intervention, what is the *raison d'être* of these different perfections and endowments? As St. Thomas put it, "their use [as secondary causes] to produce effects would have been in vain. The doctrine which leads to such a view is, therefore, repugnant to the divine wisdom."⁶⁷

The primacy of God as First Cause is adequately safeguarded in granting to created substances a secondary causality. This communication of secondary causality to creatures is, as St. Thomas shows, a consequence of their constitution in being. As *causa essendi*, He is the First Cause of the existence of created substances. *Agere sequitur esse*. He is also the First Cause Who has granted to creatures a limited causality proportioned to their being. But subordination in being is the fundamental form of subjection of the creature to its Creator.

The perfection of the effect demonstrates the perfection of the cause, says St. Thomas. God is the most perfect agent: the higher power operates the more perfect effect. Now, if God is the most perfect agent, it follows that agents created by Him should obtain from Him a certain perfection. To mini-

⁶⁶ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, III, c. 69: "Si autem res creatae nullo modo operentur ad effectus producendos, sed solus Deus operetur omnia immediate, frustra essent adhibitae ab Ipso aliae res ad producendos effectus. Repugnat igitur praedicta positio divinae sapientiae."

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

mize the perfection of the creature is, in reality, to detract from the power of God, its cause. Now, occasionalism certainly belittles the perfection of the creature by denying to it real efficient causality: by this very fact, too, it detracts from the divine perfection. "It is," says St. Thomas, "the mark of the plenitude of a thing's perfection that it can communicate this perfection to another being."⁶⁸ Moreover, as we know things only through their activities, there is no good reason why we should affirm so many inert masses, if they are in reality no more than passive occasions for the exercise of the divine activity. We can say with Berkeley, "let them go: nobody will miss them."

V

The general epistemological and metaphysical positions of the Personalists assume considerable importance as tending to give a typical orientation to their theistic doctrines. For the philosopher, the problem of God arises naturally from the metaphysical enquiry. Natural theology finds its place in the philosophical hierarchy as a branch of metaphysics, of which it constitutes one of the special branches. The general ontological enquiry must examine and explain especially finite being: it lays down the general principles which explain the characteristic unity and diversity of reality. It will seek especially the essential conditions for the existence and causal activity of finite being. These are seen to imply the characteristic articulation in finite being of a composition of principles in the static stage: essence and existence; and in the stage of activity, of act and potency, substance and accident.

Ultimately, however, these principles are seen to be inadequate to give the final explanation of the order of finite beings. The relative, dependent, limited character of each finite being is reflected in the total order of finite beings. The contingent, limited character imposed on each member of that order and reflected in the composite character of its being, both in the dynamic and static stages, entails the same characteristics in

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

the total order of the finite. The latter manifests the same contingent, limited and perfectible character as its component parts. The question arises logically as to how the whole finite order is ultimately to be explained, for, metaphysically, it is not self-sufficient. What is relative, dependent, conditioned demands some absolute reality as its foundation. The relative, the insufficient, the dependent cannot, in virtue of these very characteristics, explain itself.

Along such lines, Thomism has traditionally posed the philosophical problem of God. The setting is metaphysical: essentially, the problem is to explain being as we find it. The fundamental demonstration is, therefore, *a posteriori*, by way of a metaphysical inference from finite beings as revealed in our experience. The starting-point is the existence of creatures, beings which are clearly revealed as effects, with the characters of dependence and contingency. The analogy of being is the underlying doctrine. Hence, the method of natural theology is the analogical method. To establish a relationship in being between two things, is, metaphysically, to establish a proportion between them, to set up an analogical relation. The three stages of the analogical method—causation, negation and eminence—are essentially implied by the proportional analogy of being, and constitute the complete expression of that analogy. This method obtains essentially in both parts of Natural Theology, between which, in fact, there is no adequate metaphysical distinction; and governs both the proofs for God's existence and the deduction of His attributes.

The *a posteriori* proofs for God's existence, of which the *quinque viae* of St. Thomas represent the most interesting formulations, all follow this pattern. Setting off from some experiential aspect of finite beings, or of the activity of such beings, they establish the dependent, contingent character of this aspect. Then by a metaphysical inference they move to assert the necessary existence of an Absolute, a Necessary, Unconditioned, Independent Being. The characteristic notes of such proofs are their empirical starting-points and their

employment of the method of metaphysical inference, resting on the principle of causality.

Personalists are in line with this traditional approach when they view the problem of God as arising necessarily from the metaphysical enquiry. Any world-view, they recognize, is incomplete without a conception of the causal ground of the universe. A doctrine of theism in some form is an integral part of all typical forms of Personalism. "True, normative personalism," says Knudson, "must be theistic."⁶⁹ The same writer adduces as a reason for this theistic bias the fact that "the central idea of Personalism, the unique significance of personality, owes its origin to Christian influence. This was the great contribution made by Christianity to European philosophy. . . . Christianity concentrated attention upon the distinctively personal element in God and in the human soul as had not been done before. A personal God and personal immortality—these were the two foci in the ellipse of Christian thought."⁷⁰ So essential does Knudson regard a doctrine of theism to Personalism, that he rejects as totally inconsistent with its fundamental tenets the doctrines of atheism and pantheism.

The theistic interest which marked the beginnings of Personalism is still a marked feature of its more typical formulations. The primacy of theism is a recurrent theme in the writings of American Personalists, from Howison and Bowne to Flewelling and Brightman. They are sincere in accepting a personal God and in seeking in Him the explanation of all things. They view the world as a hierarchy of persons, with a Supreme Person at its head.

Still, their defence of theism is not without its own peculiar features and is colored by their general philosophical positions. In view of the intimate connection which has traditionally existed between natural theology and metaphysics, it is clear that any reformulation of the former must taken account of this orientation. It is equally evident that traditional theism

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

cannot be reproduced without significant changes, when the original metaphysical background is altered. The leitmotif of the recent literature of theistic Personalism is the more or less articulate demand for a restatement of the traditional doctrine in terms of a metaphysics more acceptable to the modern mind.

The claim that Personalism is the pre-eminent philosophical defence of Christianity today is now frequently made. "Personalism," writes Knudson, "is, in a pre-eminent sense, the philosophy of religion of our day. It may indeed be said to be the most thorough-going philosophical expression that Christianity has yet received."⁷¹ "[Personalism] has during the last century been the most powerful ally of religion and . . . at least in Protestant lands, it has almost alone defended the citadel of religious faith against the attacks of materialistic and positivistic naturalism. . . . For it the claim may, therefore, fairly be made that it is the type of philosophy with which Christian thought most naturally allies itself at the present time."⁷²

More often, however, we have explicit claims that all current presentations of Theism, save that of the Personalists, are, even philosophically, unsatisfactory. Referring to the dissatisfaction with all current formulations of the doctrine of God expressed by Herbert Wildon Carr, a writer in *The Personalist*, says: "It is quite true that Theism 'as ordinarily propounded' is full of contradictions which offend not only logically but also morally and religiously. But Theism 'as ordinarily propounded' is not representative of the best philosophical Theism. . . . Certainly, the Theism of Personalism does not warrant the crude anthropomorphism which has characterized the idea of God as held not only by the popular mind but by much orthodox as well as unorthodox theology."⁷³ "The pressing religious and philosophical need of our time is a reconstructed Theism along the lines of Personalism, which shall be more

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁷³ J. W. Buckham, "Herbert Wildon Carr's Contribution to Personalism," *The Personalist*, Vol. XIII, 2 (1932), p. 116.

adequate to advancing knowledge. . . . The conception of God as Perfect Personality . . . should not be regarded as having reached completion. Problems of great magnitude and difficulty remain as to the possibility and manner of relating Him, first of all to our imperfect and wilful personalities, and, still more, to the cosmos, with its apparently irresolvable contradictions and disharmonies.”⁷⁴

In these and similar pronouncements there is the implication that traditional theism, if not reformulated in a Personalist way, is no longer adequate to a defence of God. The concept of a Supreme Being is necessary to any adequate explanation of the world—scientific or philosophic. But the proper philosophical setting for the concept and its rational justification is a pressing problem for Personalists. How is this “reconstruction” of traditional theism, which is conceived to be necessary to bring the concept of God into line with modern thought, to be effected? Generally, the adaptation is conceived by Personalists to entail necessarily a jettisoning of much of the older “metaphysical setting” in which the demonstration of God’s existence and the deduction of His attributes were traditionally effected. This is a far-reaching contention. If it is granted, then, for instance, the probative force of the old metaphysical arguments is considerably reduced if not totally denied. We are justified in discerning in this desire for reformulation, a particular phase of what Mgr. Sheen has aptly designated the “modern attack on the intelligence.”⁷⁵ In the opinion of the authors of this attack, too much confidence has always been placed in the operations of the faculty of intelligence. They were conceded an absolute value which, in point of fact, they do not possess. To the modern mind, intellectual operations appear abstract, remote from life, distortions of reality. Philosophies of intellectualism, founded on this absolute confidence in intelligence, are discounted as unrealistic, divorced from life and reality, inert and inoperative. The science of metaphysics, the crowning achievement of intellectualism, incurs the same disfavor and loses all its erstwhile claim to absolute value.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

⁷⁵ Cf. *God and Intelligence*, pp. 9-20.

It is important not to admit too lightly criticism levelled at the traditional Scholastic presentation of the problem of God. Indeed, the time has come for an evaluation of the Personalist reformulation of Theism, and of the claim that it represents the philosophy of religion *par excellence* of our time. One can readily admit the genuinely theistic interests of the typical Personalists; but one should scrutinize carefully their claim that their doctrines represent "the type of philosophy with which Christian thought most naturally allies itself at the present time." For it is clear from our preceding analysis of the general metaphysical framework of Personalism that an acceptance of its tenets must necessarily entail significant departures from the traditional foundations of Christian theism. Personalism is, indeed, the heir of a philosophical tradition which represents an ever-widening breach with the tenets of Scholasticism, and, in particular, with many fundamental positions of Thomism. Knudson thinks that "the significant changes in the philosophical orientation of the Western world since Descartes" entail a reformulation, if not a rejection, of the traditional proofs. The strongly spiritualistic interests of Personalist literature, and the wholly genuine defence of traditional Christian values, which can find such sympathetic accord in the Catholic philosopher, should not, therefore, blind us to the real character of the neo-theism which is envisaged. The formulation of a system of natural theology as the basis of a rational justification of Theism, is so important for Christian philosophy that every care must be taken with its construction.

The theistic doctrines of Personalism are determined, to some extent, by its filiation from the school of Personal Idealism. The general contribution of this latter school was to restore a form of theism as an integral part of idealism. This constituted a reaction against the panlogism and absolutism of Hegel. But in its positive doctrine on God, it shows a good deal of uncertainty, much wavering and casting about in thought, giving a tentative character to the whole of its natural theology. The contributions of the individual personal idealists are of very

unequal value and often of a contradictory character. A. S. Pringle-Pattison,⁷⁶ for instance, in his earlier works, made a valiant attempt to take the doctrine of personality back, beyond Hegelianism, to its original epistemological setting in Kant. Here he sought for the foundations of the unique, individual value of each person—the separateness and impenetrability which are the metaphysical marks of all personality. But, failing to give this doctrine its full metaphysical value when applied to the Infinite Personality of God, we find him, in his later works,⁷⁷ restoring something of the already discredited Absolutism. In his attempted metaphysical system, we find a synthesis in which God and the finite are in organic relation, God being immanent in, and essential to, the world. God and nature are not separated: they are in organic interdependence.

The logical consequence of such a view is the denial of God's primacy and transcendence vis-à-vis the world. The "old" idea of God, which was founded precisely on His possession of these two attributes, must, therefore, be considerably modified, if not entirely rejected. In the "organic" view, it is of man's primacy that we must speak; God is reduced to an aspect of the universe, a function of man. The enhancement of finite personality, thus assured, is accomplished only at the sacrifice of the God of traditional theism.

The same judgment might justly be passed on the interesting attempt of Hastings Rashdall to color the doctrine of Personal Idealism by a revival of Berkeleian theism.⁷⁸ He is rightly convinced of the unique and independent value of all personality, human and divine, and of the consequent necessity of opposing rigidly every form of absolutism. To found his positive doctrine, he restores the spiritual idealism of Berkeley, which entails the view that God is necessary to give an objective reality to external things. He so stresses the independence

⁷⁶ Cf. his *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887).

⁷⁷ Cf. his *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (1917); *The Idea of Immortality* (1922).

⁷⁸ See, especially, his "Personality, Human and Divine," in *Personal Idealism* (1902).

and individuality of each finite mind that it becomes impervious to every other consciousness. Personality, in this view, becomes exclusive, and God is thus limited by the existence of human persons. God is, thus, not the sole absolute reality. The real absolute order is constituted of a community of personal spirits, of whom God is only one, though the principal. Logically, all this can lead only to the concept of a finite God.

Viewed solely from the point of view of its filiation from Personal Idealism, we need not, then, expect to find in Personalism a strict adherence to traditional theism. And, in fact, what is generally offered is an attempt at a "new" and "more modern" reformulation. H. W. Carr, for instance, strongly upholds the necessity of the concept of God for any adequate explanation of the world, scientific or philosophical. But in showing how this doctrine is to be formulated philosophically, he has recourse to certain metaphysical principles, of Cartesian, and Leibnitzian origin. The individuality of the real, for instance, is deduced from these principles of Leibnitz: Reality is essentially active; activity is individual, therefore reality is individual.⁷⁹ On the basis of these principles, we are compelled to conclude that "the conception of God . . . is not a fixed and final object of knowledge but a conception that we ourselves form, a conception subject to continual modification and reformulation." This granted, it follows that we must reject the "old conception of a Creator or divine artificer fashioning man in his own image out of a material ready to hand," and form "the new concept of a universal activity of life manifesting itself in the continuous creation of new modes."⁸⁰

A further consequence is that we must regard as invalid the "old" method of arguing from the imperfections or contingency of the finite to the infinity of the Creator. The traditional theistic argument "proceeded straightway from the necessary imperfection of the finite to the absolute perfection

⁷⁹ "The God of Philosophy," *The Personalist*, Vol. IX, 3 (1928), pp. 159-167.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

of the infinite." The leap was based on a principle never adequately criticized, viz. the "absolute nature of reason as pure enlightenment," the assumption that reason is identical in God and man, one in kind though differing in degree.

In the view of Carr, such a process of argumentation is no longer possible. Modern science has rendered difficult, if not impossible, such a conception of God. Progress in the physical sciences, and especially in biology, has complicated considerably some of its implications. These vaguely asserted difficulties are clarified somewhat in their specification: the impossibility of assigning to the act of creation a definite *locus*, state and *modus operandi*; the notion of a particular and continuous providence. While the first cause must, admittedly, be conceived as transcending the natural order, still the vital principle of biology has raised a new and difficult problem of peculiar significance for the concept of God. Modern science presents us more and more with a picture of life as an autonomous reality, a phenomenon unique in its origin and identical throughout its manifold manifestations.

These facts, while militating against the older notion of a Creator-God, do not preclude the formation of a new conception of God, in full accord with the requirements of scientific thought, and in harmony especially with the vital principle accepted by science and philosophy. Such pronouncements hold out hopes of something really original in the way of a conception of Deity. How disappointing, then, to learn that this "new" concept is nothing more than the old Platonic and Neo-Platonic idea of a world-soul! The doctrine is enhanced, to be sure, and is made to lose much of the improbability which it possessed in its original setting in Plato and Plotinus; especially is it revised to meet the requirements of modern science.⁸¹ Stripped of all its trappings and non-essential nuances, here is the more rational and consistent idea of God which Carr deems to be demanded by modern thought: "A world-soul, a mind

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

universal, a supreme monad, dependent on the activities of the individual reals which . . . constitute the universe."

Behind the dissatisfaction of Carr with traditional theism, there lies a more general distrust of intelligence and of the philosophy of intellectualism—a distrust shared by nearly all the modern agitators for a revision of the concept of God. Despite his words, he does not really intend to cavil at any particular form taken by the metaphysical inference from creatures to God, but rather, as he hints, at the ambitions of intelligence manifested by such an attempt. In proposing the outmoded concept of a world-soul as a substitute for the traditional doctrine, he is not, in reality, pitting one metaphysical conception against another; rather, he is concerned with finding, on an entirely different plane, an adequate "scientific" substitute for a notion discredited because of its intellectualist antecedents.

This sceptical view of traditional theism is not an exceptional one among recent Personalists. Knudson takes the view that the essential truths of theism cannot be established by purely theoretical arguments. The "older" view which regarded the theistic "proofs" as strict demonstrations, has to be abandoned. Kant has forever disposed of their claim to an apodictic value, and has clearly shown that strict demonstration in this matter is an impossibility.⁸² This position is entailed by the more general fideism of personalist epistemology. All knowledge rests on faith and this is as true of God as of objective reality in general. Our knowledge of God's existence rests chiefly on moral faith. This faith needs to be supplemented by theoretical considerations, and in this role the traditional speculative arguments retain a permanent value. But they must forever shed their pretensions to a strict demonstrative character.⁸³ This attitude is endorsed by the editor of *The Personalist* in the following typical statement: "The best philosophy can do is to show the reasonableness for the assumption

⁸² Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 162-163.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

of the existence of God.”⁸⁴ God’s existence is undemonstrable scientifically because He pertains to the domain of faith and values. Science can neither establish His existence nor refute it, because He is not susceptible of spatio-temporal designation, the proper scientific method of identification.

If these latter statements refer exclusively to the domain of the purely positive sciences, they could be endorsed by any Thomist. It is clear, however, that they are of more general implication, and are intended to exclude a strictly philosophical demonstration of God’s existence. The fideism which colors the general Personalist approach to the doctrine of knowledge is applied, logically, to this problem. Here, however, it undergoes a characteristic development which is not without significance. The most important feature of this development is the defining of the relations between philosophical theism and the Christian religion. Religion necessarily has its philosophical implications, of which God and immortality are the most significant. Theism claims to justify these tenets. But religion has its own autonomous validity, quite apart from any rational justification.⁸⁵ For Personalists, religion has its own *a priori*, carrying in itself its own justification. Logical or metaphysical developments can never be its essential supports. Religious experience is an ultimate form of experience and as such is neither created nor eliminated by logical thought. This position recognizes a clear-cut distinction between natural and revealed theology. It acknowledges that the Christian religion can never be reduced to the dimensions of a mere philosophical theism.⁸⁶

This does not mean that natural theology loses all its interest. Indeed, Knudson would have Personalism “primarily interested in the philosophical foundations of religion in general.” In this regard, it is possible to discern an incipient and encouraging reaction against the agnostic tendencies of much post-Kantian thought. The popular agnostic view, that Kant has totally

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁸⁵ *Philosophy of Personalism*, pp. 247-251.

⁸⁶ Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 161-170.

overthrown all traditional arguments for the divine existence, is not unreservedly accepted by all Personalists. Admittedly, these arguments can no longer be regarded as apodictic—they are too ambitious and are not demonstrations in the strict sense. They “attempted the impossible.” Indeed, a strict demonstration of God’s existence is impossible—so much at least is clear from Kant’s critique.⁸⁷ Still, the traditional attempts to find such a demonstration do not lose all value for the theist. While holding strictly to the primacy of the practical reason, and consequently of the moral and religious basis of God’s existence, we must accord a place, too, to a metaphysically grounded theism. The error of Kant’s position was, perhaps, to overstress the distinction between pure and practical reason, and to make the latter too exclusively the basis of religion and of morality. This does violence to the unity of human nature. Both theoretical and practical reason are ultimately seen to point towards a “common spiritual interpretation of the universe.” And the theistic arguments are thus seen to suggest a world-view that is in “the line of least resistance for the intellect,” no less than for man’s religious and moral nature.

It is from this modest standpoint that the traditional theistic arguments must today be evaluated. Omitting all consideration of their apodictic value, the modern theist should confine his attention to a critical limitation of their value. As a result of his critical evaluation, Knudson finds that none of the traditional formulations of the theistic argument is entirely satisfactory. They are classified by him under two main headings: the conceptual arguments and the causal arguments. Under the former category, all variations of the Ontological argument are dismissed because of their general ultra-realist implications, and because the criticisms traditionally alleged against them are still valid.⁸⁸

The causal argument receives more favorable consideration,

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 235-237.

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 234-241. Also same author’s *Philosophy of Personalism*, pp. 259-273.

but its analysis by St. Thomas into the traditional "five ways" lacks complete cogency. The Aristotelian terms and setting are found remote from life and unintelligible to modern thought. Again, more was read into their conclusions than was warranted by the premises. Even the unity of the world, which seems to have been a postulate for each proof, was, in Lotze's phrase, "an altogether arbitrary leap." In other words, it was surreptitiously assumed by the Scholastics that the world is a systematic whole, rather than an absolute pluralism of self-existent atoms. Parallel with this assumption was that of the immediate identification of the necessary Being with the God of Theism: men's certainty of the existence of God blinded them into a too facile identification of the *ens realissimum* with the Supreme Being of philosophical speculation.

All this entails a revision of the cosmological argument in terms more acceptable to the modern mind. Lotze has attempted a modification of the older cosmological argument and has thus provided the Personalists with the basis for their sole theistic argument.⁸⁹ This turns out to be a proof from causality, in modern terms. As developed by Bowne and his followers, it proceeds in two stages. The first of these purports to show the necessity of some unifying world-ground, as a basis for systematic interaction (incorporating the older cosmological argument). The second stage argues to the intelligent, personal character of this unitary being (the teleological argument).

The first phase of the proof is thus summarized by Knudson: "The argument for a unitary world-ground begins with the admitted fact of systematic interaction and consists in showing that such an interacting system as the material universe is recognized to be can be rationally conceived only as the work of a co-ordinating One. There is and can be no actual transference of states or conditions from one independent thing to another, nor are there forces playing between them or influ-

⁸⁹ For the metaphysical background for this argument, cf. *supra*, the discussion on the Personalist tenet of unity.

ences passing from one to the other. . . . The real explanation of systematic interaction can be found only in the immanent action of an underlying One. Independent things cannot in and of themselves form an interacting system. The very idea of such a system excludes a fundamental pluralism. If such a system exists, there must be a unitary agent that mediates the interaction of the many, or is the dynamic ground of their being.”⁹⁰

The reasoning calls for little comment. It may be noted that the interaction envisaged in this argument is adduced as the sole authentic example of the operation of efficient causality in the material world. The terms of its description are rather unmetaphysical and sound strange to Scholastic ears. Moreover, the validity of the whole reasoning process depends on the peculiar Lotzean conception of systematic interaction which is its inspiration.

The second stage of the argument seeks to determine more precisely the nature of the underlying One. This necessarily involves the remaining topics of natural theology—God’s attributes and His relations to the world—problems that are the source of no little perplexity to Personalists.

VI

It is often pointed out that modern discussions on God tend to centre around the problem of His nature rather than that of His existence. This is a natural consequence of the rejection of the value of the traditional proofs and the more or less explicit acceptance of the indemonstrability of God’s existence. This naturally entails a shifting of the focus of attention from the problem of demonstration to that of the Divine Nature. The traditional proofs, too, are regarded as having a too metaphysical flavor and the modern mind is not amenable to metaphysical considerations. They tend to “formalize” God unduly and to place Him in an abstract sphere alienated from life. The modern approach demands that God be treated more

⁹⁰ Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, p. 239.

in function of the world and man: it is especially His relations to the latter that should claim interest. Men are no longer concerned with the nature of God as He is "in Himself"—His absolute aspect—but rather with the role He fills in relation to the world. The tendency is to democratize God, to present Him to men as the God of their needs and desires.

Personalists have generally tried to steer clear of such an over-pragmatic presentation of the doctrine of God. They have made a genuine attempt to preserve many of the speculative and metaphysical considerations of traditional theism. But the constant preoccupation with finding the "reinterpretation" which is deemed necessary, leads to a good deal of vacillation in the acceptance of cardinal tenets in the pure theism of Scholastic tradition.

The first crucial question that arises as regards the nature of God concerns the possibility and manner of ascribing personality to the Supreme Being. Adherents of the Bownean tradition find in the second stage of the theistic argument a decisive step towards the establishment of the divine Personality. For the latter phase of the proof is concerned with showing that the unitary World-Ground possesses at least one supremely personal attribute—that of intelligence. The cosmological argument, taken by itself, merely leads to the necessity of positing a unitary Being; it cannot further determine its nature. We could not even exclude the possibility that the unifying Being might be a blind, impersonal energy or force. But this hypothesis is seen to be excluded by the application of the second form of the causal argument, the so-called "physico-theological" or teleological proof. Taking up the same fact of experience—that of the interacting system which constitutes the world—it finds in it an evident implication of order. Without order, the interacting system would be lawless. This fact of order argues an intelligent Cause Who is its Author. And this inference is necessary whether we take as our starting-point the evidences of design in the inorganic world—which gives us what Bowne designates as the argument from order—

or whether we limit it to the complex structures and adaptations found in the organic realm, which yield us the argument from design.⁹¹ In either case we are led to infer intelligence as the source.

Does this conclusion immediately deliver us from all shades of impersonal monism and enable us to infer directly the personality of the Deity? Theistic personalists are at one in ascribing personality to the unitary Cause of the world, but they encounter considerable difficulty in determining the precise sense to be attributed to the term in this case. Bowne's designation of God as the "World-Ground" is in itself rather unfortunate, as savoring too much of the impersonal One of the Monists. Still, one must not always quibble at words; it is the underlying reality thus designated that really matters. And in this connection, there can be no doubt as to the truly personal character of the God of Bowne's theism.

Still, the personal character of God raises further problems for Personalists. To begin with, how is the notion of God as Person to be reconciled with His character of absoluteness? It has been argued that personality naturally and inevitably connotes some kind of limitation, and its application to God is an unwarranted piece of anthropomorphism. Personalists deny the incompatibility of the two and show how, on the contrary, they mutually imply each other in the concept of Deity. The compatibility of these two attributes is evinced from their definitions. "Absolute" does not necessarily bear the agnostic or symbolist sense of unrelated and hence unknowable; rather it signifies primarily independent in existence, the unconditioned, the perfect, the complete. On the other hand, personality implies basically no more than a conscious and free intelligence. And while personality in our experience is always of a necessarily limited type, this does not mean that it may not exist in a supereminent way in a transcendent Being, Who is superhuman. In other words, there is no contradiction in the

⁹¹ Bowne, *Theism*, pp. 75-76; Knudson, *Doctrine of God*, pp. 239-240; *Philosophy of Personalism*, pp. 293-301.

notion of a being who is at once Absolute, and thus transcends everything contingent; and also personal, in the sense of possessing the powers of self-direction and self-determination. Beyond this human reason may not be able to go; it may not be able to characterize the exact way in which personality is realized in God. But it can at least show the intrinsic possibility of such a personal being; and this is sufficient for Personalist theodicy.⁹²

This, however, is far from solving all the difficulties. In fact, it raises another problem of peculiar difficulty for Personalists. If God is conceived as the Absolute, must we not deny His relations to a finite, changing world; or, on the other hand, if we defend such relations, must we not abandon the idea of an independent, perfect Deity, and have recourse to the notion of a finite, limited God? Is God finite or infinite? And, in either case, is He related to a finite and changing world?

These questions offer much perplexity to the thought of even the most conservative Personalists. The latter, indeed, are deeply concerned with safeguarding the absoluteness of God in its full traditional significance.⁹³ His transcendence vis-à-vis the finite world is a necessary conclusion both for the theoretical and practical reason. Yet, great difficulty is experienced in the proper conception of these divine attributes and in their reconciliation with God's relations to creatures. So keenly are these difficulties experienced that many have concluded that we are forced to relinquish altogether the absoluteness and transcendence of God. E. S. Brightman thinks that we must posit an element of limitation in the divine nature, so that we can legitimately speak of a finite God. In Him, there is an element or content that resists the divine will, a tension between the possible and the actual, a recalcitrant and resisting factor that frustrates the realization of all the values possible to an infinite mind. Thus there is, within the will of God itself, a

⁹² Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 244-248, 299-305.

⁹³ Cf. especially *The Doctrine of God*, Chap. VII, pp. 242-284.

factor that thwarts the complete achievement of the divine purpose.⁹⁴ Thus God is not omnipotent.

Flewelling argues that we must either abandon the notion of an Absolute God, or else reject the possibility of such a God having any relations with a changing and limited world. A God related to a world of change is by that very fact limited. "Self-limitation is one of the leading characteristics of the Divine Person. . . . An immutable God could have neither part nor lot in a world of change."⁹⁵ To hold the notion of God as Absolute is, *ipso facto*, to reject His creation of the world, His relations with it, His Providence and the doctrine of the Incarnation. Such a conception must, consequently, be rejected. For it must be substituted the notion of God as organic with the universe, a God Who is continually adapting Himself to the needs, achievements and understandings of men, and Who works with them towards moral and spiritual good. And if it be objected that such a conception is incompatible with powers and perfections demanded by the doctrine of a Supreme Being, the answer is that the new notion does not necessarily imply an imperfect God. As long as we regard the limitations as self-imposed, the older notions of transcendence and absoluteness can be safeguarded. What is really needed is a moral and spiritual, rather than a philosophical conception of God. The continuity of creature and moral purposes implies the notion of God as the Supreme Continuum.⁹⁶

H. W. Carr is one among many who, under Bergson's influence, have toyed with the idea of a changing and growing God Who is necessarily finite. Like Howison, he rejects the notion of creation. The divine perfections do not necessarily entail *creatio ex nihilo*. The monad is essentially a continuous activity to which a past is essential, and the idea of its temporal creation *ex nihilo* is, therefore, a contradiction. Hence, the idea of God as creator or efficient cause of the world must be aban-

⁹⁴ Cf. E. S. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, Chaps. V and VII.

⁹⁵ R. T. Flewelling, "The Supreme Continuum," *The Personalist*, Vol. XXVII, 3 (1946), p. 255.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 255-261.

doned. For Howison, the prevalence and intensity of suffering and evil in the world are repugnant to the nature of God as a Being of Supreme Goodness and Love. The origin and preservation of nature and the world must be attributed to spirits other than God. God's dominion over creatures is more in the nature of a spiritual attraction, an ethical influence which implies final rather than efficient causality.⁹⁷

All these tentative reformulations represent so many reservations on the pure doctrine of classical theism. The creationist dilemma is but one example of a number of general difficulties on the question of God's relation to finite beings. These, in turn, are but phases of the central problem of the proper conception of how God can transcend the finite order and yet retain some degree of immanence in it. As against the deist conception of an "absentee landlord," it is felt that God must not be totally isolated from His world. On the other hand, God must certainly transcend the finite world-order, if any link is to be retained with the classical doctrines of traditional theism. If the notion of God is to retain any value for the theoretical or practical reason, He must not be conceived in any pantheistic fashion, as being totally immanent in the world, or as being but a phase or aspect of it. Yet how is His transcendence to be conceived, if He is to retain any relations with the world He has caused? Can an infinite and perfect Being have any relations with an imperfect and changing world? Or, if not, must He not be totally transcendent and unrelated to it? On the other hand, if such relations obtain, must He not lose His attributes of Infinity and Perfection and become an essentially finite God? Must He not, at least, undergo some form of "self-limitation," such as even a good theist like Bishop McConnell deems to be essential to Him.⁹⁸ In other words, how are the attributes of immanence and transcendence to be so adjusted that one does not cancel out the other, or that neither is derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being

⁹⁷ Cf. G. A. Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*, pp. 414 ff.

⁹⁸ Cf. F. J. McConnell, *Is God Limited*, pp. 20-21, 52-53.

as an infinite and personal God? This is a vital problem for any upholder of traditional theism, and it is one which Personalists have not yet successfully solved.

VII

In the preceding pages, we have been primarily interested in the character of the theistic doctrines of Personalists. No proper evaluation of these is possible, however, without taking account of the systematic character of the underlying philosophy. No system of natural theology is possible as an entirely autonomous science, totally independent of the other philosophical disciplines. As has been already pointed out, natural theology presupposes, especially, a science of general metaphysics of which it represents the crowning-point and necessary completion. It follows that, in the case of Personalism, a proper evaluation of its theistic doctrines necessarily entails a survey of its relevant metaphysical positions. These latter will, in fact, largely determine the attitude taken up with regard to the most important problems of theodicy.

Furthermore, the modern tendency to place a primary emphasis on a doctrine of knowledge and to institute an epistemological enquiry as a necessary prolegomenon to any systematic philosophy, necessarily affects our enquiry. For the noetic doctrines which are fundamental to systematic Personalism are not without their influence on the solution of problems in the domain of ethics, metaphysics, and theodicy. When we seek to determine the nature of deficiencies in the latter, we are often led back to seek their ultimate origin in some badly founded epistemological tenet. In particular, we have seen that the Personalist system is fundamentally vitiated by a too facile acceptance of certain Kantian epistemological doctrines. The voluntarism and fideism which are primary tenets of Personalism necessarily color the handling of the whole metaphysical enquiry, and especially the problem of God's existence and nature. If Personalists have succeeded in steering clear of complete agnosticism with regard to the latter, it is only at the

expense of logical consistency in suddenly renouncing their allegiance to pure Kantianism. Preoccupied, above all, with safeguarding the vital tenets of classical theism, they forget, perhaps, the integral character of these tenets with the broader epistemological and metaphysical phases of the philosophical enquiry. The theistic problem cannot be divorced from these settings; it is necessarily enshrined in the broader perspective of a metaphysics of knowledge and of being. A philosopher who begins his enquiry with an affirmation of voluntarism and anti-intellectualism will find it difficult, if not impossible, to keep in line with classical theism when he comes to the central problem of God's existence.

Even more vital is the strictly metaphysical background of theism. Here, again, the question of logical consistency is compelling and fateful. The bearing of metaphysical principles upon the whole discussion of theodicy is decisive and immediate. Allegiance to bad traditions and mentors in the former is destined to lead to interminable difficulties in the latter. And, under pressure of this allegiance, Personalists have been compelled to yield, or to modify significantly, some of the more important positions of traditional theism. The general metaphysical positions of Personalism do not constitute a satisfactory system for the rational explanation of the general laws of being. The problems raised by such questions as individuality, substance, activity and causality are not handled in a satisfactory fashion, and the resulting positions do not constitute a coherent and satisfying explanation of these aspects of finite being. Yet such doctrines are of vital importance to a rational explanation of reality; and they have particular relevance for the doctrine of God and the main problems of natural theology. There, in fact, we have the highest application of such general metaphysical principles; and deficiencies in their proper formulation will become especially evident when they are applied to reality in its highest form. An examination of a theistic doctrine such as that of Personalism, in the light of its general metaphysical foundations, can be very instructive on the value of the traditional background of Scholastic theodicy.

A crucial instance of such a fundamental deficiency may be found in the Personalist doctrine of unity. Broadly, this tenet is made to cover aspects of reality which were traditionally explained by the doctrine of *analogia entis*. The real similarity and diversity of all beings, and their proportional unity within the analogical notion of being, implying at the same time the characteristic articulation of finite beings in the composition of the metaphysical principles of essence and existence, are aspects of reality which must be explained by any satisfactory metaphysical system. Thomism finds its solution in the richly nuanced doctrine of *analogia entis*, which is the groundwork of its general metaphysical doctrine, and is the bulwark against all one-sided doctrines of monism and pluralism. In passing to natural theology, the crowning point of the metaphysical enquiry, Thomism finds the key to the solution of its main problems in an application of the same doctrine—the analogical method, with its triple way of causation, negation and eminence. A technically precise application of this method to the twin problems of God's existence and His nature enables the Thomist to avoid every shade of agnosticism, symbolism and anthropomorphism, and to present a consistent and metaphysically satisfying doctrine of God.

For the Thomist, the most fateful deficiency in the metaphysical phase of Personalism lies in its total neglect of the fundamental doctrine of analogy. Compared with this capital defect, erroneous theories of individuality, causality or substance are really secondary; even the most excellent formulations of these latter doctrines cannot eventually lead to an adequate metaphysical world-view, once the fundamental question of analogy has been misunderstood or neglected. From the systematic viewpoint of a full metaphysical world-view, the problem of analogy cannot be neglected without serious consequences for the whole theory of reality. This is as true of the doctrine of finite beings as it is of the problems of natural theology. All this is a consequence of the unity of the science of metaphysics: there is but one science of metaphysics, and its method is essentially the analogical method.

The error of Personalism is, perhaps, to attempt to save the tenets of traditional theism, while jettisoning many of the metaphysical doctrines which were its presupposition and foundation. The lesson of its failure is the truth that we cannot overestimate the importance of the whole metaphysical doctrine which is the philosophical basis of our rational justification of theism. Conversely, we must view with reserve all claims to present a new and more "modern" version of this theism, if such novelty is achieved only at the expense of jettisoning foundations that are essential to the structure. And as the problem of God is one with the most far-reaching consequences for man and his destiny, it is imperative to ensure that at no stage is its solution vitiated by false philosophy. St. Thomas has pointed out that a relatively small error in the initial stages of an enquiry may have more serious consequences in the final result. Nowhere is this more true than in the philosophical search for God.

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PLOTINUS' QUEST OF HAPPINESS



THE quest of happiness is a desire so deeply-rooted in man's nature that we see everyone occupied in acquiring what he calls happiness. Only a few men are fortunate enough to seek this goal where it really resides, but alas! the greatest number among them, toil in vain for the acquisition of this supreme good since they look for it in the wrong place. History of philosophy is particularly interesting and useful in this that it teaches us the object which the greatest minds of all times selected as the true end of human life. The ancient philosophers of Hellas have put forth various theories and doctrines concerning this problem and one of the most interesting and most approximate to truth was developed by the Platonic School; first with Plato, the Master and Founder of this trend of thought, but especially with one of his followers of the Neo-Platonist School of Alexandria, Plotinus.

Plotinus was born in Lycopolis (Egypt) around the year 206 A. D. and died in the Roman Campagna in 269 A. D. Formed by Ammonius Saccas, from whom he would have heard of the Christian doctrine,¹ he retained the best of Plato's doctrine and especially his theory of purification towards personal perfection and betterment. Throughout his life, he strove to abandon sensible frivolity in order to unite himself and, so to say, to lose himself entirely in the infinite ocean of perfection, in God, the One, as he calls Him, the source of all sensible and intelligible realities. His philosophy is a religious one, and for that very reason Plotinus had a great influence upon St. Augustine.

Throughout history the minds of men have wavered between two dispositions: optimism and pessimism. An important sec-

¹ Eleuterio Elorduy, S. J., "Ammonio Sakkas: la leyenda de su apostasia," in *Pensamiento*, 3 (1947), p. 5-27.

tion among the modern philosophers is but too inclined towards the latter. The supporters of Existentialism especially are very radical. They separate man from God, the Absolute, his strength and his end. Thus, the free creature is weakened and made unfit for attaining happiness and immortality. It is enough to recall the names of Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and Martin Heidegger. We know, however, that man has an unquenchable thirst for the Absolute, and unless he places the Absolute in the right object, he is doomed. Saint Augustine expresses the same thought very clearly when he says: "... for Thou hast created us for Thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in Thee."²

In the optimistic philosophy of Plotinus life really means something, contrary to the doctrine of the atheistic part of Existentialism. There is nothing tragic nor dramatic about life; it is simply a serious affair. In such a philosophy, man can be called a pilgrim of happiness. Plotinus assuredly is optimistic and with conviction. But his optimism is in no way comparable with the ardour and the juvenile enthusiasm of younger students of philosophy after their first contact with the marvellous world of essences. Plotinus had a late vocation to philosophy and began its study at the age of 28. For some time he remained deceived by the words of his first professors. Fortunately enough, he finally became acquainted with Ammonius, the lecturer in accord with his mind. For ten full years he followed his lectures. The philosophy he developed is a composite of the philosophies of Aristotle, Pythagoras and Plato with an evident preference for Plato. This was to make him particularly dear to St. Augustine. Plotinus accepted without discussion the platonic doctrines of the ideas and of the intelligible world and he brought them to their summit of dialectical perfection.

His philosophy acquired a religious value as yet unheard of, since it was destined to lead men to God through their own purification and unification. No wonder, then, that St. Augustine could make the following statement about Plotinus:

² *Confessions*, I, 1, n. 1.

Shortly afterwards, when all the persistent sophistry was dead, and when the clouds of error has been dispelled, then Plato's countenance—which is the cleanest and brightest in philosophy—suddenly appeared, especially in Plotinus. Indeed, this Platonist philosopher has been adjudged so like to Plato that they would seem to have lived together, but there is such a long interval of time between them that Plato is to be regarded as having revived in Plotinus.³

One can only understand the value of this praise if he remembers what St. Augustine said of Plato: "Plato, the wisest and most erudite man of his day, spoke in such a manner that importance attached to whatever he said, and he spoke such things as would not be unimportant no matter how he spoke them."⁴ Notwithstanding his retraction,⁵ Saint Augustine always had a great reverence and a great esteem for Plato.

One of the roles of philosophy, according to Plotinus, is to defend the gods from all accusations⁶ and he will perfectly fulfill this part of his program throughout his works but more especially in dedicating two treatises to the refutations of charges brought against Providence.⁷ Absurdity and anguish will thus be banned from human life. Man is the son of the One [God] and the end of life consists in a blissful union with God to whom man can ascend by demonstrations and contemplation. "The one end of his life was to approach and become one with the God over all," Porphyry assures us.⁸ The appeasement of this desire for the divine in whom rests happiness can also come from the repetition of our discourses.⁹

Therefore, if the normal goal of life lies above this world, earthly goods lose all their importance, and man should look upon earth only as that which should give homage to God. The human body, material and earthly as it is, has no more value than the rest of creatures and his biographer tells us that he was ashamed of living in a body. One day when his disciples desired to obtain his picture, Plotinus refused "as if [he said]

³ *Contra Academicos*, III, 41, tr. by Denis J. Kavanagh, O. S. A. in *The Fathers of the Church* (New York, Cima Publishing, 1948), p. 218.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 37, p. 212-213.

⁵ *Retractationes*, I, 1, 4.

⁶ IV, 3, 30.

⁷ III, 2; 3.

⁸ *Life of Plotinus*, 23, 15.

⁹ V, 3, 17.

it was not sufficient to bear this image with which nature has surrounded us, you think that a more lasting image of this image should be left as a work worthy to be inspected.”¹⁰ Despising, as we also should, material goods as not being essential and perfect good, Plotinus devoted himself entirely to religion and mysticism. “The retreat and sundering [he says], must not be from this body only, but from every alien accrue-ment.”¹¹ He strives to obtain intimate union with his Maker and if his biographer and most beloved disciple is faithful, Plotinus enjoyed this bliss four times during his existence, while the disciple, less fortunate than the Master, had the ecstasy only once during his life—and at the age of sixty-eight.

Two things only are considered to be worthy of interest by Plotinus: God and the soul, the first found in the interior of the second. God alone is the object of his quest; by giving back to his soul its beauty and primeval splendor, he will discover God, his architect. Everything else is indifferent to him. Here, as elsewhere, St. Augustine speaks in the same way, but, enlightened by Faith, surpasses him in his dialogue with Reason:¹²

Augustine. Lo, I have prayed to God.

Reason. Now what do you want to know?

Augustine. All those things which I have prayed for.

Reason. Sum them up briefly.

Augustine. I desire to know God and the soul.

Reason. Nothing more?

Augustine. Absolutely nothing.

And a few pages farther: “O God, ever the same; may I know myself, may I know Thee. This is my prayer.”¹³

Plotinus is in the spirit of the platonic tradition for which true realities are those unseen, but a mind confessing the limits

¹⁰ *Life of Plotinus*, 1.

¹¹ I, 1, 2. Tr. by Grace Turnbull, *The Essence of Plotinus* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1934).

¹² *Soliloquies*, I 2 (7), in *The Fathers of the Church* (S. Augustine, Vol. 1, 1947), p. 350.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

of the intellect, its unfitness to satisfy the real needs of the heart, as to say the last word of things, a soul tormented by a lofty ideal, which limits its ambitions to nothing short of the possession of God and which tends with courage and perseverance towards this beatific end.¹⁴ His belief is that the object most accessible to our researches and the most worthy of our observations is our soul, which in platonic philosophy signifies the whole man. He thus joins the Oracle of Delphoi through Socrates, the martyr of truth and light.

The starting point of his pilgrimage lies in a feeling of discomfort, in the clear consciousness that the present state of mankind is a state of downfall and of calamity.¹⁵ Instead of dwelling on this thought in a morbid fashion,¹⁶ he will take this opportunity to arrive at and to preach the urgent necessity of a return to the man that was,¹⁷ since man did not remain in the state of his creation.¹⁸ "The human soul, placed in the body, suffers evil and pain; it lives in affliction, desire, fear and all ills; the body is a jail and a tomb, a cavern and a den."¹⁹

The Platonists are at ease with the play on the words *σῶμα* (body) and *σῆμα* (grave, tomb, coffin). Soul united with the material and the corporeal is fallen, for matter is an evil principle. Struck by, and loving the apparent beauties of bodies, beauties which are in fact simple reflections of its own natural beauty, the soul declines without consideration²⁰ and descends or falls into the body, the mudpit. It is then soiled²¹ and unrecognizable; it is like gold covered with mud.²²

Superficial souls or people think in their perverse imagination that they effectively find joy and happiness in the company of the body, the sensible joys alone touch and move them. They claim that they really and fully live while passing from

¹⁴ René Arnou, S. J., *Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, Alcan, 1921), p. 15, *passim*.

¹⁵ This point was treated in "Man's Downfall in Plotinus," in *The New Scholasticism*, 29 (July, 1950).

¹⁶ See Gaston Carrière, O. M. I., "Plotin et la tragédie humaine," in *L'Année théologique*, 10 (1949), p. 97-115.

¹⁷ VI, 7, 15.

¹⁸ IV, 8, 3.

²¹ VI, 7, 31.

¹⁸ III, 3, 4.

²⁰ IV, 3, 14.

²² IV, 7, 10.

one sensation to the other; they are only sleepy-heads who, instead of wakening themselves, consume their existence in passing from one bed to another;²³ life in the body and in intimate connection with it is considered by Plotinus as a sleep and a dream. They ignore the fact that the body is an impediment to the soul because they form a dangerous and feeble union.²⁴ It is impossible to live happily in such a company;²⁵ death is better than bodily life.²⁶

The wise man, thanks to philosophy, appraises everything at its true value and in discovering the beauty of his soul is aware of its real place in the universe. He understands, according to the phrase of Plato, that men are in the nursery of the gods²⁷ and that God is the author of the human drama. He wrote the play and distributed the roles; the actor has but one thing to do, play his part in the best possible way he can.²⁸ The scene, of course, is larger than the stages of human fabrication; they choose between honor and infamy; reward or punishment will follow accordingly. Since we are not outworks in the universe²⁹ we fit into the general order and pattern of the world and if we "are astonished to find injustice among men, it is because we judge man as the most precious part of the world and the wisest of all beings."³⁰ His place in reality is in between gods and beasts, inclining at one time towards the one and at another time towards the other. Philosophy will elevate man. Man, as a partial thing, cannot be required to have attained to the very summit of goodness; if he had, he would have ceased to be of the partial order.³¹

If we take the liberty of criticizing Providence on that account, we are like ignorant critics who accuse the painter because he did not put beautiful colors everywhere,³² when in fact he put the convenient color in each place, taking the whole into consideration. Realizing the true dignity of man, we will be filled with love for him and his Maker and will be

²³ V, 6, 6.²⁴ IV, 4, 18.²⁵ I, 4, 16.²⁶ I, 4, 7.²⁷ *Phaedo*, 62 b.²⁸ III, 2, 17.²⁹ III, 3, 3.³⁰ III, 2, 8.³¹ III, 2, 14.³² III, 2, 11.

forced to admit that "man is a beautiful creature, as beautiful as can be"³³ and that "in the framework of the universe, man is more precious than all the other animals living on earth,"³⁴ he is of a divine nature.

Ills, then, will not affect us anymore and we will not be inclined to chide Providence for the existence of certain small animals "the ornament of the earth; [because] it is a ridiculous reproach to say that they sting men, as if men should pass their lives sleeping."³⁵ The wise man is not moved by the existence of evils; for without them, the universe would not be perfect³⁶ and they are useful to the whole even if we do not always perceive their utility. This is no hindrance to happiness.

. . . this is enough to tell us that all human intentions are but play, that death is nothing terrible, that to die in wars is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store, to go away earlier and come back the sooner. So for misfortunes that may accompany life, the loss of property, for instance; the loser will see that there was a time when it was not his, that its possession is but a mock boon to the robbers who will in their turn lose it to others, and even that to retain property is a greater loss than to forfeit it.

Murder, death in all its guises, the reduction and sacking of cities, all must be a spectacle as are the changing scenes of a play; all is but the varied incident of a plot, in and out of costume, acted grief and lament. For on earth, in all the succession of life, it is not the soul within but the shadow outside of the authentic man that grieves and complains and acts out the plot on this world stage which men have dotted with stages of their own construction. All this is the doing of man knowing no more than to live the lower and outer life and never perceiving that, in his weeping and in his graver doings alike, he is but at play; to handle austere matters austere is reserved to the thoughtful; the other kind of man is himself a futility. Those incapable of thinking gravely read gravity into frivolities which correspond to their own frivolous nature. We must remember, too, that we cannot take tears and laments as proof that anything is wrong; children cry and whimper where there is nothing amiss.³⁷

Taught by nature, the philosopher will easily understand that a part of the universe "fulfilling its role . . . is useful to the

³³ III, 2, 9.³⁴ II, 9, 13.³⁵ III, 2, 9.³⁶ II, 3, 18.³⁷ III, 2, 15.

beings capable of profiting by its action, but it also destroys or injures those who cannot sustain the impetuosity of its action, as we see plants roasted by the passage of fire, or small animals driven away or run over by larger ones,"³⁸ or the turtle, too slow, crushed by the marching army; so much the worse for it, why was it there, or why had it not walked faster? Nothing is more simple! For he who sees and understands, the world is beautiful³⁹ and elevating because its order is perfect.⁴⁰ It gives testimony of its own perfection⁴¹ while its government proves the grandeur of the intelligible world.⁴² The universe is unceasingly shouting: "God has made me; coming from Him, I am perfect."⁴³ This same thought is asserted by St. Augustine:

And what is this God? I asked the earth and it answered: 'I am not He'; and all things that are in the earth made the same confession. I asked the sea and the deeps and the creeping things, and they answered: 'We are not your God; seek higher.' I asked the winds that blow, and the whole air with all that is in it answered: 'Anaximenes was wrong; I am not God.' I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and they answered: 'Neither are we God whom you seek.' And I said to all things that throng about the gateways of the senses: 'Tell me something of Him.' And they cried out in a great voice: 'He made us.' My question was my gazing upon them, and their answer was their beauty.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, habit leads us to despise the most beautiful things: *assueta vilescunt*. "We would be astonished at the most ordinary things if someone would tell us of their operation, before we have had experience of them."⁴⁵ The world can seem evil because we attribute too much to spontaneity and chance to the prejudice of Providence⁴⁶ whose universal law directs absolutely all.⁴⁷ Universal order is divine and just; it distributes exactly to each one what is fitting for him; but ignoring the causes, our ignorance finds occasions to blame it;⁴⁸

³⁸ IV, 4, 32.⁴⁰ IV, 4, 45.⁴³ II, 9, 8.³⁹ II, 9, 4.⁴¹ III, 2, 2.⁴³ III, 2, 2.⁴⁴ *Confessions*, X, 6, tr. by F. J. Sheed (London, Sheed & Ward, 1945), p. 170.⁴⁵ IV, 4, 37.⁴⁶ III, 2, 1.⁴⁷ IV, 3, 16.⁴⁸ IV, 3, 16.

Providence always gives too much to creatures.⁴⁹ Let us not forget that we are entitled to nothing as creatures, nothing by ourselves, reliant entirely upon the first cause.

Plotinus therefore fulfilled very accurately his first function as a philosopher; that is, to purify Providence from all lack of wisdom and even from the appearance of injustice. We are very far here from the doctrines of Heidegger and Camus. Coming from God and living in a world, His product and to a certain extent His most perfect image, we feel a profound need of the Absolute within ourselves. We earnestly desire, even without realizing it, to return to Him who constitutes our own interior. God, for Plotinus, is more present to us than even we are to ourselves. St. Augustine has expressed it thus: "Thou wert more inward than my most inward part and superior unto my supremest."⁵⁰ There is a trace of God in us, in the most intimate part of our soul. Plato had said something very similar at the end of the *Alcibiades*.⁵¹ Sons of God, orphans having strayed away from Him so long that we have forgotten Him⁵² or prodigal or foolish sons roaming far from Him,⁵³ we must return to our Father, in whom alone we shall find happiness.

Plotinus explicitly asks the question: "Where must we go? Our journey is to the Good, to the Primal Principle."⁵⁴ And therefore, we must flee above, far from here.⁵⁵ Let us flee to the beloved Fatherland. But where is the Fatherland?

The Fatherland is There whence we have come, and There is the Father. This is not a journey for the feet; the feet brings us only from land to land; neither need you provide coach or ship; you must close the eyes and waken in yourself that other power of vision, the birthright of all, but which few turn to use.⁵⁶

At the same time, the philosopher teaches the end and the means of attaining it; a simple explanation will suffice. He asserts that it is "superfluous to say: Look towards God, if

⁴⁹ IV, 3, 3.

⁵⁰ *Confessions*, III, 6, "Intimior intimo meo et superior summo meo."

⁵¹ *Alcibiades*, 132 b.

⁵³ VI, 9, 7.

⁵⁵ I, 6, 8.

⁵² VI, 9, 9.

⁵⁴ I, 3, 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

we do not teach how to look; ⁵⁷ hence the questions: What art is there, what method, to bring us There where we must go? The Term we may take as agreed; our journey is to the Good, to the Primal Principle.” ⁵⁸ And he goes on to say that this truth has been demonstrated a thousand times and that the demonstrations given are also means of elevating ourselves to Him. Who is he who will elevate himself? “. . . Yes, the philosopher, an artist nature and a born lover must be led upwards.” ⁵⁹

His confidence in ultimate success is heartening, his optimism conquering, but his rationalism is too crude: the philosopher, the artist nature and the born lover must be led upwards. There is not the slightest allusion to the humble heart and to filial confidence in God. Prayer, according to him, is worthless in approaching the source of happiness. “What is really desirable for us is to go upwards by ourselves until we find what is best in ourselves.” ⁶⁰ The attainment of the vision is the work of him who wants to attain it. ⁶¹ “If one fails in his efforts, he alone is to be blamed for not having done all that he could to detach himself from everything, to be alone with himself alone.” ⁶² We do not obtain crops by praying, but in tilling the soil, and we become ill if we neglect the care of our health. ⁶³ “If some are unarmed, the well armed will defeat them. God was not bound to fight for the pacifists, the law exacts that in war one finds his salvation in his bravery and not in prayer,” ⁶⁴ and “divine law will not permit, if we are wicked, that we ask others to be oblivious of themselves to save us, by praying to them.” ⁶⁵ He also affirms that the gods cannot neglect their own lives to rule our particular affairs. Porphyry speaks in the same vein. “True piety does not consist in the mumbling of litanies and the slaughtering of victims.” ⁶⁶

Plotinus wanted a purer religion and he slandered the false piety of those who act on every occasion according to their

⁵⁷ II, 9, 15.

⁵⁸ I, 3, 1.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ VI, 7, 30.

⁶¹ VI, 9, 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ III, 2, 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ III, 2, 9.

⁶⁶ J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre* . . . (Gand, E. Van Goethem; Leipzig, B. C. Teubner, 1913), p. 114.

own liking and do nothing to please the gods. It would only be ridiculous to obtain salvation from the gods even though we performed none of the actions prescribed by them as means of salvation.⁶⁷ He is by no means loathe to criticize the material piety of his contemporaries.

You may not hope to see It with mortal eyes, as the saying is, nor in any way that would be imagined by those that make sense the test of reality and so annul the supremely real. For what passes for the most truly existent [sensible things] is most truly non-existent, while this unseen First is the Principle of Being and Sovereign over reality. You must turn appearance about or you will be left void of God. You will be like those at the festivals who in their gluttony cram themselves with things which none going to the gods may touch; they held these goods to be more real than the vision of the God who is to be honored, and so they have no share in the sanctities of the shrine. In these celebrations the unseen God leaves in doubt of His existence those who think nothing to be evident but what may be known to the flesh; it happens as if a man slept a life through and took the dream-world in perfect trust; wake him, he would refuse belief to the report of his open eyes and settle down to sleep again.⁶⁸

Men are returning to Plato's cave. Those who at the vision of the Supreme God are content with a glance at the escort⁶⁹ constitute another category of bad worshippers.

No, the journey to God is different; the pilgrimage is more spiritual; sightseeing, curiosity and greediness find no place in this ascent to the Holy Mount. The pilgrim must purify himself and get rid of all his environment, that is, of sensible things, and find himself anew, alone, pure, simple, in order to face the divine Solitude, the divine Purity and Simplicity. He states that "the purified soul is with God."⁷⁰ This separation from sensible things, from these charming trifles which bewitch us and hurl us far from our Father, is accomplished through philosophy.⁷¹ Withdraw into yourself and behold;⁷² it is within ourselves that, thanks to the feeble trace he left of Himself,⁷³ we can find Him and be united to Him.

⁶⁷ III, 2, 8.

⁶⁸ V, 5, 11.

⁶⁹ V, 5, 3.

⁷⁰ IV, 3, 24.

⁷¹ I, 1, 3.

⁷² I, 6, 7.

⁷³ III, 8, 9.

He would readily make his the words of Plato:

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? ⁷⁴

This is the good struggle. "It is the progress in the interior virtue of the soul, accompanied with prudence that leads to the vision of God; without true virtue, God is but a name." ⁷⁵ In order to enter the category of "divine men," ⁷⁶ one must be ready to accept all sacrifices. St. Augustine asserts something similar when he exacts a *disciplina* from the philosopher, he who is in quest of philosophy, of wisdom and happiness, he who wants to be called a *vir sapiens* and devote himself entirely to the *studium sapientiae*. He can aspire to the *studium sapientiae: qui bene vivit, bene studet, bene orat*. St. Augustine however insists on the first point: *qui bene vivit*, that is *summa opera danda est optimis moribus*.

In order that this be granted us, our greatest efforts should be for a life most virtuous; otherwise, our God will not be able to hear us. . . . Let our prayers not be, therefore, that wealth or honors or any fleeting and changeful things of that sort come to us—things that quickly pass away, no matter who may strive to hold them.⁷⁷

To youth listening to him, St. Augustine addresses the following:

Accordingly, this science imposes a twofold order of procedure on those who desire to know it, of which order one part pertains to the regulating of life, and the other pertains to the directing of studies. Youths devoted to this science ought so to live as to refrain from all wantonness, from the enticements of gluttony, from excessive care and adornment of the body, from silly practices of games, from the dullness of sleep and sloth, from jealousy, detraction, and envy, from the ambition for honor and power, and also from the unrestrained desire for praise. Let them be con-

⁷⁴ *Republic*, X, 608 b.

⁷⁶ V, 9, 1.

⁷⁵ III, 9, 15.

⁷⁷ *De Ordine*, 2, 20 (52).

vinced that love for money is an unfailing poison for all their hopes. Let them do nothing half-heartedly, nothing rashly. . . .⁷⁸

This also reminds us of some of the qualities demanded of the philosopher by Plato.⁷⁹ The sacrifices asked by Plotinus can be summed up in one word: "It is necessary to relinquish everything" and flee above⁸⁰ towards our beloved Fatherland.⁸¹ Then the body shall be treated as a stranger and shall be given just what is given to a foreigner: ⁸² it will be governed, also chastised and sometimes will have to be fought against in view of attaining the true end of man. All that purifies the soul will be used so that she may be brought nearer to her native simplicity and consequently nearer to God, Whom she is destined to possess. Purity and beauty of the soul consists in isolationism; ⁸³ "it should not be left to unite itself with other things"; ⁸⁴ it should not even look at them; it should not glance at these shadows.⁸⁴ To purify oneself is to awaken from absurd dreams, it consists in the separation of the soul from the body.

What is meant by the purification of the soul is simply to allow it to be alone; (it is pure) when it keeps no company, entertains no alien thoughts; when it no longer sees images, much less elaborates them into veritable affections. . . . Purification is the awakening of the soul from baseless visions, the refusal to see them; its separation consists in limiting its descent towards the lower, accepting no picture thence, in banning utterly the things from which it is separated, when, risen above the turbid exhalations of sensuality and superabundance, though not free of the flesh, it has so reduced the body that it may be tranquilly carried.⁸⁶

The body must experience suffering⁸⁷ and Porphyry holds that "it is necessary to know sorrow and tears to have a real impetus towards God; we must know that the world is but a sea of foolish agitations to feel that the only good resides in the purity of the soul and in the union with the infinite."⁸⁸

⁷⁸ *De Ordine*, 2, 8 (25).

⁷⁹ *Republic*, *passim*.

⁸⁰ III, 4, 2.

⁸¹ I, 6, 8.

⁸² VI, 4, 15.

⁸³ I, 6, 5.

⁸⁴ III, 6, 5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ I, 4, 14.

⁸⁸ J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, p. 114.

The casting off exacted by the union with God is absolute. He who wants to obtain this end "should renounce kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, spurning the world of sense beneath his feet, and straining to This, he may see!"⁸⁹ One should abandon "sensations, desires, wrath, and the other futilities by which we are completely inclined towards perishable things."⁹⁰ We should abandon all and it is through this renunciation that we shall be able to see Him.⁹¹ Elsewhere Plotinus insists: Leave everything,⁹² "it is necessary to relinquish all the rest and hold to Him alone,"⁹³ "life of the blessed is to be alone with Him alone."⁹⁴

Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful; he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labor to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiseling your statue until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendor of virtue, until you shall see the perfect Goodness established in the stainless shrine.

When you know that you have become this perfect work, nothing now remaining that can obstruct that inner unity, nothing from without clinging to the authentic man; when you find yourself wholly true to your essential nature, wholly that only veritable Light which is not measured by space, but ever unmeasurable as something greater than all measure and more than all quantity—when you perceive that you have grown to this, you are now become very vision: call up all your confidence, strike forward a step—you need a guide no longer—strain and see.⁹⁵

Let us remember once more in the words of Plotinus that exterior goods are not even useful to learn the flute;⁹⁶ we lose more in retaining them than in losing them.

After Plato, he would renew the exhortation: "Courage Thaetetus. So small as our strength might be, we must always go forward."⁹⁷ The stake is of a great value. At all costs,

⁸⁹ I, 6, 7.⁹⁰ V, 3, 9.⁹¹ I, 6, 7.⁹² V, 3, 17.⁹³ VI, 9, 9.⁹⁴ VI, 9, 11.⁹⁵ I, 6, 9.⁹⁶ I, 4, 15.⁹⁷ *Sophist*, 216 b.

we must become the men we once were ⁹⁸ and then we will see that it is not befitting nor reasonable to continue living this "life mixed with death." ⁹⁹ Have we forgotten that earthly lives are but narrowness and meanness and that vile and impure as they are, they stain purity? It is a hard work. True! But is he ignoring this, he who writes: "And for this the sternest and uttermost combat is set before the soul; ¹⁰⁰ all our labor is for this, lest we be left without part in this noble vision, which to fail of is to fail utterly": ¹⁰¹ we must leave everything. Words only? By no means. The practice of his disciples and his own bear testimony to his seriousness. The senator Rogatianus can be considered as a typical case. Having attained perfect detachment, he abandoned his wealth, sent away his servants, renounced his dignities, and refused to dwell in his own house. He was satisfied with eating only every other day. It is no surprise, then, if Plotinus considered him a model for philosophers. ¹⁰² I wonder if our modern philosophers would accept as readily such mortifications or the *qui bene vivit, qui bene studet, qui bene orat* of St. Augustine in order to insure the success of their vocation and profession.

Plotinus completely neglected the care of his body, never permitting any celebration of his birthday, ate no meat ¹⁰³ because he thought that happiness did not consist in stuffing oneself ¹⁰⁴ nor in the remembrance of a good meal partaken of ten years ago. ¹⁰⁵ Happiness does not even consist in a great and robust body. ¹⁰⁶ The wise man enjoys a lasting pleasure, and possesses serenity. ¹⁰⁷ Separated thus from everything, the purified and simplified soul becomes beautiful. It pertains wholly to the divine where the source of Beauty lies: ¹⁰⁸ it can be confident in itself, it can rise on high.

The love that the soul can now have for itself comes from

⁹⁸ VI, 4, 15.

⁹⁹ I, 6, 5.

¹⁰⁰ I, 6, 7.

¹⁰¹ I, 6, 7.

¹⁰² Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus*, 7.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰⁴ I, 1, 2.

¹⁰⁵ I, 5, 8.

¹⁰⁶ I, 4, 14.

¹⁰⁷ I, 4, 12.

¹⁰⁸ I, 6, 6.

the One "who beautifies his own lovers and makes them worthy to be loved" ¹⁰⁹ and this love does not constitute a self-esteem exclusive of all other loves, but the love of the God who contains in His universality our own good. We love because of the trace of the Good which "colors" it, so that to be in search of ourselves as we should is at the same time to be in search of the Good which is God.¹¹⁰ This love tends toward a fusion in the object loved.¹¹¹ Plotinus now describes the supreme degree of perfection and explains the role of love:

Knowledge of the Good, or contact with It, is the all-important; this is the grand learning, the learning, we are to understand, not of looking towards It but attaining, first, some knowledge of It. We come to this learning by analogies, by abstractions, by our understanding of all that is derived from the Good, by the upward steps toward It. Purification has the Good for goal; so the virtues, all right ordering, ascent within the Intellectual, settlement therein, banqueting upon the Divine—by these methods one becomes, to self and all else, at once seen and seer; identical with Being and Divine Intellect and the entire living All, we no longer see the Supreme as an external; we are near now, the next is That and It is close at hand, radiant above the Intellectual.

Here we put aside all learning; disciplined to this pitch, established in beauty, but suddenly swept beyond it all by the very crest of the wave of the Intellect surging beneath, the quester is lifted and sees, never knowing how; the vision floods the eyes with light, but it is not a light showing some other thing, the light is itself the vision. No longer is there object seen and light to show it, no longer Intellect and object of Intellection; this is the very Radiance that brought both into being.¹¹²

Uplifted by love, the Soul is pleasantly surprised at the sight of the beloved, and she desires to be united with Him at all cost.¹¹³ Lovers do not always know what they must love; we philosophers must teach them.¹¹⁴ Considering this beauty, the Soul then asks herself who is the Father of this beauty and, since the object of her love is boundless, the love she has for Him is also boundless¹¹⁵ and she is seized by mystical ecstasy.

¹⁰⁹ I, 6, 7.

¹¹⁰ René Arnou, S. J., *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹¹¹ V, 6, 6.

¹¹² VI, 7, 36.

¹¹³ VI, 7, 31.

¹¹⁴ V, 8, 8.

¹¹⁵ VI, 7, 32.

No longer can we wonder that That which evokes such longing should be utterly free from shape. The very soul, once it has conceived the staining love towards This, lays aside the shape it had. There is no vision, no union, while one is occupied with anything other than this; the soul must see before it nothing else, that alone it may receive the Alone.

Suppose the soul to have attained; the Highest has come to her, or rather has revealed Its presence; she has turned away from all about her and has made herself apt, beautiful to the utmost, brought into likeness (with the Divine) by the preparings and adornings known to those growing ready for the vision; she has seen that Presence suddenly manifesting within her, for there is nothing between, nor are they any longer two, but one; for so long as the Presence holds, all distinction fades; . . . The soul has now no foreign name, not man, not living being, nor anything at all; any observation of such things is beside the mark; the soul has neither time nor taste for them; This she sought and This she has found and on This she looks and not upon herself; and who she is that looks she has not leisure to know.

Once There she will barter for This nothing that the universe holds—no, not the heavens entire; than This there is nothing higher, nothing more blessed; above This there is no passing; all the rest however lofty lies on the downward path; she knows that This was the object of her quest, that nothing higher is. Here can be no deceit; where could she come upon truer than the truth? And the truth she affirms, that she is herself. In this happiness she knows beyond delusion that she is happy; for this is no affirmation of an excited body but of a soul become again what she was in the time of her early joy.

All that she welcomes of old,—office, power, wealth, beauty, knowledge—of all she tells her scorn as she never could had she not found their better; linked to This she can neither fear nor know disaster; let all about her perish, so she would have it that she may be wholly with This, so huge is the happiness she has won.¹¹⁶

Evidently "knowledge of the Good, or contact with it, is the all important," since Soul and God make only one,¹¹⁷ and since nothing separates them.¹¹⁸ The soul is happy and nothing can take away its happiness. Even sufferings are not an impediment to happiness, as Plotinus says:

¹¹⁶ VI, 7, 34.¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*¹¹⁸ VI, 8, 9.

If happiness did indeed require freedom from pain, sickness, misfortune, disaster, it would be utterly denied to anyone confronted by such trials; but if it lies in the acquiring of the authentic Good, why turn away from this Term and look to means, imagining that to be happy a man must need a variety of things none of which enter into happiness? If our quest is of one term alone, that only can be elected which is ultimate and noblest, that which calls to be the tenderest longings of the soul.¹¹⁹

Having left all things, the soul enters into the most intimate union with its Maker and sees only its Father, being blinded as it were by the light of the Father of all light. Yes, indeed, man must not seek to gaze upon this vision of God with mortal eyes.¹²⁰

Plato rightly said that after having seen the interior beauty, one is ready to do anything¹²¹ since the spiritual man is very far from the material man. The spiritual man, in the sight of God or at least in the assurance of His presence within the very core of his heart and mind, will find courage and strength to continue manly his earthly pilgrimage. The heathen Plotinus thought he had enjoyed this presence of God within his Intellect:

Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; living the noblest life, acquiring identity with the Divine; poised above whatsoever is less than the Supreme; yet there comes the moment of descent, and after that sojourn in the Divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be.¹²²

Assuredly the soul of man is a great thing. This passage of Plotinus inspired a corresponding page in St. Augustine:

Being by these books of the Platonists admonished to return to myself, I entered even into the secret chamber of my soul, for

¹¹⁹ I, 4, 16.

¹²⁰ V, 5, 11.

¹²¹ *Banquet*, 216, d, fol.

¹²² IV, 8, 1.

Thou wert become my Helper. And I beheld with the eye of my soul the Light unchangeable, above my intelligence. Not the common light which all flesh may see, nor a greater of the same kind; he who knows the truth knows that Light and he who knows that Light knows Eternity.¹²³

Such is the quest of a heathen. Plotinus searches for happiness and truth and he is assured of finding it, but with what amount of courage, resignation, suffering and mortification. He is right in asserting that true realities, true values, the most precious things, are not gold, money, success, material things, but the unseen, the spiritual goods and values. St. Augustine, the Christian, thought the same. This should be a lesson for our practical minds of to-day. And the sympathetic French author Peguy was equally right when he said:

Ce sont les mystiques qui sont même pratiques et ce sont les politiques qui ne le sont pas. C'est nous qui sommes pratiques, qui faisons quelque chose, et c'est eux qui ne le sont pas, qui ne font rien. C'est nous qui amassons et c'est eux qui pillent. C'est nous qui bâtissons, c'est nous qui fondons, et c'est eux qui démolissent. C'est nous qui nourissons et c'est eux qui parasitent. C'est nous qui faisons les oeuvres et les hommes, les peuples et les races. Et c'est eux qui ruinent.¹²⁴

Socrates, Plato, Plotinus are historical examples who deserve the recognition of all men for their lofty doctrines and teachings. Rightly had they occupied a place of choice in the minds of philosophers, poets and artists. The School of Athens of Raphael Sanzio consecrates their triumph and is equalled only by the following extract of the *Divina Commedia* of Dante:

When I had lifted up my brows a little,
The Master I beheld of those who know,
Sit with his philosophic family.

¹²³ *Confessions*, VII, 10, 16, tr. by Grace Turnbull, *The Essence of Plotinus* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 250.

¹²⁴ Quoted by W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), vol. 2, p. 181, note.

All gaze upon him, and all do him honor.
There I beheld both Socrates and Plato,
Who nearer him before the others stand.¹²⁵

St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa* adds his approval in quoting the praise of Macrobius who said: "Plotinus, together with Plato, foremost among teachers of philosophy."¹²⁶ This praise of Aquinas, however, does not mean that the philosophy of Plotinus is free of errors or even of great misunderstanding. No, by no means, but the Angelic Doctor has seen the strenuous intellectual effort of the Neo-platonist to come to an understanding of reality and the sincerity of his pilgrimage towards his Maker and God.

We must acknowledge with Plotinus that the end of man lies in his intimate union with God, but, supposing the supernatural elevation of man, the means he proposes are all but adequate. He belittles the value of prayer and over-emphasizes the strength and the efficiency of man's powers to attain the supernatural goal. His rationalism and insistence on man's capacity to develop his own abilities by himself is to be found quite often in Plotinus. On the other hand, he is surely to be praised for the insistence he puts upon the knowledge one should have of his soul and of his God, but, here again he is wrong, following Plato, in making the soul the real nature of man. Man is composed of body and soul, and every philosophy which forgets one of these elements cannot prevent being false.

Explaining matter as the evil principle, our Philosopher fails to discover its true nature. He does a great benefit to mankind in defending so well Divine Providence from accusations, but again he falls short by failing to understand the true Providence, really caring for creatures. God, according to him, has written the drama; we have to play our role without His help,

¹²⁵ *Inferno*, IV, 131 fol. (H. W. Longfellow translation.)

Poi ch'innalzai un poco più le ciglia,
vidi 'l maestro di color che sanno
seder tra filosofica famiglia.

Tutti lo miran, tutti onor li fanno:
quivi vid'io Socrate e Platone,
che 'nnanzi a li altri più presso li stanno.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ I-II, 61, 5, *sed contra*.

since prayer is of no avail and since God has something else to do.

He is in the true light by insisting on the beauty of the world as a means of elevation and also by stressing the fact that philosophy should separate us from sensible things and by exacting a real asceticism from the philosopher. This intellectual asceticism is not insisted upon in our days.

Finally, he renders a service to his fellow countrymen by ridiculing their commercial way of praying. But, once more, his rationalism blinds him. Had he taken advantage of Divine Revelation brought on earth by Christ and spread by His Church, Plotinus, to a certain degree, the father of St. Augustine, would have deserved without any reticence the praise of St. Thomas: "Plotinus, together with Plato, foremost among teachers of philosophy."

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BASIC CONFUSIONS IN CURRENT NOTIONS OF PROPOSITIONAL CALCULI

IN a preceding article,¹ we took note of three salient features in the so-called propositional calculi of modern mathematical logic: (1) the use of constants and variables to represent the possibility of propositional composition; (2) the tautologous character of all theorems in the calculus; (3) the *truth-functional* interpretation of such propositional compounds.

Nevertheless, it may be recalled that of these three features only the last one was the subject of any real discussion. Thus we sought to show how, when propositional compounds are interpreted truth-functionally, it is impossible to give any sort of adequate account of so-called implicative compounds. And yet at the same time, such compounds, so far from being dispensable or capable of being explained away, are actually presupposed and employed in any conceivable development of propositional calculi. Accordingly, interpreting the types of propositional composition that enter into these calculi truth-functionally, the calculi themselves are thereby rendered both inadequate and inconsistent. Nor did there seem to be any way out of the impasse, save that of frankly recognizing that these calculi are not descriptive of logic at all, and that their subject matter consists not of objects of second intention, but of first intention.

But why might not this third feature of the calculi be simply omitted? After all, it being only an interpretation, why would it not be possible merely to interpret implicative compounds in a way other than the truth-functional one, and thereby make it assured that the calculi were veritably *propositional* calculi? Indeed, the only reason we gave for our suggestion that the

¹ Veatch, H., "Aristotelian and Mathematical Logic," *The Thomist*, XIII (Jan. 1950), pp. 50-96.

calculi might have to be regarded as pertaining to objects of first intention rather than second intention was that, on the truth-functional interpretation of the theorems, these theorems simply ceased to be either adequately or consistently descriptive of propositional relations. Eliminate the truth-functional interpretation, therefore, and the whole difficulty might seem to vanish.

Not only that, but a random glance at the theorems in any one of these calculi would certainly seem to indicate that they were descriptive of propositions. Thus it simply is true of propositions that:

$$\begin{aligned} p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p \\ p \vee q \cdot \supset \cdot q \vee p \\ p \cdot \vee \cdot q \vee r : \supset : p \vee q \cdot \vee \cdot r \\ \sim p \vee \sim q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim (p \cdot q) \\ \sim (p \cdot \sim p) \end{aligned}$$

In other words, upon examination, theorems of this sort do turn out to be tautologous in the sense defined,² i. e. they are necessarily true, no matter what *propositional* values be substituted for the variables *p*, *q*, *r*, etc.

Moreover, to clinch the point that it might be possible to interpret the implicative compounds in the calculus in a way other than truth-functionally, we need only remark that this has actually been accomplished. For Prof. C. I. Lewis, in his so-called calculus of strict implication, has in effect done just this. Thus to follow Prof. Lewis' own account, he says, speaking of the truth-functional interpretation of propositional compounds: "In the usual terms, this means that the truth or falsity of *p* and *q* being given, the truth or falsity of $\sim p$, of $p \supset q$, of $p \vee \sim q$, of $p \cdot \supset \cdot q \supset p$, and of every other function of *p* and *q*, which can figure in the system is thereby categorically determined. Any system having this character—that there is no function or relation of the elements which is in the system except such as are categorically determined to be true

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

or to be false by the truth or falsity of their elementary terms—may be called a ‘truth-value system.’”³

On this basis, then, continues Prof. Lewis, “ $p \supset q$ definitely holds except when p is true and q false, in which case it definitely fails to hold. This is, in fact, exactly what is expressed by its definition.

$$p \supset q \cdot = \cdot \sim (p \sim q) \cdot$$

By contrast $p \rightarrow q$ ⁴ is definitely false if p is true and q false, but is not determined to be either true or false in the other three cases: whether it holds or not depends on something else than merely the truth or falsity of p and q .”⁵

Apparently, then, in such a system of strict implication there would be obviated all of the paradoxes and difficulties attendant upon a merely truth-functional interpretation of implicative compounds. And this being so, we would seem to be left with a propositional calculus which would unquestionably be a calculus of propositions, and which in intricacy and detail would quite surpass anything that had ever been developed in the Aristotelian tradition. Accordingly, the claim of the mathematical logicians to have taken up the whole of Aristotelian logic and to have absorbed it within their own far more extensive systems would, after all, seem quite justified.

And yet the issue is not so simple. For let us suppose now that we have before us an elaborate propositional calculus of the familiar pattern and developed according to the logistic method, but which at the same time has been entirely purified of all paradoxes attendant upon a truth-functional interpretation of propositional composition.⁶ Even so, such a system will present a most dubious feature.

³ Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic* (New York and London: The Century Co., 1932), p. 199.

⁴ Prof. Lewis uses the symbol, \rightarrow , to signify his so-called strict implication, in contrast to the symbol, \supset , which signifies mere material implication.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁶ In a sense, of course, this must not be taken to be exactly descriptive of Prof. Lewis' system of strict implication altogether but rather to show how it may be derived from strict implication.

And to consider what this feature is, let us choose two possible theorems from the calculus and compare them rather closely.

$$\begin{aligned} p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p^7 \\ p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r^8 \end{aligned}$$

So far as the system is concerned, these two theorems are, one might say, generically of the same kind. This would mean that there was no difference between them, other than the specific differences arising from the fact that they are constructed out of different constants and variables, grouped in somewhat different ways.

And yet no sooner does one remind oneself of the inescapably *intentional* character of all logical entities, and so come to view these theorems in their function as vehicles of knowledge, than one is immediately struck by a difference that is nothing short of generic. Moreover, in order to observe these logical entities functioning intentionally, we have but to supply values for the variables. Thus let

$$\begin{aligned} p &= \text{Virtue is knowledge} \\ q &= \text{Virtue can be taught} \\ r &= \text{Virtue should be introduced into the} \\ &\quad \text{school curriculum.} \end{aligned}$$

Accordingly, our two propositions can then be exemplified in concrete arguments of this sort: ⁹

⁷ For the present, we shall continue to use the commoner symbol, \supset , rather than the symbol, $\supset\cdot$.

⁸ It may be noted that this theorem is laid down as a postulate in Prof. Lewis' system. We shall have much to say subsequently regarding the significance of this fact. Cf., *infra*, p. 256.

⁹ It will be noted immediately that when we give content to these formulas, we also change their character. Thus the formula itself is given as a single hypothetical proposition, whereas when the forms are given content, they cease to constitute a single proposition and become instead more like an argument made up of several propositions.

The reason for this is obvious. When a single hypothetical proposition is used, the object of one's intention is unequivocally an object of second intention. (For example, when one says $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$, or even were one to give this

I. $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$

If virtue is knowledge, it can be taught. Therefore, if virtue can not be taught, it is not knowledge.

II. $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$

If virtue is knowledge, it can be taught. If virtue can be taught, it should be introduced into the school curriculum.

Therefore, if virtue is knowledge, it should be introduced into the school curriculum.

Clearly, when these two examples of implicative compounds are given content in this manner and so come to be recognized precisely in their character of being themselves intentions and as means of knowing, it should immediately become apparent that, when compared with one another, they stand for arguments of very different types. For consider how differently the conclusion is related to its supporting evidence in each of the two cases.

Thus in the second example, there is unquestionably a genuine attempt to prove or demonstrate a certain conclusion, the conclusion, viz., that if virtue is knowledge, it should be introduced into the school curriculum. And the way this conclusion is proved is through the medium of the teachability of virtue.

But contrast with this the first example. There the conclusion is that if virtue cannot be taught, it isn't knowledge. And

formula content in some such manner as the following: "If one can assert that if virtue is knowledge it can be taught, then one can assert that if virtue cannot be taught, it is not knowledge"—clearly, what one is intending here are propositions and not what the propositions are about.) On the other hand, when one removes the hypothetical character of the original proposition and expresses the whole in separate propositions, then the object of one's intention is clearly an object of first intention.

Our justification for such a shift in intention is to be found in that contention which we were so insistent upon in our preceding article, viz. that only in so far as the objects of logic are regarded as being themselves intentions (i.e. as instruments whereby the first intentions of the mind can be carried out), can they be properly understood. Hence we have changed the hypothetical character of our two original formulas simply in order to point up the inescapably intentional character of these logical entities.

on what grounds is this asserted? Merely on the grounds that if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught. However, there is no mediating evidence here. On the contrary, the so-called conclusion would really seem to be little more than an alternative way of stating the very same truth that was expressed in the original proposition.

And in this respect our present example resembles that illustration which we cited previously:¹⁰

Every physical body is subject to gravitational forces.

Therefore, nothing that is not subject to such forces is a physical body.

Here certainly, there can be no question of a proof or demonstration of a previously undemonstrated truth. Instead, it is merely a case of the same truth, being first asserted affirmatively and then asserted negatively.

Moreover, this kind of relationship between propositions—according to which the one proposition, instead of following from the other as a conclusion, constitutes merely a different formulation of the same truth—has come to be known by the name of immediate inference.¹¹ In other words, it is the thrust of our present argument that a propositional calculus of the sort we are now considering quite fails to take note of the difference between so-called mediate and immediate inferences. Thus, to revert to the example which we have chosen, the implication of $\sim q \supset \sim p$ by $p \supset q$ is very different from the implication of $p \supset r$ by $p \supset q$ and $q \supset r$: in the former case, the consequent represents merely another way of stating the same truth that is propounded in the antecedent; in the latter

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 75, note 39.

¹¹ As we shall try to show later (*infra*, p. 251) this term "immediate inference" is in all ways unfortunate: it is without historical warrant in the Aristotelian tradition, and is entirely misleading in itself. However, its use is so prevalent in modern discussions of Aristotelian logic that one finds it difficult to dispense with. Accordingly, we shall introduce it here simply out of deference to current usage and shall then discard it later when the real nature of that which it is supposed to designate has been made clear.

case, the consequent represents an entirely new truth that may be inferred from the premises laid down in the antecedent.¹²

But perhaps our thesis has been established somewhat too hastily. For are we perfectly clear as to the nature of the distinction between mediate and immediate inferences? Is it even a valid distinction? And if valid, is it really pertinent to the theorems of the propositional calculus? After all, we have thus far observed its applicability only in the case of two rather isolated examples. Besides, even supposing that the various propositional calculi do overlook the distinction between mediate and immediate inference, does that really make so much difference? Would the calculi themselves be invalidated or even weakened, merely as a result of such an omission?

To these questions, then, we must address ourselves. And to begin with, let us consider somewhat further what is meant by this distinction between mediate and immediate inferences. Fundamentally, of course, the distinction does turn on the point which we have already mentioned: a mediate inference purports to be a proof of a new and as yet undemonstrated truth, whereas an immediate inference involves only a different propositional formulation of the same truth. However, consequent upon this basic point of difference, there are other somewhat more superficial ways of bringing out the distinction. Thus, for instance, an immediate inference is said to be an inference from a single proposition, whereas a mediate inference always presupposes two propositions as premises. Also, in an immediate inference, the inferred proposition must always have the same terms (though not necessarily of the same quality or in the same order) as the original; on the other hand, in a mediate inference two terms are joined in the conclusion which were not joined in the premises.

Turning, then, to the theorems of the propositional calculi, do we find that these criteria for distinguishing between the two types of inference are really applicable? Well, we have,

¹² Cf. Maritain's excellent discussion of this. *An Introduction to Logic* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 162-164.

of course, already seen how in the case of the two theorems, $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$ and $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$, the application of the first and most fundamental of our three criteria serves to bring out the fact that the former of these two theorems is an example of immediate inference, and the latter an example of mediate inference. But now let us consider the application of the last two criteria.

For instance, the third of our criteria stated that in any immediate inference the terms of the two propositions must be the same, save for possible differences in order or in quality. Now as is well known, this criterion has traditionally been applied to categorical propositions. And yet could it not be applied to hypothetical propositions equally well? Thus a categorical proposition is one that is made up of two terms, a subject and a predicate. On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition has for its component elements, not terms, but whole categorical propositions. Moreover, just as in categorical propositions the terms are joined by a verb copula, so also in hypothetical propositions the component elements are united by a copula; but this time the copula is not a form of the verb "to be," but rather is a conjunction of the type "if-then," "either-or," etc.¹³ Nevertheless, the analogy between the *terminal* components of categorical propositions and the *propositional* components of hypotheticals is sufficiently close to warrant our treating them alike when it comes to the application of the criteria of immediate inference.

For example, take a theorem from the propositional calculus, such as $p \vee q \cdot \supset \cdot q \vee p$, and compare it with an instance of simple conversion in the case of categoricals, e. g. SeP into PeS. Clearly, in the one case as in the other, we may say that the "terms" of the "converse" are the same as those of the "convertend," except so far as their order is concerned.

Likewise with respect to the so-called obverses, contraposi-

¹³ Cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus*, Log. I.P. Summul. Lib. II. Cap. VII: "Et sic differunt hypothetica et categorica penes copulas et penes extrema copulata, quia hypothetica non unit verbo, sed particula 'et,' vel 'si' et similibus; nec immediate unit terminos, sed propositiones."

tives, inverses, etc., of categorical propositions, there would seem to be analogies to these in the propositional calculus.¹⁴ Indeed, we have already remarked on how the relation of $p \supset q$ to $\sim q \supset \sim p$ is analogous to the relation of SaP to $Se\ non-P$.¹⁵ Or again, relations such as that of $p \supset q$ to $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$, or that of $p \vee q$ to $\sim(\sim p \cdot \sim q)$,¹⁶ etc. would all seem to be instances of what the Scholastics were wont to call the equipollence of propositions. Obviously, in all these cases, the criterion of immediate inference that the "terms" of the propositions must be the same is upheld. For in all these cases the "terms" of the original proposition and its equipollent are the same, except for the necessary changes in quality or in order or perhaps even in copula.

And as for the opposition of propositions, we find that here, too, just as categorical propositions having the same terms may none-the-less be opposed in quality or quantity or both, so also hypothetical propositions having the same component elements may nevertheless be opposed in quality and in the type of copula uniting them. For example, $p \cdot \sim q$ is certainly opposed to $p \supset q$, or $\sim p \cdot \sim q$ to $p \vee q$, etc.

Moreover, turning to the second of those three criteria by which immediate inferences may be distinguished from mediate inferences, we find that it, too, is just as readily applicable to hypothetical propositions as to categoricals. According to this criterion, an immediate inference proceeds from a single proposition, whereas a mediate inference proceeds from two propositions. Very well, then, let us examine our two earlier examples

¹⁴ Prof. Tarski is the only contemporary logician we know of who has actually spoken of "inverses," "converses," "contrapositives," etc. in connection with what the Aristotelians would call hypothetical propositions. Of course, he does not seem to be at all aware of the significance of such immediate inferences, so far as the general nature of the propositional calculi is concerned. Cf. his *Introduction to Logic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1946), pp. 44-47.

¹⁵ To be sure, the analogy is not strict: the two categoricals which we cited are the obverses of each other, whereas the two hypotheticals are really contrapositives.

¹⁶ Considered as examples of immediate inference these last are somewhat different from our preceding examples since they involve not just changes in quality or in order but also in copula.

in the light of this criterion and see what it reveals about them. First, with the theorem $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$, it is obvious that the consequent $\sim q \supset \sim p$ does follow from the single proposition $p \supset q$. To be sure, the p and the q are each of them symbols standing for whole propositions and not mere terms. And yet as we saw in our earlier analysis of so-called hypothetical compounds,¹⁷ the component propositions in such compounds really lose their identity as independent propositions and are absorbed into the unity of the single compound proposition. Accordingly, $p \supset q$ must be regarded as a single proposition from which $\sim q \supset \sim p$ is, to use the common phrase, immediately inferrable.

On the other hand, in $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$, the consequent $p \supset r$ is not inferrable from either $p \supset q$ alone or from $q \supset r$ alone, but from *both* propositions taken together. In other words, the inference is mediate rather than immediate, the mediating factor being, as we have seen,¹⁸ that proposition which is common to both premises, viz., q . Of course one might object that just as in the case of $p \supset q$, the p and the q lose their independent status as propositions and become absorbed in the unity of the whole proposition, $p \supset q$, so also in the case of $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r$, the separate propositions, $p \supset q$ and $q \supset r$, lose their independence and become mere elements in the single proposition, $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r$.

However, there is a difference in the two cases. For one thing, the proposition $p \supset q$ represents what we have chosen to call a hypothetical compound, whereas the proposition $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r$ represents a categorical compound; and not only that, but a categorical compound that is in no wise implicative in character. In consequence, we can see that in such a conjunction the component propositions do not necessarily forfeit their independence in the way in which they do in a hypothetical compound.

Of course, a mere conjunction such as $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r$ could be regarded as a unit, and a unit in which the component propo-

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 67 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 242.

sitions do to an extent lose their independence. Thus consider a proposition of this sort $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset q \supset r \cdot p \supset r$. Here the consequent follows upon the antecedent, considered precisely as a unit.¹⁹

On the other hand, in the proposition $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$, the antecedent is not regarded as a unit in the same sense at all. And as a sign of this, it may be noted that for $p \supset r$ to be inferred from $p \supset q$ and $q \supset r$, it makes no difference whether $p \supset q$ and $q \supset r$ actually are united in a single conjunctive proposition, if one wants to call it such, or whether they be considered as two separate propositions; in either case, the conclusion will follow.

On the other hand, to derive the proposition $\sim q \supset \sim p$ from p and q , it is absolutely necessary that p and q not be regarded as separate and independent propositions, but rather that they be taken up into the unity of the hypothetical compound, $p \supset q$. In other words, an immediate inference can be derived only from a single proposition; or if the proposition be a compound one, it is essential that the component elements be completely subordinated to the unity of a single whole. On the other hand, in a mediate inference the conclusion must always be drawn from two propositions, taken either separately or as loosely conjoined in a categorical, non-implicative compound.

However, let us consider still another example—the theorem $p \cdot p \supset q : \supset \cdot q$. Clearly, such a *modus ponens* argument is a case of mediate, not of immediate inference. But let us see in precisely what sense the conclusion q represents an inference from two propositions taken as premises. In our preceding study, we have seen how any *modus ponens* argument is really nothing but a categorical syllogism. Thus the conditional proposition, $p \supset q$, itself is really a disguised syllogism in which at least one of the premises is accepted only conditionally. However, with the assertion of the proposition, p , this hypothetical and conditional character of the argument is removed, with the result that one is left with a straight-forward cate-

¹⁹ For a further discussion of the sort of situation here described, cf. *infra*, p. 253 ff.

gorical syllogism. And naturally, in any syllogism the conclusion follows from *two* premises.

Supposing, then, that we recognize that there are these three criteria of immediate inference, and supposing, too, that we recognize these three criteria to be applicable to hypothetical as well as to categorical propositions—immediately we can approach a typical calculus of propositions and, going down the list of theorems, discriminate between those which represent types of immediate inference, and those which represent types of mediate inference. Thus, for instance, if we examine the first 41 theorems (11.1-13.5) in Prof. Lewis' system of strict implication, we notice that they fall into the following major groups.²⁰

First, the great majority of them are obvious formulas of immediate inference in the sense explained. Thus consider the following by way of example:

$$11.4 (pq) r \cdot \supset \cdot p(qr)$$

$$12.15 pq \cdot = \cdot qp$$

$$12.4 \sim p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset p$$

$$12.6 pq \cdot \supset \cdot r := : q \sim r \cdot \supset \cdot \sim p := : p \sim r \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q$$

$$13.4 p \vee (q \vee r) \cdot \supset \cdot (p \vee q) \vee r$$

Second, there are a few theorems which would seem to be constructed somewhat on the analogy of so-called identical predication²¹ in the case of categorical propositions. For example,

$$11.3 p \cdot \supset \cdot pp$$

$$12.1 p \supset p$$

$$13.3 p \vee p \cdot \supset \cdot p$$

²⁰ It should be noted that this grouping is our own, not Lewis'.

²¹ Gredt contrasts such "identical predication" with the more usual "formal predication." Cf. *Elementa Philosophiae*, I, (Freiburg: Herder, 7th ed., 1937), p. 114.

John of St. Thomas points out how in the case of such identical predication the distinction between subject and predicate involves a mere "distinctio rationis ratiocinantis," in contrast to a "distinctio rationis ratiocinatae." Cf. *op. cit.*, Log. II. P. Q. II, Art. III.

Third, there are some theorems of this type:

$$\begin{aligned} 12.17 & pq \cdot \supset \cdot p \\ 12.72 & \sim p \supset \sim(pq) \\ 13.2 & p \cdot \supset \cdot p \vee q \end{aligned}$$

Finally, there are five theorems which would seem clearly to be formulas for mediate inference. Of these, two are introduced as postulates, the two, namely, that we have already had occasion to call attention to:

$$\begin{aligned} 11.6 & p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r \\ 11.7 & p \cdot p \supset q : \supset \cdot q \end{aligned}$$

The other three are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 12.75 & q \supset r \cdot p \supset q : \supset \cdot p \supset r \\ 12.77 & p \supset q : qr \cdot \supset \cdot s : \supset : pr \cdot \supset \cdot s \\ 12.78 & p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot r \supset s : \supset \cdot p \supset s \end{aligned}$$

Now of these four types of theorems, the second and third types would seem to be instances of immediate inference and hence reducible to the first group. That this should be so with the theorems in the second group may be taken as obvious. That it should also be so with the theorems of the third group is perhaps not so obvious. As a matter of fact, there would seem to be something rather dubious about a theorem of the type of 13.2, $p \cdot \supset \cdot p \vee q$. For is it really the case that any proposition, p , necessarily implies its own disjunction with some other proposition, q ? And yet a detailed criticism of such a theorem would hardly be germane to the purpose of our present enquiry. Suffice it to say, therefore, that if such a theorem as $p \cdot \supset \cdot p \vee q$ be admitted, it would presumably be admitted as a formula of immediate inference rather than mediate inference. Consequently, we may conclude that nearly all of the theorems in the calculus are formulas for so-called immediate inference, only a few being in the nature of mediate inferences.

But now having considered both the nature of the distinction between immediate and mediate inference, as well as its applica-

bility to the propositional calculus, it remains for us to consider its peculiar significance with respect to this same calculus. And to begin with, it might be well to note how the term "immediate inference" is not a term that is to be found in the Aristotelian tradition proper at all; on the contrary, it is a term that has made its appearance only among the latter-day corruptions of that tradition. Nor is it in any wise an appropriate term. For as Maritain has so effectively pointed out, so-called immediate inferences are not inferences at all. On the contrary, as he says, even though they involve an "act of passing from one proposition to another proposition which follows from one proposition to another proposition which follows from the first (the word *other* here refers only to the *disposition of the terms or concepts* in the proposition), . . . still these propositions do nothing but *purely and simply signify the same truth*; . . . they are merely two different ways of saying the same thing, of constructing the same object of assent."²²

On the other hand, he insists, "in every inference properly so-called the mind passes from one proposition to an *other* proposition which follows from the first, the word *other* being here related to the *intelligible object itself which is presented to the mind*. . . . It is evident then that, when the word *inference* is taken in its proper sense, *there can be no immediate inference*."²³

But if they are not to be regarded as inferences, how then, are these converses and opposites and obverses etc. of propositions to be regarded in the Aristotelian view? The answer is that they are to be regarded as the *properties* of propositions. In other words, any proposition by its very nature stands in relation to certain other propositions, viz. its converse, its obverse, its opposites, etc.; and such relations may be regarded as among the properties of that proposition.²⁴ Consequently, when it is said that the propositional calculi of the mathematical logicians consist largely of formulas of immediate infer-

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Cf. John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Log. I, P. Summul. Lib. II, Cap. XVI.

ence, what is really meant thereby is that such propositional calculi in large measure represent efforts to trace out the various properties of the almost limitless possible kinds of hypothetical and conjunctive propositional compounds.

Moreover, this fact serves to clear up a point that might be a source of no little confusion. For one might wonder how it happens that, if a propositional calculus be supposed to involve for the most part mere immediate inferences, the immediately inferred propositions are nonetheless proved and demonstrated in the calculus. For example, $\sim q \supset \sim p$ is held to be immediately inferable from $p \supset q$; and yet at the same time, in the calculus it is not immediately inferred at all, but rather is demonstrated through the use of the operation which Prof. Lewis calls "substitution" and ultimately, too, through the use of what he calls "inference,"²⁵ both of which operations, as we have already had occasion to note in our earlier article,²⁶ are really syllogistic in character.

Nevertheless, the supposed difficulty here arises entirely from the use of the unfortunate term "immediate inference." Accordingly, if one but bears in mind that what are here being considered are properties of the propositions in question, then the difficulty will vanish. For instance, let it be recognized that it is simply a property of a proposition of the form $p \supset q$ that it should be related to its contrapositive $\sim q \supset \sim p$. It should then be apparent that just as one may use a syllogistic demonstration to prove the existence of properties of real beings, e. g. the power of articulate speech in men, so also one may use a syllogistic demonstration to prove the existence of properties of certain beings of reason like propositions, e. g. that a proposition like $p \supset q$ implies $\sim q \supset \sim p$. In short, in the latter case the demonstration would be about objects of second intention, whereas in the former it would be about objects of first intention.

²⁵ Thus cf. how in Prof. Lewis' system, theorem 12.43 is proved through 12.42, and 12.42 through 12.41, and 12.41 through 12.4. Lewis and Langford, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 84-86.

But now with all this behind us by way of elaboration, our earlier contention should receive not only confirmation but supplementation. For this contention was, it will be remembered, that in the propositional calculi of the mathematical logicians, even when purified of any sort of truth-functional interpretation of propositions, there is still a total disregard of the distinction between mediate and immediate inferences. Accordingly, having now seen that so-called immediate inferences are not inferences at all, but rather properties of propositions, and having seen also that all propositional calculi seem for the most part to involve demonstrations of these properties of propositions, the question arises as to whether such properties of propositions should not be the exclusive concern of these calculi.

In fact, if we but remind ourselves of the basic structure of Aristotelian logic—the division, namely, into a doctrine of terms, a doctrine of propositions, and a doctrine of argument—it would seem only proper that all investigations of the properties of propositions should belong under the doctrine of propositions, whereas all investigations of the nature and structure of inferences should belong under the doctrine of argument. Accordingly, one may well ask the question, “By what right and title does a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ belong in the same calculus with a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$?” After all, in a proposition of the latter type, the proposition that is set forth in the consequent represents a property of the proposition that is set forth in the antecedent. Consequently, such a proposition would seem to belong in a calculus devoted to the description and exfoliation of the properties of propositions. On the other hand in a proposition such as $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$, the consequent, $p \supset r$, is in no sense a *property* of the antecedent, but rather a *conclusion* following from the two propositions set forth in the antecedent. Consequently, its proper place would seem to be in the doctrine of argument and not in any calculus of propositions at all.

To be sure, it is perfectly understandable how such a proposition as $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ should enter into such a cal-

culus as a mere component part of some still more compound proposition. For instance, one might construct a theorem of this sort:

$$p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r :: \supset :: q \supset r \cdot p \supset q : \supset \cdot p \supset r$$

or of this sort:

$$p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r :: \supset :: p \supset q : q \supset r :: \supset :: p \supset r \\ \cdot \supset \cdot r$$

Theorems like this are, of course, perfectly legitimate in a calculus that is strictly devoted to the task of tracing out the properties of propositions, for that is what these theorems themselves are expressive of, and of nothing else.

Indeed, any syllogistic inference is capable of being expressed in a single proposition; and as a single proposition, there will be properties pertaining to it. Thus even $p \supset q$, as should be apparent from our earlier discussion,²⁷ can represent a syllogistic inference. Nevertheless, considered as a single proposition, the inference represented by $p \supset q$ has certain properties, e. g. its relation to $\sim q \supset \sim p$. Consequently, $p \supset q$ enters into a properly propositional calculus simply in terms of its relationships to its obverse, converse, opposites, etc.

Nevertheless, granted that $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ might appropriately be a part of a propositional calculus so long as it were considered precisely in its character as a single proposition, the question that now confronts us is as to how such a proposition can enter into a propositional calculus, *as being itself a theorem of that calculus*. For considered in this way and all by itself, $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ is not expressive of a property of any single proposition, but rather of a conclusion following from two propositions. This being the question, let us see how the mathematical logicians attempt to answer it, and whether they are able to adduce any really adequate grounds for introducing such a theorem into their calculi.

Now of the mathematical logicians, some rely upon the test of the matrix method for the admission of theorems into the

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 74 ff.

calculus, while others use the logistic method. Accordingly, if the matrix method be used, a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ would certainly seem legitimate as a theorem. For when subjected to the test of a truth-table, such a proposition will be found to register "true" for all possible truth-values of its component elements. In other words, the proposition is seen to be a tautology,²⁸ and this is supposed to determine whether a given proposition is to be treated as a theorem in the calculus or not.

But at once, it should be apparent from our discussion thus far that such a test is by no means an adequate one. In the first place, the very use of the matrix method as a test is based on the truth-functional interpretation of propositions—and this, as we tried to show in our preceding study, must simply be rejected.

But in the second place and more fundamentally, the supposition that the mere tautologous character of a proposition is enough to warrant its inclusion within a calculus devoted to the elaboration of the properties of various kinds of propositional compounds—this supposition simply will not bear scrutiny for a moment. For that $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ is tautologous may be readily admitted; also that $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$ is tautologous may be admitted. And yet this certainly does not mean that these are propositions of generically the same kind, or that they are susceptible of inclusion within the same system or calculus. On the contrary, the whole of our foregoing argument has been devoted to revealing the significantly disparate character of these two propositions.

Accordingly, it would seem that the merely superficial similarity of these two propositions, due to the fact that they are both tautologous, had blinded the matrix-method logicians to the radical dissimilarity between them—a dissimilarity that immediately becomes apparent as soon as the intention or

²⁸ Once more, be it remembered that we are taking "tautology" precisely in the sense defined in our earlier article (p. 60). Incidentally, Prof. Lewis' in his account of tautology would go much farther than this and would attribute to the concept notes which are in no wise comprehended in our present usage. Cf. Lewis and Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 209 ff.

meaning of the propositions be taken account of. Moreover, the conclusion, too, would seem to be inescapable that so far as the matrix method is concerned, it quite fails to provide any sort of adequate justification for the inclusion of a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ within a properly propositional calculus.

But now what about the logistic method? Through its means can it perhaps be shown that a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ can legitimately be included as a theorem within a propositional calculus? Well, so far as *Principia Mathematica* is concerned, the attempt is actually made to demonstrate that this is a theorem in the calculus. But how does the demonstration proceed? Without going into details, we may simply state that it is a demonstration that is made possible in virtue of the fact that all the relevant propositional compositions are regarded merely truth-functionally. Accordingly, we may simply disregard²⁹ it here.

²⁹ This is perhaps much-too-cavalier a dismissal of the possibility of demonstrating logistically such a proposition as $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$.

Thus suppose the sort of demonstration that *Principia* gives be freed from the truth-functional interpretation of the propositions concerned. Would it not then be a perfectly valid demonstration? Thus $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ (*3.33) is demonstrated ultimately in the light of one of the so-called primitive propositions, viz. $q \supset r \cdot \supset : p \vee q \cdot \supset \cdot p \vee r$ (*1.6). For instance, by substituting in this primitive proposition $\sim p$ for p , and by recognizing that $p \supset q$ may be defined in terms of disjunction, $\sim p \vee q$ (*1.01), one comes out with this proposition $q \supset r \cdot \supset : p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset r$ (*2.05). Then through the principle of "importation" (*3.31), according to which a part of the consequent is imported into the antecedent, one gets the required $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$. Of course, such a demonstration is perfectly correct. And yet it is not a demonstration of what we are looking for. For what we were demanding was proof that $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ did in fact belong in a calculus devoted to tracing out the properties of propositions.

However, in the demonstration given in *Principia*, the primitive proposition, $q \supset r \cdot \supset : p \vee q \cdot \supset \cdot p \vee r$, upon which the whole proof rests, is not itself a theorem belonging to any calculus of propositions. For it is not a theorem in which the consequent is a mere property of the antecedent. (Thus note that it does not contain the same number of terms). On the contrary, on the non-truth-functional interpretation of disjunction, any disjunction involves an implicative relationship between propositions that are universally and necessarily disjoined. Accordingly, this so-called primitive proposition is readily transformed into $q \supset r \cdot \supset : p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset r$. And this is a proposition expressive of an inference of a conclusion from premises, and not of a property of a single proposition.

But, then, our interest must needs shift back to Prof. Lewis. For as we have already pointed out, his is an attempt to develop through the logistic method a calculus of strict implication in which implicative compounds will not be interpreted merely truth-functionally. Accordingly, what is his justification for making $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ a theorem in the calculus? Amazingly enough, he does not give any justification. Instead, he simply lays it down, as a postulate and makes no attempt to prove or demonstrate it whatsoever. Presumably, this could only be because such a theorem is impossible to demonstrate in a calculus of propositions. And why should it be impossible to demonstrate? Perhaps the reason is the one which we have already suggested: since $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ does not exhibit a property pertaining to a propositional compound but rather a conclusion following from premises, there is no way in which the consequent, $p \supset r$, can be proved to be a property of its antecedent.

But, then, the question suggests itself as to why Prof. Lewis should have felt it necessary even to have had such a theorem in his calculus at all. To be sure, as we have already intimated, it is a perfectly legitimate theorem, being necessarily true;³⁰ but the point is that it is a theorem pertaining to a very different division of logic, viz. the doctrine of argument, and hence is in no wise relevant to a calculus that is concerned with the properties of propositions. Why, then, should Prof. Lewis have felt it necessary to inject so heterogeneous an element through the rather dubious resort of simply laying it down as a postulate?

Apparently, the answer is that despite his insistence upon the necessity of logic's taking account of so-called strict implication,³¹ Prof. Lewis nevertheless makes the same mistake as all the other mathematical logicians: he quite fails to take cognizance of the inescapably intentional character of all logical entities. Moreover, no sooner is this mistake made, than, as we have seen in our preceding article, logical entities come

³⁰ Sc. tautologous.

³¹ I. e. a type of implication which cannot be interpreted merely truth-functionally.

to be regarded as objects of first intention rather than second intention. And once they are looked at in this false light, then there really would appear to be no basic difference between a proposition like $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r : \supset \cdot p \supset r$ and one like $p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$. Both of them are alike tautologous and hence apparently susceptible of treatment within the same calculus.

As a consequence, the traditional distinction between a doctrine of propositions and a doctrine of argument comes to be entirely overlooked; and in its stead there is erected an elaborate calculus of propositions, which is superficially very impressive, but which upon examination turns out to be an illegitimate amalgam of quite disparate elements, not belonging to the same order or level of analysis at all.

And to make matters even worse, the mathematical logicians have a way of claiming that their propositional calculi are descriptive of nearly all of the different types and forms of inference. Thus, for instance, Prof. Tarski flatly declares that "almost all reasonings in any scientific domain are based explicitly or implicitly upon laws of sentential calculus."³² But unfortunately, as we have tried to point out, such propositional calculi are in fact for the most part not descriptive of inference at all, but rather of properties of propositions. Moreover, in so far as any of its theorems do set forth patterns of inference rather than properties of propositions, these same theorems may be shown to enter the calculus without sufficient title or warrant and merely as postulates.³³

Accordingly, merely in the interests of clarity, to say nothing of the integrity of the subject matter of logic, it would seem well to return to the traditional Aristotelian distinction between a treatment of the properties of propositions on the one hand and a treatment of argument or inference on the other.

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³² *Op. cit.*, p. 44. Cf. a similar statement by Prof. Lewis, Lewis and Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

³³ They are not postulates, of course, when the matrix method is used. And yet this exception is not pertinent here.

BOOK REVIEWS

Living Law of Democratic Society. By JEROME HALL. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949. Pp. 146, with index.

American Democracy And Natural Law. By CORNELIA GREER LE BOUTILLIER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. 210, with index. \$3.00.

Human Rights. Edited by UNESCO. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 288, with index. \$3.75.

Jerome Hall set out to make a contribution to legal philosophy and in the process produced a thoroughly honest book of great value. The defects to be found in it are easily understood, and borne with; while he has, with courageous intellectual integrity, thrown off the fever of the intellectual diseases of his time, some of the disfiguring pock-marks still scar his best efforts. The peculiar value of the book lies not only in its open rebellion against the ethical evasiveness that has bankrupted American jurisprudential thought, but also in the manner in which the fight is carried on. In his rebellion, Dr. Hall is only one of a growing multitude of American legal philosophers and practitioners who are in dismay at the beggared condition of legal thought; in his unyielding respect for common sense, for facts, and in the profundity of his analysis he is in a class by himself.

Many writers in the law journals have had a fairly clear view of the causes of the present disgrace of jurisprudential thinking, and have stated these causes without mincing words. Take, for example, Abraham Glasser, writing in the Autumn 1950 number of the *Journal of Legal Education*. "Contemporary writers and teachers in the jurisprudence field, then, have by no means been uninterested in legal value judgments. In the new surge of the last couple of years, however, we have had what to me seems a significant change. Until quite recently, with rare exception, the thinking of non-theological contemporary legal philosophers about value choices has pretty generally displayed three characteristics: (1) It has been socially utilitarian—i. e., in one way or another it has asserted that law should serve men's social needs. (2) It has been ethically arbitrary—i. e., its concepts of social need have been *chosen*, *arbitrarily chosen* (italics not mine), without pretension of undertaking to prove the philosophical validity of the particular value choices or the invalidity of their opposites. (3) it has necessarily therefore been, in philosophical terms, skeptical or at best relativist or reservational about its own value choices. Like secular Existentialism and the whole contemporary rationalist-materialist science

which generates these philosophies of fundamental evasion in matters of value judgment, contemporary legal philosophy has arbitrarily been counselling affirmational social action while evading or even denying the possibility of integrating these counsels in an affirmational, scientifically founded philosophy of values" (pp. 66-67).

Dr. Glasser then goes on more positively: "It is a thesis of this paper that without such an affirmational *philosophy* to energize it, no program of affirmational social *action* in the law or elsewhere can escape eventual disintegration" (p. 67. *Italics not mine*). Yet when he comes down to brass tacks, he ends up like this: "My own *guess* (*italics not mine*) is that while man may never prove the scientific rightness of religious belief, he will one day prove that the ethical affirmational impulses expressed in all higher religions are materially determined and of cosmic scope" (*ibid.*, ft. note 31, p. 80). In this escape into a cloud of unfounded hopes on the wings of a guess, Dr. Glasser parts company with Jerome Hall but not with most of his dismayed and searching fellows. Dr. Hall does not guess, nor does he vaguely hope; he is not afraid to face facts, even those that cannot be "observed" by science, nor is he afraid to trust his own mind. He sets out in dogged earnest to figure things out; and he very nearly does.

The reader must not be misled by Dr. Hall's title. His purpose is not to bolster American Democracy by fair means or foul; he does not attempt to mold truth into a shape most flattering to a particular political form. He is trying to arrive at a solidly adequate notion of positive law; he is delighted when the conclusions of his honest investigations give high approval of democratic society. The point is, he has not put the cart before the horse; he has looked for the truth about law, and then applied that truth to democratic society. He is not at any time prepared to falsify truth by way of supporting a form of society that would, if it needed such falsification, certainly not be worth defense.

The particular value of the book is both positive and negative. On the negative side, the book contains a crushing refutation of legal positivism from every angle, even the very angles on which the positivistic betrayal of reason has built up its spurious reputation. On the positive side, the author has seen and stated the really crucial problems of jurisprudence, put them in their proper perspective, and made a valuable contribution to their solution. To say the book is modern is to point out in one gesture both its strength and its weakness: Dr. Hall is thoroughly familiar with modern legal thought, indeed to a great extent his own thinking is a part of that tradition, and this gives his argument an authentic ring in modern ears; yet precisely because he is so close to his times, he is the victim of some of the blind spots whose causes he so thoroughly refutes and rejects. Some of these defects will be pointed out specifically in the course of this review.

Dr. Hall rightly observes that serious efforts to solve legal problems lead inevitably to relevant fundamentals. Thus the crucial questions of the mid-twentieth century, whatever else they may involve, are ultimately jurisprudential ones. And the central inquiry of jurisprudence is: what is law (p. 7). To attack this problem, Dr. Hall divides his book into three parts: law and legal method; law as valuation; and law as cultural fact. The first section is much more than a statement of legal method, its purposes and the scope of its effectiveness; it is a stalwart defense of the certainty that justifies the existence of legal method and makes possible a science of law, and a sharp distinction between the science of law and the positive law itself. The second section argues incisively for morality in and through law. The third section makes the cardinal point of the necessity of an honest consideration of facts, all the facts, in legal thinking.

The author approaches the first phase of the problem down the avenues of history and of common sense. Surely law is power; but from the beginnings of Western history in the city-states of the ancient Greeks, the major thrust of the greatest thinkers has been that law is more than might (p. 8). Jurisprudence, he thinks, has not done much of anything with these ancient insights. Obviously, if law is more than might, the additional element is reason's discovery, i. e., truth. The author will have no truck with those lazy and careless writers who dish up a variety of conflicting definitions of positive law, make some comment on the ambiguity of the term, and let the reader take his choice. He has even less patience with those who defend a particular theory while insisting that there is no better or objective determination of the issue—a neat splitting of the heart of the positivists' contradiction stated unblushingly by Kelsen (p. 9-10). For himself, Dr. Hall argues that the common sense point of view is that definitions must represent the facts, no less in law than in science. This brings up flatly the permanent problem of the essence of positive law. Here the author does his cause some harm by misreading Aquinas' "matter and form" as "form and substance" and so makes unnecessary difficulties for himself; Aquinas, of course, never argued that the matter and form, making up an essence, was by any means the whole story. However, the author's fundamental point is good and of capital importance. Some such notion (like "essence") is a permanent need: "the least that must be recognized by those who think positive law refers to some sort of existing entity is that the nature of that entity is not a matter of individual preference" (p. 12).

The pace of the author is slowed up a bit on p. 13 when he stops to make one of his infrequent bows to the modern sacred cows; non-sequiturs just do not fit well into Dr. Hall's customary thinking, so it comes as rather a jolt to hear him say: "To hold that if we wish to understand a legal philosophy, we must know the prevailing basic perspectives and the

concomitant culture is to imply that there is no such thing as 'absolute truth' in jurisprudence." There is, of course, no such implication in the necessary limitations of our jurisprudential knowledge. In fact, Dr. Hall himself cannot do more than mouth this morsel and then spit it out by insisting on a jurisprudential truth quite apart from any one individual's biography or biology or the economics of his time. He does not accept Marxist epistemology; nor does he deny the existence of jurisprudential truth, nor depreciate the critical and intuitive methods required to understand it (p. 13). It is clear to Dr. Hall that certain ideas have persisted at least in Western culture for thousands of years and, to some extent, we understand them though we know nothing of the speaker, the place, or the circumstances. However, if we are to get the fuller significance of those ideas, we need to reconstruct the social situation, the dominant perspectives, the cultural milieu of discourse (p. 14). Since the nature of positive law can only be the common core of all the specific positive laws, of certain actual entities, jurisprudence, if it is to be fully understood, must also be located in living configurations of fact, thought and feeling (p. 14-15).

In the light of this theory, the author criticises Pound (p. 15-17), and then traces the issue of "might vs. right" through Hesiod, Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas (p. 17-25). He concludes that the formal criteria of law and the fact of power represent the oldest and most primitive insights into the nature of positive law. Actually, his conclusions should have been much broader to include morality in those ancient concepts of law, insisting on its normative power. For the fact that Plato and Aristotle distinguished true law from bad law did not indicate a choice offered, any more than the distinction of good grammar from bad canonizes the bad. The obedience given bad laws was entirely extrinsic to the laws themselves, the consequent of accidental circumstances that would make disobedience a more serious threat to the common good than was the bad law itself. This same teaching is to be found unchanged in Aquinas; it did not "become essential" in Cicero and Aquinas, while it remained mere preference to Plato and Aristotle (p. 21 ff.).

The author is quite solidly on the side of Aquinas and against the positivists' elimination of morality in favor of a description of law exclusively in terms of form and power. The story of the modern theory from Hobbes and Austin and its relation to the political forms of that time will be a shock to the dreamers who have blithely decreed that this legal theory is of the very essence of democracy (p. 29). It is precisely here, in the question of the normative power of law, that the sharpest disagreement is met among modern legal thinkers. The author makes plain his own stand; but it remains essentially weak when he goes no further than the "hypothetical or conditional Judgments" in establishing these norms. However, he does make it clear both that the normative is an essential charac-

teristic of positive law, and that there must be fundamental ideas unifying the vast number of specific rules of law: the first under penalty of no law at all, the second under penalty of no science of law, reducing law to an utterly primitive state.

The rest of this section is a particularly apt and easily intelligible interrelation of the rules of law and legal method. The author argues that a thorough understanding of the totality of positive law demands that we follow the actualization of the substantive rules through the official procedures into external fact. Regardless of the certain core of meaning, there is always a peripheral sphere of uncertainty where the meaning and application of the rules need determination. Every legal order must provide methods of finding the facts and discovering the meaning of the rules. A penetrating criticism of some of the disciples of Holmes and their resignation to a complete scepticism is an obvious conclusion from the foundations the author has already laid. The author's words towards the end of this section are well worth quoting: "If we do not ignore human intelligence by equating men to mice and restricting our interest in men to what the two have in common; if we reflect on our own conduct in relation to the norms not only of the State but also of the various lesser groupings in which we participate; and if we observe the conduct of other persons in similar situations, we are bound to believe that law and other norms are important factors in the solution of legal problems" (p. 49-50). "Of all the various components of legal method, the most important is simple honesty. . . . Sound legal method depends ultimately on intelligence, factual knowledge, and a disinterested desire to discover the truth and to do what is right. It implies that "better answers" exist, that wise policies can be discovered, and that substantially correct factual determinations can be arrived at" (p. 53).

In the second section, on law as valuation, Dr. Hall argues that legal experience is moral experience. The entire hierarchy of value, from constitution down to judicial decisions, represents legal experience, a distinctively human experience which does not operate in a separate compartment that merely parallels the moral experience of the race; it is a part of that moral experience. Here, of course, he runs head on into the positivists. His starting point is the fact that the perennial perspective maintained that virtue is an essential attribute of positive law. This perspective rests ultimately on the position that men are rational and social. The history of legal philosophy, he says, consists largely of attacks on these foundations, and refutations of the attacks. He joins cheerfully in the battle.

In plain words he exposes and refutes the still vital opposing theories. The Historical School (Savigny) of the nineteenth century in Germany and its concentration on the investigation of the origins and development of particular legal systems is first. Almost enough is said when it is pointed

out that *Volksgeist* was the ultimate perspective for valuation; the present generation has seen that theory in practice. The most effective of the opposing theories has been the one elaborated in England through Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, completely evading moral problems and, in its political implications, giving the merely quantitative aspect of democracy. Duguit and recent legal philosophers of Europe built exclusively on fact and so made it impossible to make any recommendations as to what ought to be done. Pragmatism, for all its encouragement to social experiment, has remained sterile in ethics. Dr. Hall takes on Dean Pound and his contradictory discipleship of William James; but he saves his heaviest fire for the ultimate challenge of legal positivism in the teachings of Hans Kelsen. Kelsen's flat rejection of all ethical principles, and his central thesis, that only propositions which can be verified by observation have meaning and all other propositions are nonsense, are utterly demolished by no less than nine arguments offered by Dr. Hall (p. 68-71). As if this were not enough, the author goes on to do a good job on the positivistic limitation of knowledge and the accuracy of science. If the book accomplished nothing else, this section alone would make it extremely worth while for the defense of legal philosophy.

His own position is stated clearly, though his justification of it could stand some clearing up. He says that the ultimate test of any theory is its persuasiveness in relation to important acts and experiences for which an explanation is sought. We know that valuation is a commonplace in all societies, and that there are large areas of uniform valuation among diverse cultures. Hence, we cannot be satisfied by the assertion that valuation is entirely and always a subterfuge or self-deception, or the expression of emotion. Naturalistic ethics doesn't begin to suffice. On the other hand, there is not justification for rejecting a theory of values on the ground that it is not rigorously scientific, or for failing to recognize that the nature of a subject matter conditions the relevant knowledge of it. He concludes: "the objective validity of moral judgments is known intuitively or, as regards problematic situations, it is established by analysis, discussion, and reflection, coherence with wider experience, the consensus of informed, unbiased persons, and the universality of the solutions among diverse cultures" (p. 80-81). As he uses the word here, "intuition" seems to lump together the process of perception, the knowledge of first principles, and the clear conclusions of a syllogism; it probably means the clarity of the evidence and the mind's inability to refuse to assent to it—what the scholastics called the "light of objective evidence," a factor not susceptible of proof but at the same time not susceptible of rejection by a healthy intellect.

His argument for a non-theological theory of morality (p. 83) is really a demand for a natural law that is really natural, i. e., intrinsically effective as to its obligatory power; as such his demand is eminently reasonable, or

would be if he had made the distinction between the existence of God (the source of this law) and our acceptance or denial of that existence. The denial would, of course, in no way affect the intrinsic effectiveness of the law; on the other hand, no power can eliminate God. The intrinsic—what he calls “secular”—effectiveness of the law is completely guaranteed by the facts. The unvarying nature of man is obviously a fact of the universe; it seems no less clear that there are some things that perfect human nature and some things that destroy it. A natural law for man would be one that pointed out to man the things that would destroy him and the things that would perfect him, at least the broad outlines of his possible destruction or perfection. St. Thomas put this neatly in giving his triple phrasing of the fundamental principle of natural morality: follow your ordered inclinations, act for your end, do good. The inclinations of appetite indicate to man the things he needs for his development, their order is measured by their more universal ministering to the whole man; the violations of these directions, then, is a perversion against which nature revolts. The difference between man’s natural guidance to his perfection and that of any other nature in the universe is that man can know what is good or bad for him and can choose a path either to destruction or perfection; his law is a *moral* law. In the light of that broad general principle (act for your end) he can readily know that murder, adultery, theft, and so on are things that destroy both individual and social life among men.

Dr. Hall’s high estimate of democracy on moral grounds is essentially sound, for it is essentially a recognition that democracy, at least in theory, is the one political form that excludes every form of political injustice. Unfortunately, Dr. Hall doesn’t make enough of this, and is rather pleased with the notion that united action can and often does rest on divergent perspectives and philosophies; apparently he doesn’t recognize the frail foundations this offers for action since there must be an inherent contradiction between philosophy and action on the part of one or the other of the divergent philosophers. His conclusions in this section on law as valuation (p. 100) must be read in the light of his earlier assertion that beyond the moral duty of law is the boundless area of individual sacrifice and devotion; and with a rejection of the implication that the “hypothetical-imperative judgments” of law offer an indifferent choice to the citizen.

The third section, on law as cultural fact, completes Dr. Hall’s exposition of law as a compound of form, value, and fact. Here again he is in complete opposition to the positivists’ view of fact as a merely parallel phenomenon having nothing to do with the nature of positive law. In defense and exposition of his thesis of the indissoluble connectedness of law and fact in court and out of court as opposed to the abstractionism made prevalent by positivism, the author makes a vigorous and decidedly concrete refutation of the positivists’ position (p. 101-110). Perhaps his

most telling blows are delivered on p. 108-109 where positivism is convicted of being thoroughly unscientific. The principal problem confronting legal philosophers is, the author says, precisely that of transcending legal positivism and achieving a jurisprudence that is adequate in the light of legal history and juridical experience.

By way of understanding the factuality of law more fully, he makes a thorough exploration of the meaning of culture and its relationship to human nature, particularly its legal aspects (p. 111 ff.). Here the author pauses to make, just in passing, one of those awkward bows to a sacred cow, a gesture all the more clumsy because so entirely out of character: "The basic norm of science is an ultimate test of truth, and it may be noted that the standard has shifted from reliance on authority to reason and, then, to empirical verification" (pp. 113-114). This sentence is refuted by all the canons he has employed and all the processes on which he himself has depended. He is careful to note that the cultural fact, the external, observable side of law is only one side; there is the equally important, internal side of law, namely, all the thoughts and values that give meaning and distinctiveness to every bit of external fact (p. 118). With this precaution taken, he distinguishes three stages in the development of the empirical side of law; first, the factuality of law is represented in feeling; second, the factuality of law is represented in the socialization, the objectivization of the individual internal states in social norms; third, the factuality of law is an attribute of certain conduct of human beings acting in a context of artifact—courthouse, penitentiary, official insignia, statute books and the like (p. 119-121). His main argument is summarized thus: "What the legal theorist observes is human conduct directed toward various goals under institutional pressure to avoid the commission of proscribed social harms. The legal institution can be distinguished (not separated) from other institutions. It can be analyzed and systematized as a static structure in terms of certain propositions. But in its totality, law is a distinctive coalescence of form, value, and fact" (p. 131).

The book closes with answers to objections anticipated from the long dominance of legal thought by positivism, some confirmatory considerations, and these two general conclusions regarded as of importance for progress in jurisprudence: 1) "A rejection of the view that sound definition of positive law is an insoluble problem and especially a rejection of the nominalist thesis that one definition is as good as any other. The above discussion has opposed both of these views, leading to the conclusions that the problem is soluble within reasonable limits, that there is a "better," a defensible definition of positive law, and that legal history and cultural anthropology supply the supporting data. 2) That the correct direction of better definition lies in distinguishing among the various entities that have indiscriminately or on merely formal grounds been designated "positive law"; that sound method in this regard consists in

discovering common characteristics of the most significant norms and restricting "positive law" to the entities thus segregated. This means, in general, that "rule of conduct" is the principal focus; but that does not imply, as Ehrlich asserts, that the legal proposition and norms for decision are never positive laws within the scope of its restricted meaning" (p. 141).

Professor Le Boutillier is not attempting to make a contribution to legal philosophy; she is rushing to the defense of American Democracy against the invading horror of natural law. This purpose she keeps stoutly in mind, and to it all of her reasoning and much of her historical considerations are bent, and sometimes broken. By her efforts she has added another sad chapter to the tragic tale of intellectual suicide so fashionable in American university circles since the birth of pragmatism. The jacket of the book assures us that the Professor is to make an examination of the sources and meaning of American Democracy, clarifying its ultimate philosophical grounds in a critical time; "lucidly and directly she gives us a brief examination of the concept (of natural law) and a survey of some of the various ways in which it has been understood. Her inquiry is analytical rather than chronological." An indication of her philosophical detachment is given in the preface where natural law, in the sense which she intends to extirpate it, is "an unexaminable abstraction" and "a cloudy concept."

Dr. Le Boutillier means well and she is in deadly earnest; moreover, she likes the American way of life. She is a graduate of Barnard, has an M.A. in philosophy from Radcliffe, and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia. She has taught at many places: Bryn Mawr, Occidental, Reed, Delaware, and Hunter College. Her articles have appeared in no less than six profound journals; she has published short stories in the *Atlantic*, *Colliers*, *Scribner's*, and *Woman's Home Companion*, besides a novel published twenty-one years ago by Doubleday. Obviously, though, all this is not enough. At the moment, she has written an exceedingly poor book. Perhaps, all that has gone before was a little too much. Her main arguments in this book are precisely what could be predicted of a confirmed pragmatist; they have their scholarly and devastating refutation in Dr. Jerome Hall's book, of which we have just written. We might recommend the reading of Dr. Hall's book to Professor Le Boutillier, but probably that would do little good. The impressive list of works cited, given at the end of the book, indicates that Professor Le Boutillier has already read many books. However, the substantial refutation can be left to Dr. Hall's book; here it will be sufficient to point out some of the dark spots that in themselves suffice to discredit both the book and the author.

In her first chapter on "Citizen and State," later summarized on p. 154, the author sets up her targets by distinguishing three world views, namely, communism, totalitarianism, and democracy, and two ethics, i.e., absolute ethics and empirical ethics. The point made in this chapter is that "be-

tween empirical ethics and democracy there exists to a peculiar degree what is called in logic an "operational" correspondence. Furthermore the concepts of empirical ethics are in all respects adequate to the concepts of democratic theory." The conclusion is stated more strongly in the summary on p. 155; no other concept of man does so well in accounting for our form of government. The ethical distinction is made plausible by restricting self-realization, the perfection of the potentialities of man, in fact anything in the line of accomplishment, to empirical ethics. The author can do this with a clear conscience because of her ignorance of the distinction between objective and formal happiness, between the object whose possession perfects man and the possession of that object; it never dawns on her that these are two sides of the same coin. This ignorance is a great help to her indignation later on, as it is the instrument by which she discovers flat contradiction in Maritain (pp. 96-97) and the key to her enlistment of the Founding Fathers on her side (Chapter III, p. 110 ff.).

In this first chapter she betrays the usual assumption of vague ends with no justification, and an indignant cherishing of means. She depends on man's inherent drives and group needs (p. 43), and has great faith in "man's inherent decency and worth" (p. 44). If we ask what needs are, the answer is explicit on p. 107: "Who decides what the 'needs' are? The answer is not hard to find. Felt needs are only interests stepped up to a point of intensity at which man makes an effort to supply them. . . . But there is a hierarchy of 'needs,' just as there is a hierarchy of wants, and a hierarchy of interests. There are individual needs without which the human creature dies. There are world needs without which civilization will fall apart. . . ." Where do these inherent drives, group needs, felt needs, the hierarchy of needs and wants, the dependence of man and the world on them, the inherent decency and worth of man come from? Why are they what they are? On p. 100, the author explains: "Why call the law of nature an expression of divine will, when it can be adequately explained as human will? This pedestrian explanation is both more satisfying intellectually and more profitable in terms of human understanding and human good . . . (quoting James and Dewey) 'Ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with the other parts of our experience.'"

On p. 77, Professor Le Boutillier has a principle that knocks all this nonsense into a cocked hat; of course she is using it against her opponents, and presumably it doesn't count against her own thesis. She says there: "An explanation which is accepted, when it does not explain, is a rabbit's foot drawn across a trail which might lead on to a true and fruitful solution." How very true. The inherent drives, felt needs and all the rest do not explain simply because they do not account for themselves; they *need* explanation rather than give it. This sort of thing is one of the re-

liable symptoms of a diseased mind that rushes to embrace a contradiction such as the uncaused effect, but gags at the mystery of the uncaused cause.

In chapter II, on "Natural Law," the author is really choosing the sides for the game she is to play, making very sure she gets the right men on her side regardless of where they belong. Again, ignorance is a great help to her. Among the distinctions that are Greek to her is that of the speculative and the practical. She identifies the speculative with idealism, the practical with utilitarianism; and then goes blithely on her way. In the material of natural law itself, she has heard of natural law being posed as a rival of positive law, competing declarations of rival authorities; she has heard, vaguely, of positive law being described as nothing more than conclusions from natural law; both of these she welcomes as easy opponents. But of natural law as universal moral principles of which positive law is the *determination*, as autonomous yet as dependent as second causes on the first cause—this is beyond the experience of the Professor; and she is sunk without experience. Again, she is evidently a complete stranger to the distinction of the possession of rights from the exercise of those rights, and she thinks entirely in terms of the second part of that distinction. To the amateur observer, it seems fairly clear that women in the crush of Christmas shopping have not lost their marital rights even if the exercise of those rights is forbidden by circumstances. The great point she makes of rights being "won" makes no sense except in terms of the exercise of rights: the exercise can be interfered with by tyranny and that interference can be thrown off; in this sense, rights are won. A person does not lose the right to free speech by such a fact as paralysis.

It is in choosing her team that the author reaches the heights. On the opposing team we find Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Paine, Stammler, del Vecchio and Maritain; on her team are Aristotle (fighting Aquinas to the death!), Grotius, James, Hume, Bentham, Haines, Dewey, and all the Founding Fathers of the American Republic. Clearly, anyone opposing the author's thesis is unpatriotic and thoroughly undemocratic. The choice is possible by reason of her ignorance of the distinction, and harmony, of objective and formal happiness; if anyone she wants on her side hints at the perfection of man, he is given a uniform; if anyone she wants on the other side throws out the same kind of hint, he is convicted of a contradiction (e. g., p. 96-97). It is by this trick that the Founding Fathers are caught in her web, in spite of their explicit words; she would much rather have them (and Aristotle) guilty of forensic trickery than of acceptance of natural law (p. 61; 119-120 ff). It is principally in her third chapter that the author accomplishes this logically impossible feat. The fourth and final chapter of the book summarizes the preceding chapters then slides into a series of contortions in an apparent attempt to define the thing that Dr. Le Boutellier has taken to be natural law. The attempt

fails. And the author emerges from the gymnastics touselled and tired, but with the triumphant announcement that natural law cannot be defined.

Many individual gems could be selected for serious considerations, particularly by the parents who have trusted their children to the Professor's intellectual molding. On the historical level, we find the following on p. 69: "To Grotius, whose genius formulated an accepted law of nations, belongs the credit of separating natural law from its dependence on theological authority, instating it in the shrine of rationalism rather than, necessarily, in the shrine of religion. For Grotius set forth this law as self-evident in the same sense that the truths of mathematics were held to be self-evident: the truths of mathematics would remain in force even if God could be conceived as nonexistent. So also would the law of nature: 'Just as even God, then, cannot cause that two and two should not make four, so He cannot cause that that which is intrinsically evil be not evil.' Notice should be taken here in passing of Grotius' introduction of the concept of *value as intrinsic*, rather mediated in terms of empirical results: 'intrinsically evil,' he says." In sober historical fact, Grotius was merely repeating the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, and in practically the words of Thomas. Thomas, too, insisted on a natural law that was really natural, i.e. intrinsically effective quite apart from authority; in his view, natural law was not a dictate of religion, rather religion was a dictate of natural law.

P. 178 gives us this: "The rights of man is history, not postulates." The Atlantic would certainly frown on such a sentence, quite apart from content. Very close friends might be kind enough not to mention that communism and fascism also are history, while the abuse or violation of the rights of man probably takes up more historical space than the vindication of those rights. Throughout the book, it is clear that the author has no use for communism or fascism; but it is not clear whether her dislike is merely a matter of taste or really a matter of principle. *A priori*, it would be said that it must be a matter of taste since she divorces her thinking from all absolute, i.e., unchanging principles; truth, she has insisted, is a matter of helping us get into satisfactory relation with the other parts of our experience. Perhaps, the Russians are satisfied with the harmony of their experience, and so their ideas have become true. On the *a posteriori* side, there is this open contradiction. On p. 158, after admitting that the Declaration of Independence mentions such equivocal matters as the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God, self-evident truths, and inalienable rights conferred upon all men by their Creator, she says: "however, there is affirmed (in the second paragraph of the Declaration) man's right to abolish oppressive government 'and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem likely to effect their safety and happiness.' Thus, at the very source, a utilitarian object is cited for our Ameri-

can statecraft." Then on p. 181: "After England's long Civil War and after the American colonists' long struggle to separate themselves from decisions of a remote British Parliament in which they had no representation, the right to overthrow a tyrannous government by revolution was affirmed in our Declaration of Independence. But it can hardly be too often or too clearly pointed out that this right was intramurally absorbed and annulled in our Constitution, which provides the people of the United States with power to amend and alter their government by popular, constitutional means. The right of revolution in these United States is no more." Not even against oppressive government! There is much more of this sort of thing. Fortunately, most of it will never be seen by the men called on to die for the things that Professor Le Boutillier, in her ignorance, so indignantly throws overboard.

Human Rights is a symposium edited by Unesco, and is the result of a questionnaire circulated to various thinkers and writers of Member-States of Unesco. The first group of the essays deals with the general problems of human rights; the others deal in detail with such subjects as the respect for cultural diversity, the social implications of science, the value of objective information, the right to education, and so on. The Introduction by Jacques Maritain (who also has an essay in the book) is a penetrating examination both of the book and the ideas behind the book. We can do no better than quote from Maritain's analysis by way of reviewing the book.

"This book then is devoted to the rational interpretation and justification of those rights of the individual which society must respect and which it is desirable for our age to strive to enumerate more fully." The variety of schools represented go from the classical to the revolutionary in their interpretations. The real divergence begins when the question of the "why" of human rights is raised. "... the present state of division among minds does not permit of agreement on a common *speculative ideology*, nor on common explicit principles. But, on the other hand, when we are concerned with a basic *practical ideology* and basic principles of *action* implicitly recognised today, in a live, even if not formulated state, by the consciousness of free people, we find that they constitute *grosso modo* a sort of common denominator, a sort of unwritten common law, at the point where in practice the most widely separated theoretical ideologies and mental traditions converge" (p. 10). "The phenomenon (of antagonistic theories converging in practical principles) proves simply that systems of moral philosophy are the products of reflection by the intellect on ethical concepts which precede and govern them, and which of themselves display, as it were, a highly complex geology of the mind where the natural operations of spontaneous reason, pre-scientific and prephilosophic, is at every stage conditioned by the acquisitions, the constraints, the structure and the evolution of the social group. . . . What is important

for the moral progress of humanity is the apprehension by experience which occurs apart from systems and on a different logical basis—assisted by such systems when they awake the conscience to knowledge of itself, hampered by them when they dim the apperceptions of spontaneous reason, or when they cast suspicion on a genuine acquisition of moral experience by linking it with some error of theory or false philosophy” (p. 12).

“From the point of view of philosophic doctrine, it may be said, without over-simplification, that, as regards the question of human rights, men are today divided . . . into two antagonistic groups: those who to a greater or lesser extent explicitly accept, and those who to a greater or lesser extent explicitly reject ‘Natural Law’ as the basis of those rights” (p. 13).

. . . “It is legitimate to suspect that the antagonism which many contemporary authors see fit to postulate between ‘old’ and ‘new’ human rights is partly artificial and derived either from the liking of theorists for ideological conflicts or more, perhaps, from the absolutist concept of human rights held by the philosophy—or better the rhetoric—of the eighteenth century, whose after-effects still in some measure give rise to misunderstandings today, and taint certain sacred formulae of the vocabulary of human rights. If each of these rights is in itself absolute and not susceptible to any limitation, in the same way as a divine attribute, clearly any conflict between them is insoluble. But in practice everyone sees that these rights, being human, are subject like every other human thing, to modification and limitation. Even where rights are ‘inalienable,’ a distinction must be made between possession and exercise, the latter being subject to the modifications and limitations dictated in each instance by justice” (p. 14-15). “Incidentally, this instance shows us that at the root of the hidden urge which impels us ever to the transformation of society, there lies the fact that man *possesses* ‘inalienable’ rights and that nevertheless he is deprived of the possibility of justly claiming to *exercise* *certain* of them by such inhumanities as subsist in the social structure in each age” (*ibid.*).

“Conceivably the advocates of the liberal-individualist, of the Communist and of the co-operative type of society might draw up similar, even identical, lists of human rights. But their exercise of these rights will differ. All depends on the ultimate value whereon those rights depend and in terms of which they are integrated by mutual limitations. It is in terms of the scale of values which we thus acknowledge that we establish the means whereby, in our eyes, human rights economic and social, as well as individual, shall impinge on life; it is from these different scales of values that spring mutual accusations of misunderstanding. . . . It remains to be decided which has a true and which a distorted vision of Man. . . . For the peoples (of the world) to agree on the means of securing effective respect for human rights, they would have to have in common,

however implicitly, not necessarily the same speculative concept, but at least the same practical concept of man and life . . ." (pp. 15-16).

There are no less than thirty-one thinkers represented in the book by their essays. Four appendices are attached: the first gives the "memorandum and questionnaire circulated by Unesco on the theoretical bases of the rights of man"; the second, "The grounds of an international declaration of human rights" drafted by a Unesco committee of experts; the third, is a universal declaration of human rights adopted on December 10th, 1948 by the UN; the fourth is an index of contributors and members of the Unesco committee on the philosophic bases of human rights.

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Von der Wahrheit. By KARL JASPERS. Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1947.
Pp. 1126, with index.

Readers who raise an eyebrow at the size of the present work will raise both of them on learning (pp. 26 ff.) that it is only the initial volume in a series of four studies on "philosophical logic." Yet in the inkwell are books on the categories, methodology, and the theory of knowledge.

Taking logic in a sense akin to the metaphysical meaning it held for Hegel, Jaspers, in his upper sixties, is now opening a new phase of a career which has already swept him from psychiatry across phenomenology into the very heart and heat of the moral crisis facing present-day man. In his present study, *On Truth*—huge in form, wide in scope, and deep in purpose—he gives to existentialism the most powerful and positive apology it has yet claimed. Though not solving philosophy's great problems, he must, at least, be credited with raising them. In this respect, he stands opposite Sartre whose existentialism, as Blondel remarked, prevents the real questions of philosophy from even being raised.

In view of the broad scan of Jaspers, it is astonishing to find in the present book so many serious blunders about Catholic theology. For instance, as he sees things, Catholicism is a closed system while reason, by contrast, is ever open and searching and organic. It is true that the deposit of revelation is complete, but this does not shut off revealed religion into a stagnant systemism. Our insights into dogma can always be enriched, and in the practical order, there is no limit upon the holiness of the Church in its members. Rendering man *capax Dei*, grace has an effect exactly opposite to the closure, limitation, and arid formalization which Jaspers seems to find in Catholic thought. Inviting man to participate in infinity, Catholicism is open; it is existentialism that is closed—

closed by the anti-intellectualism which makes anything beyond experience unnatural and anything beyond nature impossible.

Definitions of faith and morals do not close off man's mind or, as Dewey would have it, stifle the spirit of inquiry. They are guarantees when accepted and obeyed that the Catholic Christian has his roots in infinity, his mind clear of error, his will free of evil, that he does not wander off sinfully into the finite and the creaturely seeking them for themselves alone. Defined truth is a map toward the attainment of infinity as the supernatural destiny of man.

Jaspers' unfortunate comparison of Catholic faith and human reason ought to be obverted. It is reason, closed off from the vision of God by its native limits, that is finite and highly formal. Faith opens to man the vast and eternal riches of infinity itself.

Reason for Jaspers is not of the sort to be completed by faith. It is not reason, philosophically informed and open to the supernatural, but reason searching blindly and fruitlessly, too fallen and feeble even to know the *preambulae fidei*. Reason in this existentialist caricature of its nature is open only because it is vacuous and completely formal.

With arguments similar to his logic against Catholicism in general, Jaspers rejects the notion of the Incarnation. It is at odds with his philosophy of history. Granted that there was the Incarnation, it would have been the central point of all time as Christopher Hollis put it. History's big questions, Jaspers reasons, would then have been decided once and for all, and there would not be the open, ambiguous, and ever risky career which Jaspers finds every man called upon to embrace.

Once more, Jaspers misconstrues Catholic theology. The Incarnation gave meaning to history and guidance to historical man, but it did not relieve him of personal responsibility. It did not banish from life the element of risk and uncertainty. It did not, in other words, destroy man's native powers. On the contrary, it perfected human life with a new and divine dimension, adding rather than subtracting responsibilities and giving to individual persons a meaning that they never had before. Moreover, since Christ lives on with the Church founded expressly to carry on the mission of the Incarnation, history has by no means been decided in advance of fact as though, after Christ came, everything were mechanically pre-arranged. History is being decided at every moment. Once more, it is the Church, living through history, which offers human life a meaning and a value without limit, and it is existentialism that closes man off into anguished solitude.

Even more so than other contemporary existentialists, Jaspers throws into high relief the fallen character of human nature. But it is a nature so fallen as to be destroyed, so fallen as to be beyond Redemption short of contradicting fact. There are strains of Plotinus in this view of man and even more apparent are traces of Luther. Nature in this concept is not

simply wounded but dead. It is not surprising that in Jaspers there is so much emphasis on death, limit, and failure by contrast to the Catholic concept of living members of a living Church.

Its title to the contrary, Jaspers' work is occupied through only about half of its contents with the formal treatment of truth. The first 449 pages are by way of introduction, describing man, charting his place in the surrounding world, and defining the various terms which have grown or been grafted in the philosophical vocabulary of Jaspers since his last great work *Philosophie*.

In the new Jaspers, what was formerly more or less characterized as the "transcendent" now carries the meaning of *Das Umgreifende*. It is hard to find an English equivalent for this term. It has the meaning of the all-pervading, the ubiquitous, the transcendental. It has the sense of being or existence, as the scholastics employed these terms, and yet it is much more Neo-Platonic than scholastic. It is not an object nor a whole. To use an analogy from Le Senne, it is more of an atmosphere than a detail. It is a kind of background, dynamic in itself but opaque to the human mind that would conceptualize it. In a similar but only similar way, Gilson has characterized existence as opposed to essence, and it would certainly be a fruitful study to compare the later Jaspers with the Gilson of *L'Etre et l'Essence*.

It is significant that *Das Umgreifende*, grammatically considered, has a participial sense with a neutral article. Such a usage parallels the dynamism and neutrality of most existentialisms; including to a great extent, that of Jaspers.

Again in a somewhat Neo-Platonic sense, this is a disjointed world and *Das Umgreifende* appears to man under various guises. There is *Das Umgreifende* in us that is both immanent and transcendent. In the immanent presence, there is man in the world (*Dasein*); consciousness (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*); and spirit (*Geist*); in the line of transcendence, there is existence as treated throughout *Philosophie*, Vol. II. Besides appearing in us in a two-fold way, *Das Umgreifende* characterizes being either immanently, which makes for the world, or transcendently, which makes for transcendence much in Jaspers' earlier sense of that term.

Presiding over all these divisions of *Das Umgreifende* and co-ordinating man's life in his thrust toward the Plotinian One is reason (*Vernunft*).

Truth is the coincidence of the various forms of *Das Umgreifende*. It is sought in the direction of the One, which is supreme in unity and reality. It is the issue of the integration of man, the thinker and doer, taking a stand in the world which faces and challenges him. However, though reason directs the quest for truth, philosophy is a matter not of ontology but of *periechontology* which is not systematic or reductive but descriptive. In such a philosophy, there is no search for an object, no conceptualization. All things are grasped only in a radically indirect manner.

True to the moral ambitions which have always driven him onward, Jaspers wants to give man not speculative truth but a patterns of practical life. At this concrete level, Jaspers finds, it is failure (*Scheitern*) which brings man to drink at the deepest springs of reality, feeling there his own littleness but somehow aware of a dark but powerful region which lies ambiguously beyond his powers.

Jaspers advances his own theology in a way that sometimes hints at a victory over the earlier agnosticism characterizing his thought. His requirements for authentic human existence seem much less severe than in *Philosophie*, even though the good man continues to seem more of a hero than a saint. In theological matters, God is the One. He is the Transcendent. He is Truth. Yet He remains completely and absolutely hidden from man, even in the cipher-language where He speaks through creatures. In his present lot, man has only to struggle onward in the spirit of heroic daring, restless in his ambiguity but never capable of shedding it. In meeting the antinomical existence that is his lot and meeting it boldly and bravely, man shows his love for God whose signs and symbols are encoded in the world of experience.

In such a perspective and across almost 1000 pages of tightly reasoned and tightly written German, Jaspers is able to say something on almost everything. Eighteen pages of the book are devoted to the table of contents with its generous number of divisions and subdivisions. There is a development of the philosophy of history, of work, of art, of signs and symbols, of evolution, of love, of authority, of freedom, of sacrifice, and many other subjects.

Jaspers is a metaphysician with no taste for analogy, no glimpse of the middle ground between the univocity of merely systematic philosophy and the equivocation that leads straight to agnosticism and despair. Jaspers' problem is essentially an ancient one, the question of the one and the many. Without analogy, the two poles cannot be reconciled, and as a result, the universe of Jaspers is a split world of the many while the one is hidden away behind Plotinian clouds.

In a realistic view, there is something at least suggestive of *Das Umgreifende*. It is existence, perfectly realized in God and analogously participated by creatures. Because of this resemblance, life is something more than mere search and struggle, and God's existence can be known even by the native gifts of human reason. Because of analogy, truth is not the object of fruitless failure; it is in some small but none the less certain way available to man's mind. Even though there is no perfect integrity or harmony of man's powers, this does not mean the complete imperfection of human nature and the failure of human life. Once more there are degrees. Again there is analogy.

Outside of Gabriel Marcel who has recently disavowed the label of "Christian existentialist," Jaspers is the only major figure of existentialism

in our time to move from a purely critical position toward a positive reconstruction of philosophy. That this movement of Jaspers has so far been brought to failure results from the ego-centric premises on which he works. He has a deep thirst, a sense of philosophy's great questions. But he gets the wrong answers because he asks his questions in the wrong way. A strict periechontologist would never speak. He certainly could never write more than a thousand pages of philosophy.

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Philosophical Physics. By VINCENT EDWARD SMITH. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. 487. \$4.00.

A book dealing with the problems raised by modern physics has been needed for a long time. It has become necessary for the relations between a philosophy of nature and contemporary science to be clarified and, particularly, that the question be answered whether or not the philosopher is to be forced to abandon his fundamental conceptions and let himself be guided by the views of the scientists or of those philosophers who believe that philosophy is, so to speak, *ancilla scientiae*. It is the claim not only of philosophizing scientists but of self-styled philosophers that philosophy has to be reconstructed continuously, so as to keep pace with and be adjusted to the recent developments of science. Although there have been not a few who maintained that the state of scientific knowledge has little bearing on the philosophical world-view, the general admiration for science and the influence it enjoys today have made others doubt whether they are still entitled to base their thinking on principles laid down at a time when science was still in an embryonic state, or did not exist at all. It was all right, so common opinion runs, to hold the views Aristotle professed at his time, or those of St. Thomas in the thirteenth century; but the twentieth century requires another kind of philosophy.

It is, of course, a fact that with the advance of mankind through the ages new problems arise the like of which even the greatest of our predecessors did not and could not know. But a new problem may well be solved by the old principles. It is only when an empirical discipline, like modern science, is envisaged as the paramount source of information, that people begin to doubt the solidity of the traditional philosophy.

One of the services rendered by the present work is that it draws a sharp dividing line between "empiriological" physics, as the author prefers to call it, on one hand, and philosophical physics on the other. Dr. Smith does not write on the "philosophy of physics" as it exists today, but on "philosophical physics," which is something very different.

The author makes very clear that a "law" of physics and a philosophical principle are two very different entities. He calls, justly, a law "a generalization of measured fact" (p. 147). Perhaps, one could go even farther and say that the laws which science formulates are the most convenient formula by which, at the present state of knowledge, the greatest possible number of measurable facts can be brought under one denominator. It is likewise true that the advance of physics depends on the premise that none of its laws is absolutely definite; "only in so far as it is doubtful and questionable," does the law have significance, because this is the condition of further inquiry.

The book consists two parts. The first is a more general presentation of the principles, and is destined for a reader who is not acquainted either with the facts and theories of empiriological physics or with the fundamentals of the philosophical interpretation of physical nature. The second part discusses problems of greater difficulty. The author seeks to avoid unnecessary repetition of matter already covered while at the same time to prevent obscurity. He has succeeded well in his endeavor.

His main thesis is that the objects of philosophical and of empiriological physics are different. Therefore, the theories of the scientist have little bearing on the views of the philosopher. As remarked above, the "law" of the scientist is not one of reality but only of certain aspects of reality. It is indeed necessary that this point be emphasized again and again. If the physicist, since the time of E. Mach and that of Heisenberg, declares that causality does not exist within his proper field, he is quite right. What he studies are relations of measurable quantities or of the quantitative aspects of phenomena. What underlies the covariability of the magnitudes the physicist studies is no longer an object of physical, that is, empiriological inquiry, but of philosophical penetration.

The proper object of philosophical physics is "mobile being." Motion must, of course, be understood in a wider sense than that of which science knows. Motion as such is not grasped by empiriological physics which, in its equations, reduces it to stability. Particularly, that motion which is called alteration, and is of the order of quality, escapes the observation of the physicist.

Within the general framework whose outlines could be just adumbrated here, the author discusses many of the questions which have arisen since modern science has claimed to present a "physical world-view." It is impossible to render account within this limited space of the multitude of problems and considerations with which the author deals. To mention some of them on which the attentive reader will find highly useful information: the problem of the infinite, that of the so-called non-Euclidean nature of space, the significance of the theory of relativity, and the compatibility of empiriological data with the principles of philosophy, especially those of causality and matter-form.

Other questions are treated incidentally in an equally happy manner, as evidenced by the brief remarks on modern existentialism.

Perhaps, one of the most important notions is that of empiriological physics as an "art" set over against "science" in the true sense of the term.

Each chapter offers suggestions for further reading. There are few bibliographical references, a feature dictated, probably, by the wish of the author of supply a helpful text for students. Nonetheless, more references would have been an asset.

One might find fault with some minor details. For instance, it is difficult to see what is the meaning of an atom being heated (p. 64). It is not correct that the cosmogonic theory originally suggested by Kant and elaborated by Laplace is known by the name of the latter only; German textbooks, at least, refer, to it as the theory of Kant-Laplace (p. 87). Some passages might be phrased in a happier manner. It is to be hoped that the book will have more editions so that there will be an opportunity for eliminating these, in fact, insignificant blemishes.

There may be some points on which one might disagree with the author. This is inevitable in any such enterprise which is, to a large extent, a new one. In any case, one has ample reasons to be grateful to Dr. Smith for having filled out a lacuna whose existence many students and teachers cannot but have felt quite keenly. The book should be widely read and used by both student and teacher.

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The Mother of the Saviour and Our Interior Life. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P. Translated by BERNARD J. KELLY, C.S.Sp. St. Louis: Herder, 1949. \$4.00.

This recently translated work of Father Garrigou-Lagrange is a more detailed study or explication of a doctrine treated summarily and in outline form in his *Three Ages*. As the title indicates, his principal intention is to inculcate in his readers a true appreciation of and a true devotion to Our Blessed Mother. His aim is to show that Mary who is the Mother of God is also the Mother of God the Saviour Who redeemed us by His sacrificial death, and that she now exercises through her merits and prayers a moral influence in the growth of our spiritual life and in the increase of union with Christ and through Him with God. He proposes, therefore, to expose the dignity of the Blessed Mother of God and her relationship to us, her spiritual children: "This book is intended to be an exposition of the principal theses of Mariology in their bearing on our interior life" (Author's

Preface). In order to accomplish this objective, the author "exposes the common teaching of the Church, transmitted by the Fathers and explained by theologians" (p. 177). "The doctrines proposed in this book are not personal ones; it has been my aim to give what is most commonly held by theologians—especially those of the Thomistic school—and to explain the various points in the light of St. Thomas's principles" (Author's Preface).

In the light of his end and the method adopted to attain his end, it is evident that this book contains a speculative and a practical aspect. And this is reasonable, since he aims to excite his readers to a loving consideration of their Blessed Mother. In order that this devotion have a firm basis he devotes considerable time to the dignity and excellence that belong to Mary in her own right. After considering the truth that pertains to Mary, that truth, by extension, becomes for us an object that attracts our affection, a good to be loved, a person to whom we owe devotion and love, in conformity with the divine plan for human redemption and salvation. This is the only way that one man may influence another, by proposing a good to his intellect and will, by persuading one with telling arguments to act in such a way as to be joined or united with that good. The disposition required to pursue that suggestion comes from God, since God's motion is necessary for every act of the will, yet under its influence one freely chooses the good to which he is moved. And in this moral persuasion Father Garrigou-Lagrange succeeds admirably.

The subject of the book falls easily into two parts: the first treating of the Blessed Mother in herself, the second dealing with Mary's relationship to men and her role in God's plan for the salvation of men. The first part is further subdivided into two parts in which the dignity of the divine maternity and the plenitude of grace which is its consequent are considered. The second part is also reduced to two headings: Mary as the Mother of men, and her universal mediation.

In the first part, Father Garrigou-Lagrange, following the majority of theologians, advances arguments to show that Mary's divine maternity outranks her other privileges, in fact, her Motherhood is the reason for her fullness of grace. The principal reason is that Mary was predestined by God to be the Mother of the Redeemer, dependent, of course, on the divine foreknowledge and permission of Adam's sin. In order to manifest His goodness and power, God permitted sin, but He also supplied the remedy for sin in the redemptive Incarnation of the Word of God. In the order of redemption everything is subordinated to Christ and His Holy Mother. Mary was therefore predestined first to the divine maternity and in consequence of this singular privilege to a very high degree of heavenly glory and to the fullness of grace, in order that she might be fully worthy of her mission as Mother of the Saviour. A second reason is that a relation's dignity is considered from its term. Hence the dignity of the divine

maternity is to be valued and measured by the term to which it is immediately related, that is, to the uncreated Person of the Incarnate God. Mary, therefore, belongs to the hypostatic order which surpasses that of grace and glory.

To this unsurpassed privilege to be the Mother of God, the Blessed Virgin owes her wonderful dignity. From it flow all her other privileges and prerogatives, her initial plenitude of grace and her consummated fullness in glory, her role in God's design for man's salvation. "Admittedly it is not possible to deduce from the divine maternity each and every one of the privileges received by Mary but all derive ultimately from it" (p. 36).

According to Father Garrigou-Lagrange, the privilege of the Assumption of Our Blessed Lady is at least implicitly revealed. While the dignity of the Mother of God is the root reason of all her privileges, it is not the proximate cause of her Assumption; rather this proximate cause is her plenitude of grace. In order that the Assumption be defined as a dogma of faith, a divine revelation, and that public, is necessary. The Assumption, as contained in the documents of Tradition, is an implicit revelation. This belief is found in documents dating from the seventh century and continuing to the present time, and in the practices of the Church which has celebrated this feast throughout the centuries. To the constant tradition of the Church the author adds two theological reasons, which are not precisely illative, but rather explicative. Mary's plenitude of grace negates the divine malediction to bring forth children in pain and to return to dust (Genesis iii, 16-19). Mary was therefore preserved through it from corruption in her body; her body would not return to dust but would be resuscitated in an anticipated resurrection. Since the two premises of this argument are revealed, the conclusion is capable of being defined. The divine malediction contains the "into dust thou shalt return" of Genesis, not as a cause contains its effect but as a whole contains its parts: "Into dust thou shalt return" is a part of the divine malediction.

The other reason proposed by the Fathers of the Vatican Council who asked for a definition of the dogma of the Assumption is adopted by Father Garrigou-Lagrange. Christ's perfect victory over Satan included victory over sin and death. Now Mary, the Mother of God, was most intimately associated with Him in His victory over Satan. Hence she was associated with Him in His victory over death by her anticipated resurrection and Assumption. Again, both premises are revealed and the argument itself is explicative rather than illative, since it bears on Christ's perfect victory which is a whole containing as its parts victory over sin and victory over death. Hence the doctrine of the Assumption is capable of definition as an article of faith.

The second half of this work is devoted to Mary as the Mother of men

and her influence in the interior growth of her spiritual children and their sanctification. Mary became Mother of the Saviour by her free consent, which she elicited under the motion of God's efficacious grace, a consent which was given in the name of all mankind. By this consent she was associated with her Son in the work of Redemption. She knew the Messianic prophecies concerning the promised Redeemer, yet she accepted these sufferings willingly because she loved God and men.

Mary's association with her Son is moral, for she is a secondary, dispositive, subordinate cause. She is not the principal and perfective cause of the Redemption, for Jesus is the Universal Mediator between God and men. By her meritorious actions, however, she disposes us to receive the action of her Son. Mary is subordinated to Christ not merely because she is inferior to Him, but also because her concurrence in saving us and, in fact, her own excellence, proceeds from His merits. She acts in Him, with Him, and by Him. In a word, her causality is moral, while that of Christ's is physical.

But can it be said, as some theologians teach, that Mary exercises a physical instrumental causality in the conferring of grace? While Father Garrigou-Lagrange inclines to the affirmative, he, nevertheless, maintains that this teaching is only probable. "However, it is probable . . . that she exercises a physical instrumental causality as well in the spiritual order for the transmission and production of the graces which we receive through her. This is no more than a simple probability, but we believe it cannot be denied without running the risk of diminishing Mary's influence, which must be greater than is commonly believed" (p. 205, footnote 26). In examining the arguments advanced for this opinion, the author repeats his stand that they admit only of probability. To the traditional argument which conceives Mary as the neck of the Mystical Body, uniting Head and members, and transmitting the vital influence to them, he replies: "But at the same time it must be admitted that it does not seem possible to prove with certainty that Mary did exercise physical causality. Theology will hardly advance beyond serious probability in this matter for the reason that it is very hard to see in the traditional texts quoted where precisely the literal sense ends and the metaphorical sense begins" (p. 237). While he is very favorably disposed to the thesis of Father Hugon, O. P., an outstanding exponent of this opinion, Father Garrigou-Lagrange maintains that there is a strong probability for Mary's instrumental causality, but there is no certainty.

While Mary is the physical Mother of Christ, she is our mother in a spiritual sense through adoption, for, by her union with Christ, she has communicated to us the supernatural life of grace. That spiritual motherhood commenced when she consented to become the Mother of God and continues to be exercised now. She is the Mother of all men and each man

in particular because she intercedes and obtains for each all the graces he receives. Again, this mediation must be understood in the sense of subordination to Christ. While her mediation is not necessary, since Christ's is superabundant and needs no complement, nevertheless, it has been willed by God because of our weakness and because God wished to honor her by allowing her the exercise of causality in the order of sanctification and salvation. She mediates between Christ and men, presenting to Him their prayers and obtaining from Him the benefits they need. Her mediation, which she exercised even while on earth, continues in heaven. She knows our needs, both spiritual and temporal, and through her prayers she asks that her merits, her satisfactions and her Son's, be applied to us at the appropriate moment.

Since Father Garrigou-Lagrange's aim is to arouse his readers to devotion to the Blessed Mother, he gives short meditations on the principal events in Mary's life, and explains briefly Mary's Rosary. Throughout this second part, which shows Mary's concern for our salvation and which should excite in our hearts love and reverence for her, he liberally sprinkles excerpts from spiritual authorities, particularly St. Grignon de Montfort. Father Garrigou-Lagrange is motivated by love of Mary and of souls. He sings her praises extraordinarily well, and his song cannot help but arouse in the hearts of his audience a lasting affection for Mary, his Mother and ours.

To the errata the following may also be added: the citation on page 48, which reads Ia IIae, q. 24, art. 3, ad 2, should read Ia IIae, q. 113, art. 9, ad 2.

JAMES R. MALONEY, O.P.

*Dominican House of Philosophy,
Somerset, Ohio.*

How to Educate Human Beings. By EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950. Pp. 174, with index. \$2.75.

We have been learning of late how true is the observation made by a nineteenth century wit that education is the most boring of subjects, one which has no beginning, middle, nor end. Since the war it has become a popular topic of public discussion but to the layman it is still too often veiled in obscurities. The fault here is largely that of the educators themselves, who, as a vested interest, sometimes feel they must throw their professional weight around by speaking in high-sounding and esoteric terms. Talk of motivation, correlation, and norms, topped off by a few statistical tables or graphs, is apt to have a soporific effect on the most eager listener.

The author of *How to Educate Human Beings* is not guilty of this familiar fault of the pedagogues. Although he has been a public school teacher, dean of a graduate school, and is now president of Mount Mary

College in Milwaukee, he is refreshingly free of the jargon of the specialist. He writes of education not as a mechanical or institutional problem but as a human problem. He leaves the undoubtedly important subjects of better physical plants and equipment and higher teachers' salaries to others; he is concerned here with human values and the attempt to define a philosophy of education and life which should underlie all teaching activity. The assumption behind this book being that man's distinctive quality is his humanity, its purpose is to present a program of liberal education that will nourish this essential humanity rather than simply train man to be a competent mechanism. The vital contribution of Dr. Fitzpatrick's book is this emphasis on man, man as *individual*, his insistence that educational machinery and organization shall always be used "as a means, not an end, in the service of the humane education of individual human beings." He sees that if we over-emphasize "society" and the social we are apt to lose the individual in the process and end with a sort of totalitarian education. He would probably agree with the remark of the late Albert Jay Nock that "the only thing the psychically-human being can do to improve society is to present society with *one improved unit*." That is the task of liberal education, not to improve or reform society, but to improve and reform individuals who in the aggregate will make the better society.

In showing how far we have departed from this ideal of education for the individual, the author reproduces that amazing paragraph from the 1947 yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators wherein it is stated that in education unreserved priority must be given to society as a whole rather than to the individual, that there must be a fundamental shift in education from helping the individual to become a valuable member of society to the preparation of the individual for higher loyalty to society, that there must be a vast stepping up of the functions of government on all levels. As Dr. Fitzpatrick well says, "Heil Hitler!"

As for the curriculum of liberal education on the college level the author seems to be in general agreement with the program of the College of the University of Chicago in having it consist of the humanities, mathematics, languages, and the social and natural sciences. Where he would part company with Hutchins and his colleagues is in the realm of vocational training—which he prefers to call vocational *education*. He quotes Maritain's phrase about the intelligence of a man being not only in his head but in his fingers in support of manual work of some sort on all educational levels. If I understand him aright he is in favor of introducing a program of manual training in the liberal arts curriculum, not only because he feels a fusion of the manual and mental makes for psychological equilibrium but also because he feels such training would have genuine value in the market place, after graduation. It would seem to me that in the already somewhat crowded liberal arts curriculum it is going to be difficult to find a place

for a vocational program comprehensive enough to be of any real value in training for jobs. Vocational activity for the liberal arts student may well be of recreational value but the real preparation for livelihood comes from the training of mind and spirit by exposure to liberalizing and humanizing education. Young men starting out in the business or industrial world rarely lose their first positions because of lack of trade or manual skills; they are more apt to lose them from lack of ability to express themselves, to concentrate, to deal with other people.

As in any good book or conversation there are many incidental bits in this work which stick in the memory. This reviewer, temperamentally sympathetic to the Great Books idea, feels nonetheless that there is justice in Dr. Fitzpatrick's stricture:

I think the Great Books program as it is being carried on is often a get-education-quick device. It deceives large numbers of people that they are getting the quintessence of these great books, whereas they are, for the most part, under inadequate leadership. All they are getting is the frequently unconsidered opinion of persons of equal ignorance with their own.

One might add that even the more accomplished leaders in these discussions—at least in some of the radio versions of the idea—are sometimes as much bent on exhibiting forensic skill or making the *mot juste* as they are in advancing the author's thought.

Another pleasant bit is Dr. Fitzpatrick's recommendation in the matter of note-taking: "It would be a great gain in all education if all note-taking and notebooks were proscribed and students had to listen either to the wisdom or the nonsense of the professor and start working on it mentally immediately or go daydreaming." And he has dug up a delicious bit from an old "survey" in which it was shown, scientifically no doubt, that the ideal professor possesses these god-like qualities: rugged physique, commanding bearing, voice clear and pleasingly resonant, great retentive and mental endowments, incisive and penetrating intelligence, keen wit, and inexhaustible humor!

Dr. Fitzpatrick is so definitely on the side of the angels one could wish his case had been presented with greater felicity. Although he does not employ the cant phrases and jargon of so many educators, he is a little heavy-handed with the English language. The notes at the end of chapters are sometimes unnecessary and sometimes do not correspond with the text references. These shortcomings aside, the author is an educator with a rational philosophy of man and his educational needs and has written a book abounding in information, common sense, and even wisdom; a book motivated by a humane concern for the individual human being.

MORTIMER SMITH

Jeremy Hill House,
Sandy Hook, Conn.

A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, Sa'd al Dīn al-Taftāzānī on the Creed of Najm al Dīn al Nasafī. Tr. by EARL EDGAR ELDER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. Pp. 219, with index. \$3.75.

The revival of medieval studies in the last fifty years is a matter of record. In almost all the great universities of the world, scholars have devoted much of their activity to the study of the institutions, literature, politics, arts and sciences extant during the long period which runs from the end of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the Renaissance. Denifle, Grabmann, Mandonnet, Haskins, Chenu, Peatow, Powcocke, Gilson and Vignaux, among many others, have worked strenuously in this field. In the New World, institutes such as the Pontifical Institute of Toronto, the Institut d'Études Médiévales of Montreal, the American Medieval Society, and Washington University and reviews such as *Speculum*, *Traditio*, and the *Thomist*, to mention a few, clearly show the depths of revived interest in the Middle Ages.

Scholasticism, naturally, has profited by this interest. The teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas and of the Franciscan School, particularly, have been studied with great care. Chronological criteria of the various works and the influence of historical background and context have been stressed without falling into a disintegration of doctrinal positions, at least among the best scholars. The Leonine Edition of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Canadian edition (Dominican) of the same work are good examples of the kind of work which has been accomplished.

This interest shown in medieval studies has led necessarily to the study of the influence of foreign cultures on occidental medievalism. Among those, the Arabic and Islamic culture have attracted attention. Beyond all doubt, names like Avicenna, Averroës, Kindi, Farabi, to mention only the fields of philosophy and theology, were familiar to the great Scholastics, and we are not surprised to see Gilson, a great specialist in medieval studies, assert in one of his books: "La première illusion à dissiper est celle qui représente la pensée chrétienne et la pensée musulmane comme deux mondes dont on pourrait connaître l'un et ignorer l'autre," which is a fairly categorical statement as to the interdependence of the two systems of thought.

Comparative studies have been made by many scholars. In the field of the sciences, the monumental works of Professor George Sarton have shown in a practical way that the study of the Arabic heritage is full of very suggestive comparisons between the different sectors of human knowledge. In philosophy, Horten, Bouyges, Asin Palacios, and Muller, and in mystical theology, the great scholars Massignon and Nicholson have presented a huge amount of material which brings to non-Arabic students an important collection of facts which may be integrated into a comprehensive history of culture.

On the other hand, this scientific approach to Arabic culture by means of medieval studies has been connected to some extent with missionary activity in regard to Islam. From the second half of the 19th century, French Jesuits, English and American Protestants, and Italian Franciscans had tried in the Near-East and in India to preach the Gospel among the Muslims. In the beginning, knowledge concerning Islam was not entirely unprejudiced; a polemic spirit prevailed and no scientific study was seriously undertaken. For the greater part, the studies of that day concerned folklore or popular beliefs. In the course of time, however, serious scholars entered the field and works of high standard concerning Islam were produced. The name and works of Duncan Macdonald, for example, are known by all who deal with mission questions about the Muslim. The scientific studies of missionaries has, in fact, now attained a high level. It is a sign of the times that a review like *Muslim World*, edited by the Hartford Missionary School in Massachusetts, should have a director of the stature of Professor Calverly and such collaborators as Professors Jeffery of Columbia University, Gibb of Oxford, and Winnet of Toronto. Important books, technical and, as far as possible, objective, have been written: *The Muslim Creed* of Wensinck, *Islam and Christian Theology* of Sweetman, the *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* of Gardet and Anawati. These works study the great doctrinal questions of Islam in themselves without any polemical intention—*sine ira et studio*. On the layman's side, the classical book of Goldziher and the more recent *Medieval Islam* of Von Grunebaum (Chicago) represent a scientific contribution to our knowledge of Islam.

The interesting part of all this activity is that such works now obtain a hearing among the Muslims themselves. For example, the *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* has been reviewed in the official Journal of the Azhar which congratulated the authors for their objectivity, and the book itself is to be translated into Arabic by one of the authors and a professor of theology at al-Azhar, the great Muslim University in Cairo.

This introduction to a review of the present work by Dr. Elder is long but not useless, for it serves as a background. Dr. Elder is laboring in the good tradition of the Macdonald school, supplemented by the numerous researches which have been done in the field of Islamic studies. Unlike the work of Sweetman which is a reconstruction of the chief problems of Islamic theology from the western point of view, the book produced by Dr. Elder is a translation with introduction and notes on a very popular textbook: the commentary of Taftazani on al-Nasafi's Creed which has remained until the present day an authoritative compendium of the arguments in support of the articles of the Muslim faith and has long held a leading place among the scholars attached to al-Azhar.

In a long *Introduction* (Pp. IX-XXXII), the translator has set the creed and the ideas of the commentators into the current of Islamic

thought. It is well known that, after a period of incubation and fermentation in Damascus, where the new doctrines of Islam met Christian theology, and a second period of elaboration in Baghdad where the translation of Greek philosophical sources put into the hands of Muslim doctors Aristotelian philosophy, the doctrinal position of orthodox Islam crystallised around Abu l-Hasan al Ash'ari (d. 935 A.D.). He himself was, at first, for a long time a partisan of the Mu'tazilit School, a very active, learned and enthusiastic group of rationalistic defenders of Islam. Then he rejected the rationalistic attitude and took a middle-of-the-road position between the rationalistic exaggeration of the Mu'tazalit School and the gross anthropomorphism of the traditionalistic extremists. Atomism was adopted as the basis for his philosophical system which was consequently vigorously occasionalistic. Creeds condensing the main items of the articles of belief were written by scholars. Wensinck has studied some of them in his *Muslim Creed*. One of the most popular of these treatises is the booklet of Najm al Din al Nasafi (d. 1142 A.D.). We find in this Creed the main questions of Islamic theology. After an introductory chapter concerning the reality of things, the author examines the causes of knowledge and then establishes the existence of a Creator. The attributes of God are then enumerated and explained, and the possibility of seeing God is discussed. The author then studies the relations of human activity with God and the responsibility of creatures. Following this, a series of chapters is devoted to such subjects as eschatological realities, sins, beliefs, angels, the ascension of the Prophet and miracles, the *khalifate*, various articles of beliefs concerning worship, the companions of the Prophet and the ranks of saints.

One of the outstanding commentaries on Nasafi's articles is that of Taftasani (d. 1389 A.D.). It has retained a high reputation down through the centuries. "Because it was written just after the subject matter of theology had been precipitated into the form it was to retain for five hundred years without perceptive change, the work of Taftazani has remained for scholars a compendium of the various views regarding the great doctrines of Islam. There is little indeed in his comment that is not found elsewhere" (p. xx). For this reason, Dr. Elder has undertaken to translate the commentary thoroughly and to accompany the text with learned notes. This work was first done as a part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Hartford Seminary Foundation. The late Duncan Macdonald was the first to guide the author to an understanding of the many intricate problems in Islamic theology. Professor Wolfson has assisted him in translating many difficult passages of scholastic reasoning, and Professor Jeffery of Columbia University has read the proofs. To this careful background of preparation we may add that Dr. Elder has spent several years of serious study in Cairo. He has, then,

spared no effort to make his work as thorough as possible, and has further enhanced it by including a good bibliography.

We reluctantly insert a tiny note of disagreement. It is not correct to translate *ru'yat Allah* (the vision of God) by "beatific vision," although Wensinck does likewise. The expression refers to a sensible vision made with the eyes of the body. We must avoid in translations the use of expressions which have a definite meaning in other creeds. One might otherwise easily fall into an ambiguous "concordism." We might suggest, too, that a lexicon of Arabic words would make the present book even more valuable.

Religious belief is an essential factor of civilization, and little is accomplished towards the understanding of peoples if we do not try to grasp the deep roots of their behavior. From this point of view, the book of Dr. Elder will be most welcome.

M. M. ANAWATI, O. P.

Cairo, Egypt.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Drama of Atheist Humanism. By HENRI DE LUBAC, S. J. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950. Pp. 253, with index. \$4.00.

In this short volume Father de Lubac, the French theologian, deals with the impossible problem of man's attempt to build a humanism on the denial of God. The atheists he selects for this study are mainly three: Marx, Nietzsche, and Comte. Against them he places Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky as believers in God who seriously plumbed the depths of atheist thought and rejected it for being anti-humanist as well as anti-theist.

The volume is curiously arranged into three parts. The first treats of four figures; Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, with comparisons and discussion centering about the last. The second section is devoted to Comte and Christianity, and the third to Dostoevsky. With the exception of the 90 pages devoted to Comte, the work is not a systematic treatment of any one author's thought about God but rather a selection from each one's writings to illustrate the particular point Father de Lubac is making at the time. The treatment of Comte, incidentally, is the best critical analysis of the French positivist's thought this author has yet seen. It makes one wish Father de Lubac would do more systematic writing instead of the brilliant but disjointed method he usually employs.

A book of this kind does not lend itself so much to systematic review as to a series of observations on its principal merits and its deficiencies. In the first place, *The Drama of Atheist Humanism* is a hard book to classify. Written by a theologian on a theological subject, it is not a piece of theological writing. Perhaps, it can best be called apologetics. Judged with the author's other works, it appears part of his plan to examine all the alternative answers to the question of human destiny and God's existence. In this work he demonstrates the impossibility of an atheist humanism.

Father de Lubac treats his antagonists with respect and with charity. He states the Nietzschean, Marxian, and Comtean positions as strongly and as sympathetically as possible before showing their inadequacies and their positive errors. The great value of this work, indeed, is that the author understands his antagonists—his psychological insight into other systems of thought is remarkable—and exposes the inner contradictions in their systems of thought. Next, it should be observed that for those in the Christian tradition the book is valuable chiefly for the many phrases and sentences dropped along the wayside by the author, any one of which can serve as a point of departure for serious reconsideration of our thought and our action in the past half century.

This reviewer is not convinced that Comte's positivism remains as important as Father de Lubac considers it. "To my mind," he insists, "it is one of the most dangerous [menaces] that beset us" (p. 157). To us in this country, Comte's religion of sociolatriy seems too naive to be taken seriously at this date, although his methodology and his general attitude toward the various fields of knowledge have left a pernicious heritage from which the modern world still suffers.

Some may wonder why Father de Lubac confronts atheist humanism with the theistic affirmations of Dostoevsky instead of with the traditional Catholic affirmations about God. To me, this use of Dostoevsky seems a masterpiece of apologetics, for the author gropes through the darkness of atheist negations with Dostoevsky and comes with him—reluctantly almost on Dostoevsky's part—to an affirmation of God's existence. Dostoevsky is valuable apologetically, for, as he puts it, "My hosanna has come forth from the crucible of doubt." It is much more difficult to analyze a novelist's thought than it is the thought of an essayist or polemicist. Father de Lubac threads his way deftly among Dostoevsky's characters to pick out what he considers the author's personal beliefs. Experts in literary criticism may disagree with certain of his conclusions, but this reviewer at least is satisfied that his interpretations of Dostoevsky's novels are essentially correct.

The Drama of Atheist Humanism is not written for theologians or philosophers primarily, but it is so written and it reveals so wide a knowledge of nineteenth-century anti-Christian thought and so deep an understanding of its *raison d'être* that it can be read profitably by specialists in the Christian tradition.

The Essentials of Theism. By D. J. B. HAWKINS. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1949. Pp. 151. \$2.25.

The title, *The Essentials of Theism*, suggests at once that the author did not intend to enter upon a detailed exposition of all the theistic proofs and refutation of opponents. And yet, along with giving the main ways by which reason, without supernatural aid, can arrive at a certain knowledge that God exists and something of His nature, Dr. Hawkins does also manage to clear away some outstanding obstacles that modern philosophy has put in the minds of many. His thought moves quickly, concisely, and with assurance; as a result, he encompasses much in a hundred and fifty pages.

We shall not stop to lament those things that the brevity of the book precludes; almost any book could have had more in it. We shall look to its assets. After a good introduction which sets forth the enduring task of the philosopher to inquire into the rational basis of religion, there are

three chapters to show that there must be some necessary being. The first, on "The Contingency of History" reaches the conclusion that "If anything exists, necessary being exists," that "beneath or beyond the flux of historical processes we must find something permanent." The second chapter asks whether this necessary being is to be found within the world of experience, and points out the inadequacy of materialism, which so pervades the modern mind, as a final explanation of the universe. Prepared by these considerations, we then take up the causal argument in a third chapter in which Plato's self-moved mover and Aristotle's unmoved mover are appraised together with the first three "ways" of Saint Thomas; for *The Essentials of Theism* takes its direction along the *Quinque Viae* to a first, necessary cause. It seems that in giving the causal argument, the author might have stressed more sharply the fact that the proof makes use of a series of contemporaneous, essentially subordinated causes, here and now operating.

Throughout these chapters and, in fact, the whole book, Father Hawkins evinces a thorough acquaintance with varying approaches to the theistic problem and turns readily to accept whatever support the history of philosophy offers to his position, as well as to cope with his opponents. One of the excellencies of these first chapters is their answer to Hume and Kant and through them, to their descendants of today.

After establishing that there must be some necessary being, the author goes on to show that this necessary being must be Infinite Being and Eternal Mind. A transitional chapter, "Retrospect and Prospect," leads to a consideration of four besetting problems: "Creation," "God the Lawgiver," "God and Free Will," "God and Evil." In the chapter on "God and Free Will" there is a more satisfactory presentation of the rival claims of "physical premotion" and *scientia media* than is usually found in such a brief treatise on natural theology, or even in longer ones.

The book fittingly concludes by dwelling on a thought taken from Saint Augustine: "God is at the same time a mystery of awe and a mystery of attraction." Having attained to reason's answer as to the nature of God, man is yet not satisfied; he longs to enter into personal relationship with Him. Hence, a philosophical study of the existence and nature of God needs to be completed by a theological study of God's communication to and with man.

The very comprehensiveness of a book such as this recommends it as helpful reading for any serious thinkers desirous of finding God. (One wishes, indeed, that the stipulation laid down by Plato in *Laws* X where he is dealing with the atheists, that all "wardens of the law" be required to know the proofs for the existence of God, be extended to our present groups of legislators and teachers.) *The Essentials of Theism* would serve excellently the purposes of supplementary reading for students of natural theology, apologetics, and also of the history of modern philosophy, for it lays the axe to the root of several modern errors.

Santo Tomás de Aquino y el Problema Psicológico de la Unión del Alma con el Cuerpo. By R. P. ENRIQUE D. ALMEIDA, O.P. River Forest: Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy, 1950. Pp. 118, with index.

The mere fact that this doctoral dissertation is published by a Dominican Faculty of Philosophy is assurance of order and clarity in presentation and fidelity to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Fr. Almeida apparently has, however, several particular ends in view, in the light of which his work should be evaluated. His introduction offers a work of orientation and exposition of St. Thomas to the intellectuals of his native Ecuador and Hispano-America; his thesis is charged with polemical overtones against materialistic psychologists. He spares us the history of this famous problem and the novelty of St. Thomas's solution only to devote some twenty pages to the clarification of the respective fields of psychology and philosophy. Here he betrays a suspicious leaning toward the material and quantitative aspect rather than the formal and qualitative, and among other things is much impressed by the multiplicity of experimental techniques in this country and our reliance on psychometrics. ". . . youth of both sexes are continually submitted to tests of this kind, in the light of which they manifest their definite vocation, in which they can obtain extraordinary success" (p. 4). Quite a testimonial to vocational aptitude testing.

He cites Barbado and Brennan to support the claim of experimental psychology to being a formally distinct science, against the trend of the common Thomistic manuals. Then, the authority of St. Thomas is used to show that experimental methods are invalid when dealing with the essence of the soul and its operations. This leads to an exposition of the metaphysics of body, soul, and union, in terms of matter and form, potency and act. He then shows the consequences of the substantial union and finally corroborates St. Thomas' conclusions from the findings of psychophysiology, psychiatry and psychosomatics. This last is the weakest part of the dissertation.

A scholastic who attempts to reconcile what are loosely called "modern" findings with the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor or to restate in modern terminology the conclusions of the perennial philosophy often fails of his purpose, because competence in one field seems to preclude competence in the other, if for no other reason than the time to be spent in study. As Fr. Almeida himself points out, he has been pursuing scholastic philosophy most of his academic life, and that in social sciences. His study of psychosomatics began with his two-year stay at River Forest. This disproportion is reflected in his work which devotes some thirty pages to exposition of scholastic concepts and four pages to criticism of psychosomatic theories. Hence as an exposition of Thomistic doctrine on the union of body and soul and its consequences in natural philosophy this work may find a welcome among our Spanish-speaking neighbors, but its influence on the non-philosophical psychologists will be negligible.

Availability, rather than any nice critical sense, seems to have determined his preponderantly English bibliography, which lists, with the exception of Barbado's studies, mostly texts and general works cited, rather than a bibliography of the problem. This is not too serious, however, since he explicitly eschewed the history of the problem.

To claim, therefore, for this work any great influence or impact on the modern psycho- studies would be ambitious and even presumptuous, but as another indication of the ageless wisdom of St. Thomas, Thomists will take it to their heart.

The Power and Limits of Science: A Philosophical Study. By E. F. CALDIN.
London: Chapman & Hall, 1949. Pp. 205, with index. 12/6.

The author was moved to write this book in order to offer a view of the place that science occupies in human affairs. To attain this goal, he analyses the method of science and tries, in this way, to show the kinship and the disparity of science and philosophy.

The first part of the book comprises three chapters which conclude that Physics deals with the universal and arrives at the general quantitative laws of inanimate matter through the aid of observation, experiment, mechanical models, constructions and mathematical principles. Physics is not concerned with agents and causation and qualities but rather with the measurement and correlation of variables.

Four chapters make up the second part of the book which is labelled "Philosophical." The author contends herein that induction is a method not appropriate to philosophy as it is to the whole field of the natural sciences. Induction, in this view, amounts to interpretation or inductive generalization based upon analogy; the validity of induction is not to be explained as stemming from the quantitative force of the mathematical laws of chance, but rather from the metaphysical presupposition that there is order in nature. The notion of truth in science is also considered in this section. The author takes a brief look at various proposals on the nature of truth in science—that such truth is a matter of coherence, of simplicity, of agreement or of communicability—and concludes with the correspondence notion of truth. The nature of metaphysics (a term which is generally used as equivalent to the term, philosophy) is then put forth as being completely different from logic, mathematics or natural science. While both the natural sciences and metaphysics, for example, use observation, natural science employs it as material for induction, metaphysics as material for reflection on the general principles that are needed if experience is to be intelligible.

The concluding part of the book is termed "Applications." A chapter on the unique beauty to be found in science is followed by two excellent

chapters, one on "Ethics and Science" and the other on "Society and Science." There is a concluding chapter and an Appendix which summarizes "The Cosmological Argument for the Existence of a First Cause."

The author's statement in the Preface that "... the desire to write the perfect book has prevented the publication of many useful ones ..." can be used as a point of departure in the evaluation of this book. For, like many other books of its general type (the author is a Lecturer in Chemistry at the University of Leeds) written formerly by such men as Jeans, Whitehead and Planck and today by such men as Frank and Margeneau, it assumes that the speculative differences between philosophy and science are such that each has different methods, different points of view, different subject matters and different standards of validity. Hence, the book serves the purpose of requiring greater attention to the problem of "philosophy" and "science"—as do those books which propose science and metaphysics as two types of knowledge or which propose to distinguish "philosophy" from "science" by the theory of ultimate and proximate causes.

We must, however, begin to come to the realization that "philosophy" and "science" are not irremediably different at all and that there is a certain mode in which we can resolve the apparent conflicts between what is termed "science" and what is termed "philosophy." To resolve the problem we cannot begin by assuming that these two terms signify two absolutely diverse modes of knowing and then attempt to discover and label their differences—*cette question est malposé*.

Both nature and mind have their own unity, and truth is the qualitative relationship of identity which obtains between them. In nature, however, there is much contingency, fluctuation, particularity and diversity; the mind can be related with truth to this aspect of nature but only in an opinionative (or dialectical) way, whether this opinionative possession of truth be that of the common man or of the man who measures probabilities in education, economics, physics and so forth.

This mode of knowing is qualitatively perfected through science (which is here used as the certain possession of truth). Further, there are but three ways in which the mind can schematize scientifically, with each mode having a basis in nature in two ways: first, in that the mind now seeks the necessity which lies within nature; second, in that the mind does so by formalizing unto itself nature as mobile, nature as quantitative or nature in its very being.

When one adopts this true frame of reference, the principal difficulties which supposedly obtain between "philosophy" and "science"—which are reflected in current jibes about "philosophers" and praises about "scientists" and are more widely confusing in the broader dimensions of present culture—begin to be resolved. In the sciences which are concerned with nature as mobile, a general science (the present Cosmology and

Psychology) of mobile being attains its correct position, and what today is called "science" is seen to consist of particular sciences dealing with particular motion—but always schematized under mobile being. The mathematical disciplines and metaphysics are seen to be equally valid sciences, and the combinational sciences (as Theoretical Physics, Physical Chemistry, Mathematical Biology) are likewise valid scientific knowledge.

Moreover, this scheme—which views truth as being either opinionative (dialectical) or scientific—by allowing intellect to be itself, accounts for the use of reason in all human affairs where man is to act in conformity to reason, as well as in the practical sciences (where the theory of the three types of arts, liberal, fine and useful is still valid). Finally, such a scheme shows the close bond that ties the scientific to the opinionative, and for which there is one logic of the intellect in its acquisition of truth as opinionative (dialectical logic or *logica utens*) or as certain (scientific logic or method, or *logica docens*).¹

The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number. By DR. G. FREGE. English Translation by J. L. Austin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 262.

While credence in mathematico-logical absolutes appears to be in decline,¹ there is still need for a broad study of the whole movement from which the putative wedding of mathematics and logic originated. This translation of Gottlob Frege's *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* of 1884 is one of the source books which will be helpful to such a study. Both the translation² and the format of the book leave little to be desired, and the original German text is reprinted on the left-hand pages for comparison.

The main item with which Frege is concerned in this work is the nature of number, for the problem of the foundations of arithmetic finally resolves itself into that of the foundations of number. In this book and in other works as yet untranslated, Frege proposes the class definition of number and attributes objective reality, of some sort, to the being of number. He was led to these conclusions, it seems, through two groups

¹ It would be good for those engaged in teaching to consider whether one can be thoroughly Thomistic as the Sovereign Pontiffs have requested, without holding to the traditional distinction of the speculative and practical sciences. In this connection, an excellent article by Pierre Conway, O. P., and George Q. Friel, O. P., entitled "Farewell, Philosophy," appeared in the October, 1950 issue of *The New Scholasticism*. The article certainly contains the basic solution to the problems of teaching in Catholic colleges and universities today.

² See for example the very recent work by G. Bouligand and J. Desgranges entitled *Le Declin des Absolus Mathematico-Logiques* (Paris, 1949).

³ There is a sentence not translated on page 40^o.

of factors: first, by a speculative confusion of mathematics with logic; second, by a supposition that the origin or nature of number can be studied and solved apart from considering its relation to other valid types of knowledge.

The nature of number, its origin and development, are interesting questions to which at least some fundamental answers can be given if the restrictions which Frege placed upon himself are removed. We must, first of all, admit that the nature of number is a metaphysical and not merely, a logical problem, for it is concerned with the very being of number itself. Number, consequently, must be viewed in relation to the field of knowledge in general.

If we agree that the science of mathematics is not the same as a pre-scientific acquaintance with mathematical judgments, then it follows that mathematical number is not precisely the same as are the numbers taught us by parents and teachers in pre-scientific experience. Mathematical number is only achieved in formal abstraction, and thereby it possesses a whole host of differences which ordinary number does not; this fact helps explain the various geometries, algebras and mathematical systems that are being formulated.

If we grant that the pre-scientific and the scientific mind know the multitudes and the unity given us in nature differently—a fact to which psychology and the history of mathematics testify—both the connectedness of mathematics to pre-scientific experience as well as its own independence, freedom and certitude are items for which we can give adequate account. We can, in this view, say that all mathematics derives, somehow, from experience; mathematical suggestions can arise from everyday experience as well as from practical needs or insights from other sciences and from the arts. But, once acquired, they must be “mathematicized” or given mathematical being within the mental act of formal abstraction.

It is here, in the mathematical formalization of experience, that mathematical numbers are validly viewed—in the philosophy of mathematics—as originating from measuring the continuum and as being a multitude measured through some sort of mathematical unity. For number has to be thought through mathematically; once this has been done, there is no tremendous metaphysical difference between 500, the square root of minus one or transfinite numbers, though mathematically the differences are significant as they would also be in practical applications.

Those who read this translation of Frege's work will find much to interest them. The good summaries of the views of such men as Kant, Leibniz and Mill, on the nature of arithmetical propositions, on the nature of number, unity and the one, are worthy of special mention. Though there is no difficult symbolism to overcome, the author's thought and expression are occasionally forced; the reader, however, can undergo this latter discomfort in order to become acquainted with a work which helped pioneer the way for the current development of mathematics and logic.

The Philosophy of Mathematics. By EDWARD A. MAZIARZ. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950. Pp. 294, with index. \$4.00.

This book was originally written as a doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Ottawa by Fr. Maziarz of St. Joseph's College, Collegeville, Indiana. After an introduction, Part I comprising six chapters is devoted to "The History of the Philosophy of Mathematics," and the three chapters of Part II are under the general heading "The Philosophy of Mathematics." There are twenty-two pages of bibliography; the footnotes, however, come not at the bottom of the pages but at the chapter endings, and since each chapter contains close to a hundred such notes (and sometimes even more), the publishers have made it difficult for the reader who wishes to consult the footnotes while going through the material to which they refer.

Fr. Maziarz has provided an unusual service to philosophy in this present book. He has tapped an amazing number of sources, digested them, and marshalled his thoughts into a highly readable order. Mathematics or the second degree of abstraction has been one field almost wholly neglected by scholastics who in the recent past have usually confined their treatment of quantity to its ramifications in the mobile world studied by the philosophy of nature. In reasoning with Aristotle and Aquinas, Fr. Maziarz has not only developed a convincing philosophy of mathematics but has shown how his views are broad enough to embrace the conflicting theories about mathematics on the modern scene.

Fr. Maziarz follows to a great extent Geiger's interpretation of abstraction and makes discreet use of the Wyser edition of parts of St. Thomas's commentary on *De Trinitate Boethii*. It would have been valuable to consult Ross' commentaries on Aristotle, for example in connection with the problem of intelligible matter. For other problems treated in this book, Cajetan's commentary on *De Ente et Essentia*, especially the first part, and John of St. Thomas' treatment of quantity and number would likewise have been helpful.

But these suggestions would have made no important changes in the content of Fr. Maziarz' work. It can stand very definitely as the most important work on the philosophy of mathematics so far to appear in any language. It will be necessary for libraries, will be helpful to teachers, and will prove invaluable to all research workers who are attempting to build anew that hierarchy of the sciences which Cartesianism left in ruins.

The first and historical section of this work begins with Pythagoras and ends with contemporary thinkers like Russell and Maritain. But Descartes is ushered in too abruptly. In a work whose intentions were more dominantly historical than philosophical, attention should be paid to some of the late scholastics, using for example A. Maier's findings in regard to Nicholas d'Oresme. In the philosophical and constructive section of his

book, Fr. Maziarz examines the nature and distinction of the sciences, the nature of mathematical abstraction, and finally mathematical abstraction and contemporary mathematics.

He finds, unlike Russell, that mathematics is still the science of quantity and that it is still concerned about the problems which bothered Pythagoras. It is, Fr. Maziarz shows, more proper to call mathematics the science of quantified substance, quantity being defined as order of parts. In a true judgment within the second degree of abstraction, "the mind becomes conformable to quantified substance in mathematical science" (p. 205).

This book, dealing with a subject that is both intricate and profound, is deserving of unusual plaudits. It is hoped that Fr. Maziarz, having completed his general work in mathematics, will now turn his talents to detailed treatments of such timely questions as number-theory, the status of symbolic logic, and the evaluation of non-Euclidian geometries.

The Nature of Physical Reality. By HENRY MARGENAU. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950. Pp. 492, with index. \$6.50.

A professor of natural philosophy and physics at Yale University, Henry Margenau has for a long time been thinking and writing in the field of epistemology. This present volume, despite its title, deals more with method and knowledge-theory than with the nature of physical reality. It is a textbook written for philosophers and especially for physicists who reflect on the meaning of their work.

If Margenau's views have counterparts in the past, it is to the Kantian tradition that they belong. In the present work, he enlarges upon his much older belief that knowledge, especially physical knowledge, is constructive. From experience, the mind gathers "datal" elements, as Kant argued; constructs, though sometimes synonymous with concepts, are not derived in a direct manner from the experienced world and have "many of the qualities of an invention." To illustrate the construct, Margenau's own words may be invoked again: "Let us understand, then, that our designation, construct, is intended to assign to trees, electrons, ghosts, and devils merely their correct genetic status in experience; the character of being a construct does not alone provide an entity of thought with scientific importance."

Such importance comes to a construct when it is duly tested and becomes a "verifact" and testing implies the relating of the construct to the datal world by what F. S. C. Northrop, Margenau's colleague at Yale, has called "epistemic correlations." Margenau prefers to call them "rules of correspondence."

Within this framework, Margenau then goes on through the field of physics, especially quantum mechanics which he is perhaps inclined to

over-estimate to the neglect of relativity theory. Margenau does not believe the difference between quantum and classical physics to be as deep and as unbridgeable as other authors have stated, and he holds that physics remains a unified science despite the quantum revolution since 1900.

In the manner of Kant again, Margenau leaves room for an approach to the real beyond his own cherished discipline of physics. This meta-region belongs, he holds, to the philosophy of existence, and he shows great respect for existentialism in the casual references he makes to it.

Reasoning of this sort can be turned against Margenau. For this higher field of philosophy, whatever its nature, may discover principles that would control the meaning of physics and change the view of it which Margenau adopts. Such a metascience, for example, would have something to say about constructs, datal experience, and the rules of correspondence which join them.

Though the author's source material is impressive, he makes no reference to Maritain's *Degrees of Knowledge*. Margenau's idea of a "construct" should be compared to Maritain's view that modern physics is densely populated with *entia rationis cum fundamento in re*. Maritain thus brings back physics to the real world by emphasizing the realism at its foundations, whereas for Margenau the construct and the datal world are more like parallel lines across which lie rules of correspondence. A comparison of Maritain and Margenau does show, however, that this present work can be of unusual interest to Aristotelians.

Also in regard to sources, it should be singled out that Meyerson is mentioned only once, Bergson twice, and Boutroux not at all.

And Madly Teach. By MORTIMER SMITH. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. Pp. 107. \$2.00.

The Theory of Education in the United States. By ALBERT JAY NOCK. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. Pp. 153. \$2.25.

These are books of protest against the type of education to which children throughout the United States are being subjected. They are not concerned with the shortage of teachers, the overcrowding of schools, the lack of equipment, or the hundred other important accidentals that have loomed so large in recent discussions of the state of our educational system. In these two books there is a real attempt to get down to the essential problems of education.

Mortimer Smith's *And Madly Teach* is addressed directly to parents. The author insists on his amateur status; he happened once to serve as a member of a board of education. Sensing that something was wrong with the educational process, he made it his business to investigate the situation;

he went so far as to read the professionals. He presents the results of his efforts in the form of propositions that contain the guiding principles of so-called "progressive education." He is reasonably sympathetic with the motives that led to the educational revolution of such men as Dewey, Kilpatrick, and others of the same school of thought. However, he sees clearly enough that the "progressives" have gone too far. His criticism always remains sympathetic, frequently it is humorous, nevertheless it is thorough. Yet, only as criticism. This the author himself admits. However, his last chapter is entitled: "Schools Reflect the Spirit of the Times." There is the suggestion that reform of the schools depends upon reform of the spirit that animates society.

The author puts his finger on what constitutes the spirit of our times: "If there is unity in our discordant world of today it consists in a devotion to this socialistic principle; there may be violent disagreements over details of the blueprint for the new world, but there is a general and widespread feeling that such a world can only be realized by narrowing the areas of individual freedom and enlarging the areas over which the authority of the social whole is supreme" (p. 87). The remedy, as the author sees it, is a balancing emphasis on the importance of the individual. "The importance and the unique value of the individual, which is an idea inherited from the teachings of Christ and Christian theology, has always been a cornerstone of modern western thought."

And Madly Teach is a hopeful book, although the author does not clarify the grounds of his hopefulness. Perhaps he feels that if enough parents are led to realize what their children are being deprived of, they may demand a return to traditional principles, if not to traditional practices.

Nock's book, on the other hand, is a despairing book. "Things being as they are, one's natural desire is to see what can be done about them. Frankly, I do not see that anything can be done about them" (p. 183). Why then talk or write about them? "Yet notwithstanding this rather barren prospect for our discussion, one thing may perhaps redeem it from absolute sterility; which is that we are presumably always better off for knowing just where we are, and for being able to identify and measure the forces which are at play upon us" (p. 19).

The content of the book was first presented as a series of lectures at the University of Virginia in 1932. They appeared in print the following year. In both guises they were not received sympathetically. The reason for this may be gathered from the following quotation, in which Nock sketches Thomas Jefferson's scheme of education in illustration of his own thesis: "In outline, Mr. Jefferson's plan was this: Every child in the State should be taught reading, writing and common arithmetic; the old-fashioned primary school course in the three R's. Each year the best pupil in each primary school should be sent to the grammar schools, of which there were to be twenty, conveniently located in various parts of the State; they

were to be kept there one or two years, and then dismissed, except 'the best genius of the whole,' who should be continued there for the full term of six years. 'By this means,' wrote Mr. Jefferson, 'twenty of the best geniuses shall be raked from the rubbish annually.' I venture to call your attention to these rather forceful words, as showing how far this great believer in equality was from anything like acceptance of our official assumption that everybody is educable. At the end of six years the best ten out of the twenty should be sent to William and Mary College" (p. 45).

Now after 17 years, the book is once more presented to the public, but in such a way that one wonders why the publishers ever bothered. For they have shielded it with an Introduction by Nock's son, who carefully denies the fundamental principles of his father's book.

Albert Jay Nock courageously held that not every man is educable; and he had a definite idea of what he meant by "educable." "The educable person, in contrast to the ineducable, is one who gives promise of some day being able to think; and the object of educating him, of subjecting him to the Great Tradition's discipline, is to put him in the way of right thinking, clear thinking, mature and profound thinking" (p. 123). To this the son replies: "A. J. N. did not take into consideration—did not know—that the development of scientific method is one great advance over the literary Great Tradition. . . . It is a peculiarly unfortunate incomprehension, too, because scientific method is one of the shrewdest means ever devised for doing just what A. J. N. insisted is the function of the intelligent man: seeing things as they are" (p. 11). We wonder where is the incomprehension? That anyone could write those last words in the year 1949 is sufficient evidence of the truth of Nock's thesis. Have we not had abundant proof of the moral and intellectual immaturity that can be found in those who have been subjected to the scientific method?

This does not mean that Nock's theory can be accepted without criticism. His Great Tradition is that of Greek and Latin literature—the liberal arts. While they are excellent instruments for the development of intelligence, they are not the whole of western tradition; there is the invaluable contribution of the religion of Christ. Even within the Christian tradition there is a confirmation of the thesis defended by Nock; there is the admitted distinction between the contemplative and the active life and the recognition that some men are more apt for contemplation, others for action. It is also true that there is a tension between the two groups and a tinge of mutual disdain; yet both make great contributions to the good of the whole.

The Renaissance. By GEORGE CLARKE SELLERY. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950. Pp. 296, with index. \$3.75.

"The Revival of Learning or, to phrase the matter more inclusively, the revived knowledge of antiquity, cannot have been the creative force which ushered in modernity. The real seminal force was the natural effort of men to achieve a more abundant life on this earth by applying their wits to problems that required and admitted of solution." With these words, George Clarke Sellery, a retired professor of history, takes his stand upon a much mooted question, and indeed, the stand he takes is a most reasonable one.

Professor Sellery gives due consideration to the weighty (and predominant) opinion that is the opposite of his own and finds the evidence insufficient to support it. He is convinced that the transition from the middle ages to the modern was under way long before the revival of classical humanism, and would have come about had there been no such revival. He studies the question as it is exposed in the literature of the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, in the writings of such varied exponents and developers of medieval thought as Aquinas, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Machiavelli, Marsilius of Padua, Villon, Chaucer, Froissart, Pecoek, and a number of others—none of them a classical humanist, each of them a contributor to, and a shaper of, modern western thought and civilization.

The book is well written, instructive, and easy to read; the author endeavors to conceal rather than display the erudite background from which his materials were drawn. Yet the reader, or, at least, this particular reader, is left with a feeling that the picture drawn is out of proportion and incomplete. This, we believe, is caused by the author's inability to evaluate the contribution of the Church. We think we may epitomize our objection to the book by stating that we still consider the *De Regimine Principum* of Saint Thomas Aquinas superior to, and far more logical than, the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua; Professor Sellery does not. We do not consider the political system propagated by Marsilius to be superior merely because it prevails today; Professor Sellery evidently does. Nor do we consider the fact of its success a proof that Marsilius "ranks as one of the great thinkers of mankind." Moreover, we fail to understand how one can logically praise Marsilius and condemn Machiavelli when both proceed from the same premise, namely, the supremacy of the state in all things. We could never see, however, any radical difference between Communism and Nazism since both uphold the same principle. Obviously, then, we could never see the Middle Ages or the Renaissance through the eyes of George Clarke Sellery.

Mr. Sellery makes several errors regarding scholasticism. He completely misunderstands the *credo ut intelligam* of St. Anselm and he makes Augustinian illuminism a problem of St. Thomas' time. As for the inept repeti-

tion of the hackneyed witticism concerning the roles played by faith and reason in the Thomistic system, it would be futile here to seek to clarify them to a man who apparently knows little about either. Incidentally, St. Thomas did not have to wait until the time of Leo XIII to be accepted by the Church, as the learned author states. He was made *Doctor Ecclesiae* by Pius V and that, we believe, is considered in the best circles as acceptance. As a final note, it might be mentioned that there is evidence of careless proof reading on pages 171 and 238.

War and Civilization. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. 172. \$2.50.

The ineluctable connection between war and civilization, Arnold Toynbee tells us, must be understood if we are to avoid present or future repetition of past errors. The nature of the link between these two seemingly disparate institutions was examined by the renowned British historian in his monumental—but still incomplete—six-volume *Study of History*. From that study, portions concerned with the twin themes of the new title have been culled and collated by Albert Vann Fowler, who, with the permission of the author, presents this new volume.

Toynbee has been treated in this piece-meal fashion before, and perhaps he will be again. His long work was, two or three years ago, abridged and popularized into the compass of one volume. His lectures, as they have appeared separately, have driven insistently at the point of the arguments he advanced in his *Study*. It might well be concluded, in fact, that Toynbee need never add a syllable to what he has written; it is susceptible as it stands of being endlessly re-written, condensed, abridged, edited, compiled, anthologized, extended and revised.

Such a remark may seem unjust to a writer with such a well-deserved reputation for scholarship, erudition, urbanity and authority. Yet it may not be disrespectful nor presumptuous to suggest that Toynbee is badly served by editors and compilers like Somervell and Fowler. His thought is good, and it may be great; it is, in any event and in every eventuality, arresting. But it is not omniscient, any more than its author is omniscient, and there can be few possibilities more saddening to the serious worker in history than to see the systematic exploitation and unnecessary popularization of a talent too prematurely labelled as genius.

Further strictures might be made concerning the value of any process of editing which throws into such high relief the defects of Toynbee's style. An excessive use of capitalization reminds one forcibly and unflatteringly of Carlyle; language chosen from a profound knowledge of classical literature is reminiscent of the first experience with any pedant. Facts pour forth in a profusion not merely bewildering but truly engulfing.

Arguments succeed each other phrase by phrase, with interruptions chiefly in the form of annoying—and inconsistent—uses of such Latinisms as *regnabat* and *nitebantur*, where other writers would content themselves with merely affixing the dates to a king's reign.

These faults were all present in the original *Study*, of course, but there the scope and sweep of the effort tended to reduce them to minor, almost invisible, flaws. This volume brings them into glaring evidence, and, as it does so, indicates that Toynbee's previous editors and proof-readers have been peculiarly inconsistent. Probably the matter of capitalization proves this inconsistency most cogently. In some cases, even such nouns as desert and town are written large. The last phrase, by the way, would have been placed in quotation marks if it had occurred anywhere in Toynbee; one is reminded of a small-town newspaper's reporting of the nicknames at a basketball banquet when one sees the plethora of quotation marks used throughout a chapter or a set of passages. Once Lycurgus has been described, for example, as a generic name for a series of Spartan leaders, it should be unnecessary to refer to him and his code as "Lycurgus" and "Lycurgean" respectively.

One more protest should be lodged—this time against Toynbee himself, and not against his editors. Only once, on page 149, does he make a near-apology for a comparison between Christ and world-saviours of strictly human origin. Yet one of the most monotonously recurring features of his writing is the number of figures and texts drawn from Sacred Scripture. The Old and New Testaments alike are rifled for contributions of particularly vivid similes and metaphors. Such usages may be sincere and reverent, but it is difficult to believe that every event in history, every important actor, has no other reason for existing in Toynbee's pages than to allow for the introduction of some Biblical counterpart. Usages of this kind occur rather frequently in this small volume; they are regularly repeated, almost page-by-page from the larger *Study*. No reason is ever given for this heavy reliance upon the Bible, and one would be forced to go back to Bunyan, behind Carlyle, to discover Toynbee's prototype—surely an odd one for a serious student of history.

The argument of the book may be summarized much more briefly than its faults: history indicates that civilization takes place in a three-act dramatic form. The second act is, in each civilization, a Time of Troubles, out of which the old civilization emerges, refurbished, to begin a new life, or disappears to give place to a new civilization. This, in turn, furnishes the first act for a new drama. But the wars which have brought Times of Troubles to climaxes have become steadily more devastating and destructive, so that man should now recognize the dangers of falling into militarism, and thus lessen or mitigate the evils of war. Civilization can then survive.

Two questions should illustrate the difficulty with such a solution. If

this thinly-veiled Hegelian thesis is accepted, how is man to know when he must avoid militarism, and when he must practice the military virtues? More fundamental is the other question: can Toynbee's thesis be accepted, especially if the obviously linear movement of biblically recorded history is meaningful? This is a matter which admits of so much argument that Toynbee himself, as well as his editors, should devote more time to elaborating and testing it than to allowing it to be half-presented, as it is in the present volume.

Bibliographische Einführungen in das Studium der Philosophie. Edited by I. M. BOCHENSKI. Bern: A. Francke, 1948. Vol. I, *Allgemeine Philosophische Bibliographie*, by I. M. BOCHENSKI and F. MONTELEONE. Pp. 42, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. II, *Amerikanische Philosophie*, by RALPH B. WINN. Pp. 32, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. III, *Symbolische Logik und Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften*, by E. W. BETH. Pp. 28, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. IV, *Kierkegaard*, by RÉGIS JOLIVET. Pp. 33, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. V, *Antike Philosophie*, by OLOF GIGON. Pp. 52, s. fr. 3.80. Vol. VI, *Arabische Philosophie*, by J. DE MENASCE. Pp. 49, s. fr. 3.80. Vol. VII, *Italienische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, by MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA. Pp. 36, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. VIII, *Aristoteles*, by M.-D. PHILIPPE. Pp. 48, s. fr. 3.80. Vol. IX, *Französische Existenzphilosophie*, by RÉGIS JOLIVET. Pp. 36, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. X, *Augustinus*, by MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA. Pp. 32, s. fr. 2.80. Vol. XI, *Der logische Positivismus*, by KARL DÜRR. Pp. 24, s. fr. 2.80.

These small books constitute the first eleven volumes of a proposed twenty-volume set. Fr. Bochenski, who has already distinguished himself in the field of logic, the history of logic, and the history of contemporary philosophy, states in the introduction to the first volume that none of the books aims at completion but seeks only to orient students toward the core of each subject considered after which they can expect to go on for themselves.

Each book is amply subdivided by topic or by some other standard. All works mentioned in the bibliographies are numbered within a system that permits easy cross-references.

The plea that all the books are incomplete and for beginners might seem to put the selection of literature made by the various contributors beyond the pale of criticism. However, though all the books are extremely worthwhile, they are of uneven merit, and some of the omissions concern matters essential to the subject being considered. Thus, in Volume II, Prof. Winn omits reference to Riley's history and to the symposia of the

neorealists and critical realists. Also, a much more representative work than *Problems of Men* could have been suggested as a sampling of Dewey. In Volume VIII, Ross' *Aristotle* is listed in its 1923 edition; Ross has revised this edition. Volume VII makes no mention of Cornelio Fabro, a fine scholar who has contributed to the understanding both of St. Thomas and of modern thought.

In the volumes to come, numbers XIII and XIV, edited by P. Wyser, are to concern Thomism; F. van Steenberghe will do the philosophy of the Middle Ages in Volume XVII.

The multiplication of books and journals in the twentieth century, which as Emile Bréhier recently stated, gives every man a chance to state a personal opinion in print makes it difficult for teachers and students and research scholars to get abreast and stay abreast in philosophy and sometimes in even a limited field of the subject. For this reason, and as a starting point toward a better bibliography of bibliographies in philosophy, the present series is extremely welcome and will make an invaluable addition to the library of every philosopher.

The editor, Fr. Bochenski, emphasizing the tentative and incipient character of the present books, invites readers to send him their criticisms and suggestions.

Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 1456. \$18.50.

It is undoubtedly desirable that the Western World, including America, possess a better knowledge of all facts concerning Eastern Europe or all the countries considered in the present volume as "Slavonic." The definition is based on the boundaries as they exist today; a man born within these boundaries is viewed as belonging to one of the Slavonic states, whatever his origin or the political allegiance of his home at his time may have been. One may question the advisability of such a principle of selection; but once it is accepted, it ought to be applied consistently. Some names are missing which one expects to find; among these the poet R. M. Rilke (although his name is mentioned in an article on Kafka as that of the greatest "Czech" poet writing in German), the famous student of heredity, P. Gregor Mendel, St. Adalbert of Gniezko. Some names occur only incidentally, the importance of the men notwithstanding. The Russian composer Borodin is mentioned in a general article, but the only Borodin receiving separate treatment is a Russian political agent in the Far East. The famous Russian-born linguist of Vienna, Troubetzkoi, is not mentioned, though he is the founder of new branch in linguistics (phonology); neither is his namesake, the sculptor, treated. Some inaccuracies occur; auscultation is not an invention of the physician Dietl, who taught at

Vienna, but had been discovered many years before by the Frenchman Laënnec.

There are 14 pages on philosophy, apart from a few articles dealing with individual figures. Here one is amazed to find the name of Bolzano mentioned only in passing as the teacher of a rather insignificant man; Bolzano is easily the most influential and most original thinker within the Czech territory during the early nineteenth century. Another name missing is that of E. Husserl, who was born in Moravia. The general article has little to say on the particular philosophies of the men mentioned; one is told only about their general attitude (Hegelian, materialistic, and so on). The section on Russian philosophy comprises not quite one page dealing with pre-Soviet philosophy, and more than five on contemporary Russian thought, the larger part being devoted to economic thought. The rather meager report is supplemented by remarks to be found under headings like sociology or historiography, and in some individual articles. On the whole, one will still learn more of Slavonic philosophy from the five volumes of Überweg-Heinze than from this Encyclopedia.

The work may be very helpful to the student of other fields, although here, too, the absence of all bibliographical references will prove a serious defect.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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